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1. Introduction: Postcolonial Studies After Foucault 
 
In 2007, data from the ISI Web of Science singled out Michel Foucault as the most cited author in 
the humanities. Whether in Literature, History, Anthropology, or almost any other discipline in 
the Humanities, the name of Foucault at times appears ubiquitous – a situation that is unlikely to 
change soon, given the continued generation of posthumous publications.1 The relatively 
younger field of Postcolonial Studies forms no exception in this regard: champions and critics of 
Foucault alike have argued that his work has played a seminal role in the production of analyses 
of (de)colonization. Ann Laura Stoler has claimed that ‘no single analytic framework has 
saturated the field of colonial studies so completely over the last decade as that of Foucault’ 
(1995: 1). Similarly, Timothy Brennan has argued that ‘the greatest influence, theoretically 
speaking, on the postcolonial tendency of the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s has been that of 
Foucault’ (2006: 103). It is this effect of Foucault’s work on Postcolonial Studies that forms the 
subject of this study.  
 In contrast to the starting points Stoler and Brennan imply, a more logical place to begin 
this analysis would be Edward Said’s Orientalism, published as early as 1978. Orientalism was not 
only the first attempt to bring the work of Foucault to bear on processes of colonization, it was 
also one of the first major texts to take Foucault’s work seriously and to render it visible in the 
Anglophone world. That should alert us to the fact that it is not just that Foucault’s ‘influence’ 
saturates the humanities, including Postcolonial Studies; rather, one may argue that Postcolonial 
Studies has actively contributed to the popularity of Foucault’s work. Breaking free of a model 
that posits Postcolonial Studies as a passive recipient of ‘saturation’ or ‘influence,’ the present 
study hopes to do justice to the intricate interrelations between Foucault and Postcolonial 
Studies.  
By focusing on the concepts of ‘discourse,’ ‘discipline,’ ‘biopower,’ and ‘governmentality,’ 
the following chapters will analyze how and why postcolonial scholars have appropriated and 
transformed a Foucauldian vocabulary in their efforts to conceptualize colonialism. These four 
concepts are not only central to Foucault’s work, they have also played an important role in the 
work of some key figures in postcolonial studies. It is this role we need to understand in order to 
make sense of the postcolonial interest in Foucault.  
                                                 
1
 Starting with Society Must Be Defended in 2003, eight of the lecture series Foucault delivered yearly at 
the Collège de France have now been translated and published in English. The earliest lectures, from 1970 
to 1973, have not been translated yet.  
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In seeking to analyze the interrelations between Foucault’s work and Postcolonial Studies, the 
focus of this undertaking lies not so much on the interrelations per se, as on the consequences of 
these interrelations for our understanding of Postcolonial Studies. However, if this description 
suggests a field called ‘Postcolonial Studies’ as a solid setting for this project, this impression is 
false. In fact, a closer look at the opening paragraphs of this text already reveals the difficulty in 
locating the referent of ‘Postcolonial Studies.’ Even though Orientalism never makes use of the 
term ‘postcolonial,’ it is not uncommon to consider Said’s publication as the constitutive event of 
Postcolonial Studies.2 Another star of Postcolonial Studies, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, even 
explicitly criticizes the label, only to be subsumed under it after all.3 The question of who is in and 
who is out of Postcolonial Studies is, from the outset, a fraught one. Timothy Brennan has 
observed that 
 
In spite of being clearly marked (if not segregated) within individual academic 
departments, postcolonial studies is a porous entity rather than a discrete field. It arose 
in the form of a political metaphorics rather than a bordered space, either "field" or 
"discipline". In disciplines like history and anthropology, postcolonial studies came into 
being under other names and without any claim to being a distinct subspecialty or field, 
as it did in English departments. (quoted in Loomba et al. 2005: 3) 
 
Thus, it is not only that certain texts have been considered part of Postcolonial Studies although 
they reject the label and its implications, but also that there are texts that do not contain such a 
rejection, and yet are not considered part of Postcolonial Studies in spite of their thematic 
similarities. The point for the current project is not so much to engage in a delimitation of the 
field, but rather to emphasize the artificiality of attempts to delineate this field and to lay bare 
the unstable locus from which it speaks. 
Unfortunately, the term ‘postcolonialism’ is not a viable alternative: although its 
grammatical singularity suggests an identifiable and relatively coherent politics, the diversity of 
material and ideas subsumed under the category of postcolonialism hardly warrants such use. 
                                                 
2
 See e.g. Sharpe 2000: 112; Schwarz 2000: 11.  
3
 See Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1999. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Cambridge: Harvard UP. In the 
opening paragraph of the preface, Spivak warns that ‘a certain postcolonial subject’ has been 
‘appropriating the Native Informant’s position’ (ix), hinting at the privileged position postcolonial 
academics enjoy, as well as the structure that produces this privilege.   
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The label ‘postcolonial theory,’ laying aside the fact that the texts under consideration are hardly 
ever purely theoretical, contains the same unwarranted suggestion of a singular theoretical 
framework. Poststructuralist, Marxist, and psychoanalytical elements have all played a role at 
some point and appear in different combinations in different texts. 
However, significant though this diversity may be, one should not overstate the ruptures 
and fault lines either. There is no denying that in its material production, ‘Postcolonial Studies’ 
exists as an interlinking ensemble of texts, generating in the process not only a plethora of 
introductions to the subject, but also a certain canon of hallmark texts. In order to mark this 
ambiguity between on the one hand a theoretical, methodological and political plurality, and a 
relatively established set of texts on the other hand, this study will henceforth use the non-
capitalized term ‘postcolonial studies,’ to denote quite literally studies that are ‘postcolonial.’ The 
term thus combines the suggestion of a discrete field called ‘Postcolonial Studies’ with the 
grammatical plurality of postcolonial studies.  
 Having recast ‘Postcolonial Studies’ as postcolonial studies, the task at hand is to 
determine the meaning of the adjective ‘postcolonial.’ In keeping with Elleke Boehmer, the non-
hyphenated form will be used in a non-chronological sense, to denote studies that ‘critically or 
subversively scrutinize [...] the colonial relationship’ (2005: 3). Although Boehmer focuses on 
literature, her formulation of the postcolonial as ‘symbolic overhaul, a reshaping of dominant 
meaning’ (3) is equally apt for a characterization of postcolonial studies as a set of scholarly texts. 
The point of postcolonial studies as a problem-space is not so much to provide the correct 
account of what colonialism is and was, but to focus on the categories that made possible such a 
supposedly neutral account in the first place. In that sense, postcolonial scholarly texts share 
with postcolonial literature the task of scrutinizing the categories and concepts that structure 
ways of thinking and acting.  
 Thus, if the present study aims to focus on – and contribute to – what it calls 
‘postcolonial studies,’ this simply means that it deals with scholarly critiques of colonialism which 
aim to scrutinize the colonial relationship. In this respect, postcolonial studies is comprised of 
texts from various disciplines, as well as profoundly interdisciplinary work. It also encompasses 
various substrands, such as the work of the Subaltern Studies collective, colonial discourse 
analysis, and postcolonial literary criticism and theory. In its minimalism, this revised notion of 
postcolonial studies is more attuned to the complexity of converging and diverging texts, 
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frameworks, and disciplines than conceptions that attempt to delimit an artificial field. It thus not 
only problematizes the field from which it speaks, but also provides a more secure starting point.  
 
As Stoler and Brennan’s comments indicate, the number of postcolonial studies drawing on the 
work of Foucault has rapidly increased since the publication of Orientalism, leading to a veritable 
boom in the 80s and 90s.  Speaking about the 90s, Neil Lazarus has argued that ‘it is Foucault's 
name that one is likely to see cited talismanically in postcolonial criticism these days’ (1999: 11, 
emphasis in original). And yet, that such an intensive engagement should have taken place is by 
no means natural. Robert Young has concluded that ‘Foucault's work displays a virtual absence of 
explicit discussions of colonialism or race’ (2001: 395). Although this claim needs to be revised in 
light of the recent publications of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France, in which race 
appears as a category of analysis, it remains indisputable that discussions of colonialism hardly 
ever figure in Foucault’s work.  
 For some, this absence is indicative of a larger problem. Ania Loomba, author of the 
authoritative introduction Colonialism/Postcolonialism, asserts that ‘Foucault’s own theories are 
Euro-centric in their focus, and of limited use in understanding colonial societies’ (2005: 49). That 
may be true of Foucault’s work as such, but it is exactly in this ‘use’ that the flexibility of theory 
and the potential to negotiate can be found. In other words, what Loomba offers is a postcolonial 
assessment of Foucault’s work, but it is not an assessment of the potential effects Foucault’s 
work may have had on postcolonial studies.  
 At the time of writing, such an assessment turns out to be hard to find. Certainly, a great 
deal has been written about Edward Said’s appropriation of Foucauldian ideas, the gist of which 
is often that Orientalism is either not Foucauldian enough, or too Foucauldian.4 Even if one 
managed to strip these critiques of their normative implications, the problem remains that Said’s 
work, seminal though it may be, represents only one part of postcolonial studies.  
One of the few commentators to look at the relations between Foucault’s work and 
postcolonial studies beyond the work of Said has been Robert Young, who devotes a chapter of 
his authoritative Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (2001) to Foucault. Young argues that 
the key to many postcolonial theoretical problems lies in Foucault’s The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, a book that ‘has never been seriously considered by postcolonial theorists’ (394). 
Convincing though this argument may be, it ultimately rehashes the old suspicion that 
                                                 
4
 These comments will be looked at in more detail in section 3.1. 
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postcolonial readings of Foucault’s body of work are theoretically incomplete or unsound. Not 
only is this presupposition of a ‘correct’ Foucault highly problematic, it also renders postcolonial 
studies subordinate to Foucauldian ideas. Moreover, it focuses exclusively on the concept of 
discourse – Foucault’s later work falls outside the scope of Young’s chapter. Similarly, Robert 
Nichols’s essay “Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault” (2010), in spite of its claim to 
provide a ‘survey of the use and interpretation of Foucault’s work in the field of postcolonial 
studies’ (111), also focuses on discourse only. Moreover, it fails to look beyond the postcolonial 
Holy Trinity of Said, Spivak, and Bhabha.  
However, this is not to say that postcolonial studies has been entirely unreflexive about 
its relationship to Foucault’s work – to the contrary, the following chapters will demonstrate that 
almost every single postcolonial study that draws on the work of Foucault has reflected on the 
manner in which it departs from Foucault’s thought. Rather, what remains generally unclear is 
the question of whether these reflections connect, whether they form specific patterns, and, if 
they do, what these patterns and connections tell us about the interrelations between Foucault 
and postcolonial studies as such.  
 
Surprising though this relative silence about Foucault’s role in postcolonial studies may be, it is 
perhaps not entirely incidental. The task of relating postcolonial studies to Foucault is 
complicated from the start by the fact that Foucault’s work does not provide a single, stable 
theoretical framework. Rather than cover up this fact by positing parts of Foucault’s work as the 
whole, as Robert Nichols’ survey attempts, this project accepts as a basic premise that the work 
of Foucault itself does not necessarily provide a fixed and identifiable starting point. Rather, it 
aims to be open to the possibility that the name of the author unifies a discontinuous set of texts 
– not so much because Foucault advocates such a position in The Archaeology of Knowledge and 
the current project supports this anti-subjectivist approach, but for the much more basic reason 
that a single glance at his work reveals that there are significant differences between his 
individual texts. Although this stance seems to run counter to Mark Kelly’s claim, developed in 
The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (2009), that Foucault produces a more or less 
coherent political philosophy (3), this is not necessarily so. Neither does this stance necessarily 
side with Foucault 2.0 (2006), in which Paras emphasizes the incoherencies in Foucault’s oeuvre. 
As Kelly’s own sympathetic assessment of Foucault 2.0 demonstrates (3), the question of 
whether one emphasizes either continuity or discontinuity is mainly one of perspective. The 
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perspective here should be clear by now: we need to keep open the possibility that different 
postcolonial studies draw on different ‘Foucaults.’ 
 Foucault himself, in an uncharacteristic move, has provided a narrative that defends the 
continuity of his oeuvre. In an essay called “The Subject and Power,” he retrospectively organized 
his trajectory around the subject, asserting that ‘[his] objective [...] has been to create a history 
of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault 2002: 
326).  In this history, Foucault focuses on three modes of objectification that produce subjects. In 
his early work, he discusses the objectifying effects of science, moving on later to what he terms 
‘dividing practices’: categories such as madness or criminality divide the subject internally or 
externally. The final mode of objectification comes to the fore in his later work, where Foucault 
illustrates through an analysis of sexuality how human beings turn themselves into subjects. 
Certainly, this is a narrative that has gained currency, but one must not forget that Foucault may 
have had a stake in salvaging his earlier work.  
 Rather than buy into these narrativizations that obfuscate the cracks, frictions and 
ruptures in intellectual production, this project aims to break them down to the atomic level. It is 
the central premise of this endeavour that in order to understand the interrelations between 
Foucault’s work and postcolonial studies, it is imperative to break down oeuvres, texts, and 
frameworks to the level of concepts. It is in Foucault’s use of a number of concepts that one 
notices minor variations and changes in focus. As Stoler has put it, the components of his 
analyses ‘appear with different conceptual weight in different projects and with a function that is 
never quite the same’ (1995: xi). By focusing on these conceptual variations and relations, this 
project hopes to do justice to the complex conceptual activity Stoler describes.  
 Moreover, concepts are not only subject to change within Foucault’s oeuvre, but also 
when they travel to different contexts. Much in the spirit of Mieke Bal’s Travelling Concepts, an 
emphasis on the interrelations between Foucault and postcolonial studies must inevitably 
acknowledge that 
 
concepts are not fixed. They travel - between disciplines, between individual scholars, 
between historical periods, and between geographically dispersed academic 
communities. Between disciplines, their meaning, reach, and operational value differ. 
These processes of differing need to be assessed before, during, and after each 'trip'. 
(2002: 24) 
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In short: when a concept travels, it changes. The next chapter will deal at greater length with 
some of the implications of this deceptively obvious statement; for now, what matters is that it is 
not so much theories that travel, as Edward Said would have it (1983: 226-47), but concepts. This 
is especially salient in the context of postcolonial studies, where scholars have been ‘drawing on 
the conceptual apparatus more than engaging the historical content of [Foucault’s] analysis’ 
(Stoler 1995: 2). Thus, it seems fair to assume that there will not only be variations in Foucault’s 
use of concepts, but also in the postcolonial studies that adopt them.  
 The task of attending to these variations becomes all the more urgent considering the 
role of concepts in Foucault’s work. As Kelly rightly points out, ‘Foucault's conceptual activity is 
about trying to invent new ways of thinking precisely as opposed to discovering deep truths’ 
(2009: 130, emphasis in original). Indeed, it is the conceptual apparatus that governs forms of 
analysis and critique and enables scholars to think in ways hitherto unavailable, foreclosing at the 
same time other pathways.   
 
Having redefined Postcolonial Studies as postcolonial studies, and Foucault’s theoretical 
framework as a potentially fluid set of relations between certain concepts, we can now 
understand the highly specific movement that forms the object of this study as a 
recontextualization of Foucauldian concepts5 into postcolonial studies. It focuses on the 
appearance of concepts in postcolonial studies that had been developed or redefined in one or 
more of Foucault’s texts.  
 This explains the first meaning of the preposition ‘after’ in Postcolonial Studies after 
Foucault: it suggests that Foucault’s work has served as a model for certain postcolonial studies. 
Indeed, many of the postcolonial texts discussed in the chapters to come explicitly acknowledge 
Foucault as a source of inspiration, whose work makes visible things that we would not see if it 
were not for him, and whose scholarship deserves to be emulated. And yet, it is not the 
mystifying categories of inspiration and influence that form the focus here – this study aims to 
steer clear of psychologistic explanations altogether. Rather, the crux of the matter is a focus on 
structural similarities in the meaning, function, and effects of concepts and their interrelations. It 
is this combination of explicit references to Foucault with one or more structural similarities, 
rather than influence, that justifies the preposition ‘after.’  
                                                 
5
 Needless to say, the phrase ‘Foucauldian concepts’ should not be understood as implying ownership or 
monopoly. It merely serves as shorthand for ‘concepts Foucault often used.’ 
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 But 'after,' in its temporal sense, can also be used to signal a break. This second meaning 
is equally appropriate, given that postcolonial studies never merely apply a Foucauldian model. 
Rather, they tend to voice explicit concerns about elements in Foucault's work they hold to be 
problematic. The task at hand, then, is to detect whether these explicit disagreements form 
patterns, whether they are of a conceptual nature, and whether and how they may be remedied. 
Besides these explicit concerns, there are also other forms of discontinuity that are at the same 
time more basic and more compelling. Regardless of whether a postcolonial study frames itself as 
a Foucauldian study proper or as a more critical engagement with Foucault's work, the simple 
fact that certain concepts have been recontextualized implies an inescapable discontinuity. There 
can be no doubt that concepts designed to provide a diagnosis of psychiatric power, the penal 
system, or the apparatus of sexuality are subject to significant change when they are made to 
operate in an analysis of colonial relations. These changes can take place at the level of meaning, 
when a definition of a concept is altered, but they can also appear in the work a concept 
performs, and in its relation to other concepts. Throughout the next chapters, the extent and the 
significance of these changes will become evident; for now, the assertion to remember is that 
when a concept is being recontextualized from Foucault's work into postcolonial studies, it 
changes.  
 Here again, the formulation is deliberately ambiguous: to say that a concept changes 
does not only refer to the fact that the meaning or function of a concept changes in the process 
of recontextualization, but it can also be read as an elliptical transitive construction: the changed 
concept changes something else. As a central unit for scholarly activity, it governs ways of 
thinking and determines which elements come into focus and which ones are left out. In 
anticipation of a more precise definition in the next chapter, one could say that the concept, in 
the process of recontextualization, radically affects its destination context. Thus, Foucauldian 
concepts do not merely travel to postcolonial studies, they actively reshape them.  
 At bottom, this process of change amounts to a mutual transformation of concepts and 
contexts. It leads directly to the central question of how this process of mutual transformation 
configures the relationship between certain Foucauldian concepts and postcolonial studies. The 
next chapters will attempt to analyze this process of transformation in four concepts in 
particular: discourse, discipline, biopower, and governmentality. Obviously, this choice involves a 
selection: it would have been possible to focus on the concepts of the subject, space, power, 
knowledge, and many others – all of which will appear at a later point. And yet, the discussions in 
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the chapters to come will demonstrate that this decision is not altogether arbitrary: the concepts 
of discourse, discipline, biopower, and governmentality have been picked up and critiqued by 
postcolonial studies as concepts, viz. as tools for scholarly activity that need to be defined and 
redefined rather than as signifiers whose meaning is taken for granted. Moreover, they have 
often been at the center of conceptual clusters, constituting the linchpin of conceptual activity, 
both in Foucault's texts as well as in the postcolonial studies on which this project focuses. Given 
this centrality in conceptual configurations, evidenced in the next chapters, it seems fair to 
accord to them the same central role in an analysis of the interrelations between Foucault and 
postcolonial studies.  
  
By focusing on the recontextualization of Foucauldian concepts into postcolonial studies, this 
study hopes to fulfil three principal aims. The first two of these aims correspond to the two ways 
in which we have understood the earlier claim that 'concepts change,' the third is situated at an 
altogether different level and relates to the recontextualization of concepts in a more general 
way. 
 First of all, a focus on the changes concepts undergo in the recontextualization from 
Foucault's work into postcolonial studies will make it possible to highlight the ways in which 
postcolonial scholars have needed to go beyond Foucault in order to analyze colonial relations. 
The postcolonial contributions discussed in the following chapters implicitly and explicitly point 
to blindspots in Foucault's work, to remnants of Eurocentrism, internal contradictions, historical 
inaccuracies and conceptual problems. In their attempts to work, at least in part, with 
Foucauldian terminology, their critical approach often provides a more informed critique of 
Foucault's work than a wholesale dismissal would. Moreover, many of these postcolonial studies, 
in their so-called 'applications,' actually contain the remedy for the problems they diagnose. 
Thus, bringing together this set of postcolonial studies not only provides us with a set of texts in 
which certain patterns of criticism of Foucault's work may be traced, it also contains guidelines 
for the production of archaeologies and genealogies more in tune with the complexities of the 
colonial past and present.  
 Second, an emphasis on the changes concepts effect in their new context can reveal the 
implications of postcolonial engagements with Foucault for postcolonial thinking at large. Each of 
the four concepts considered here directs our attention towards particular phenomena and away 
from others – that much is clear. However, what is generally less clear is the question of whether 
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and how these concepts, as well as the results they generate, relate to each other, theoretically, 
methodologically, or politically. Even in the individual chapters, the point will therefore be to find 
out whether the continuities and discontinuities between the work different concepts perform 
link up to form a larger pattern. In other words, the purpose is to find out whether there has 
been something in postcolonial studies like a 'Foucault effect': a specific focus and approach 
related to Foucault’s work. If there has been, it is high time to identify it. Rather than taking 
Stoler’s 'single analytical framework' for granted (1995: 1), we need to ask throughout the 
individual chapters and concepts whether they really constitute a single Foucauldian framework, 
and if they do, what the effect of its transformation in postcolonial studies might be for analyses 
of colonial relations.  
 Third, taking a step back from the specifics of the relationship between Foucault's 
concepts and postcolonial studies, the present endeavour can be read as a series of case studies 
on the recontextualization of concepts. Not only does it present concrete examples of concepts 
that vacillate in their meanings, functions, and effects, it also discusses cases where these minor 
conceptual variations may have a large impact on the context that appropriates them. But these 
case studies do not only illustrate the process of recontextualization; taken together, they may 
also provide sufficient material to rethink the relationship between concepts and theoretical 
frameworks – not in a technical sense, but in the priority we accord to them. In this as well as in 
other contexts, it may be helpful to consider the possibility that theoretical paradigms do not 
have the durability our attention to them suggests. Similarly, the relationship between models 
and applications may need to be reconsidered. Here again, one cannot take for granted that 
frameworks and concepts are simply being applied in other contexts; rather, the so-called 
application is always already a transformation. And even this formulation may sound too 
harmonious, given that this transformation is not the transformation of an original, but a 
transformation of an already fragmentary and partial interpretation. What the next chapters 
make abundantly clear in this respect is that in the recontextualization of concepts, there is 
plenty of room for manoeuvre and negotiation. Finally, the approach presented in Chapter 2, 
although conceived for an analysis of the interrelations between Foucault and postcolonial 
studies only, may contain valuable methodological clues for other studies that focus on a 
recontextualization of concepts. 
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In order to achieve these aims, this project draws on several established approaches, including 
discourse analysis, Begriffsgeschichte, and different theories and methods clustering around the 
concept of intertextuality. Because the next chapter will deal with the similarities and points of 
friction between this enterprise and other approaches, it suffices for now to say that none of 
these approaches on its own presents a sufficient point of departure. However, from the 
theoretical assumption that a recontextualization of a concept constitutes a mutual 
transformation of concept and context, one can derive a step by step method to disentangle this 
process.  
 In anticipation of a more substantial discussion later on, the foundations of this approach 
are worth mentioning already. Given the analytical imprecision of the term 'context,' the actual 
analysis of each concept will start from a three-tier model, in which the general notion of context 
is split into the narrower categories of cotext and context proper. This leaves us with a 
contextual, a cotextual, and a conceptual level. The relevant texts from Foucault, as well as the 
postcolonial texts in which the Foucauldian concept reappears, will all be analyzed on these three 
levels. The contextual analysis has as its primary objective the situating of the text in scholarly 
traditions, theoretical strands of thought, disciplines, institutions, and debates. This will be 
accomplished through an analysis of intertextual references. The cotextual analysis will then 
determine the position of the concept in question in the text itself. Moreover, it will focus on the 
position of the Foucauldian concept with respect to other concepts, situating the concept in the 
larger conceptual architecture the text constructs. In conclusion, the conceptual analysis focuses 
on how a concept has been defined, how its use partially or completely enacts that definition, 
and the question of which specific phenomena are highlighted or obfuscated in the process. In 
practice, the separations between these levels are not as neat as presented in this section, and 
the three-tier model inevitably leaves certain blindspots. Thus, the next chapter will not only 
elaborate this basic schema, but also discusses its ramifications. 
 
Taken together, the interconnections between the contextual, cotextual, and conceptual levels 
can provide answers to three kinds of questions. The first is the question of meaning: how is a 
concept defined? Has its meaning been changed? Does it have multiple meanings? Are these 
meanings consistent or contradictory? What does the concept refer to? What does it exclude? 
How does its meaning relate to that of other concepts? Second, there is the question of function: 
what task does the concept perform? What is its role in the text? What is its role in relation to 
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other concepts? Third, there is the question of effect: how does the meaning and function of a 
concept affect the cotext and context? Does it change the focus of the text, and if yes, how? 
What are the consequences for the different approaches in postcolonial studies? What are the 
implications for Foucault's work? Does it reconfigure the relationship between Foucault and 
postcolonial studies? The task for Chapter 2 will be to translate these questions into applicable 
categories of analysis.  
 
In this long list of questions, there is one issue that is conspicuously absent. Stripped of all its 
covers, that question would be a very simple one: is this postcolonial engagement with Foucault's 
work a good or a bad thing for postcolonial thinking? In fact, the question itself is already 
problematic: it takes for granted the existence of a single, unified ‘Foucault effect’ in postcolonial 
studies. Whether the postcolonial interest in Foucault has really resulted in a more or less 
Foucauldian approach to colonialism, however, remains to be seen, and the following chapters 
will go a long way towards dismantling such an easy assumption. In other words, before we can 
even begin to judge the role of Foucault in postcolonial studies, we must take into account the 
extent to which different postcolonial appropriations have developed Foucault’s work in 
different, often contradictory, directions.  
 Indeed, it is the central thesis of this project that there is no such thing as an 
unproblematic Foucault effect in postcolonial studies. Because of the discontinuities in Foucault's 
work, the diversity in the porous entity called postcolonial studies, and the inevitable processes 
of transformation involved in the recontextualization of concepts, there is no theoretical, 
methodological, or conceptual unity within the segment of postcolonial studies that has drawn 
on the work of Foucault. Rather, what we find is a tightly-knit intertextual web in which a 
Foucauldian critique competes with other approaches and concepts, and struggles to establish 
itself as the dominant theoretical framework. A conceptual architecture Edward Said developed 
in Orientalism often continues to absorb and reroute Foucauldian concepts, even in the work of 
those postcolonial scholars who ostensibly write against Said’s framework. The result is a crucial 
tension between Foucault’s conceptualization of power as an ensemble of technologies and 
strategies, and a Saidian focus on power understood as authority.  
 
This working thesis will be developed throughout the next six chapters. After a presentation of 
the theoretical framework and method underlying this project in Chapter 2, the concepts of 
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discourse, discipline, biopower, and governmentality will each be discussed in separate chapters. 
The order of the chapters is consistent with the chronological order in which these concepts have 
gained prominence in Foucault's work.  
 The internal structure of chapters 3 to 6, in which the actual concepts will be analyzed, is 
identical. Each of these chapters will start by analyzing the Foucauldian text(s) in which the 
concept under discussion is most prominent, or, when possible, with the text that the 
postcolonial transformation explicitly refers to as a source. It then moves on to consider two 
postcolonial texts which have transformed that concept. Each of these texts will be analyzed in 
terms of the three levels outlined above, viz. the contextual, the cotextual, and the conceptual, 
rounded off in one conclusion for the whole chapter. 
 
Whereas the selection of texts from Foucault follows almost automatically from the references in 
the postcolonial texts, the selection of the latter is less straightforward. In order to be part of this 
corpus, texts had to comply with three criteria. First, they had to qualify as postcolonial studies in 
the sense outlined above. Second, they had to contain an explicit reference to Foucault, given 
that certain concepts, of which 'discourse' would be the most notorious, tempt us to presuppose 
Foucault as a source of inspiration in spite of the fact that he does not have a monopoly on the 
concept. Third, the works included had to draw on and mobilize one of the four concepts 
considered here. Still, these criteria are not always neatly applicable, and other, more pragmatic 
reasons have also played an important role. Databases, bibliographies, and catalogues already 
impose a filter: we cannot analyze what we cannot even find. The question of language also plays 
a determining role in this selection: non-Anglophone texts have generally been left out. There 
can be no doubt that a comparative study between different languages would yield interesting 
results, but that would be another project in its own right.6 In the case of some other 
appropriations, the extent to which they actually work with one of the four concepts at hand is 
                                                 
6
 One can think here of the Hispanophone and Francophone appropriations of Foucault. As for the former, 
one interesting volume is Foucault and Latin America (2002), a collection of essays organized around the 
concepts of discourse, government, subjectivity, and sexuality. For the Francophone world, the relative 
absence of postcolonial appropriations, besides the work of Mbembe is striking. In both cases, it is worth 
keeping in mind that the field of postcolonial studies itself may be inextricably intertwined with English 
Literature as a discipline, and the study of Commonwealth Literature in particular. Moreover, in his 
discussion of postcolonialism, Graham Huggan notes that ‘English is, almost exclusively, the language of 
this critical industry (...)’ (2001: 4). In that sense, any comparative analysis would have to take into account 
that postcolonial studies as a scholarly field does not necessarily have an equivalent in non-Anglophone 
research cultures.   
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debatable. This applies, amongst others, to V.Y. Mudimbe's authoritative The Invention of Africa 
(1988), or the work of John and Jean Comaroff. Other notable exclusions are Emma Perez's The 
Decolonial Imaginary (1999), Bruce Knauft's “Foucault meets New Guinea” (1994), and David 
Arnold's “Touching the Body” (1988). In the case of Mudimbe, it seems that his work does not so 
much relate to the concept of discourse as to ‘episteme.’ As far as the Comaroffs, Perez, Knauft, 
and Arnold are concerned, their texts tend to work with the concept of power in a general way, 
rather than the specifics of discipline, biopower, or governmentality in focus here.  
 
Eventually, this selection produced a corpus with five texts from Foucault, and eight postcolonial 
transformations. In Chapter 3, the transformation of the concept of discourse will be analyzed in 
two of the usual suspects. The first is Edward Said, whose Orientalism (1978) presents an 
inescapable starting point – and not only in the chronological sense. Second, two essays of Homi 
Bhabha will be inspected, viz. “The Other Question” and “Of Mimicry and Man” (1994). The main 
text in which Foucault develops his concept of discourse is The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). 
However, whether there is anything archaeological in the work of Said and Bhabha remains to be 
seen. A specific point of interest in this chapter will be the tension between, on the one hand 
Said’s focus on identity and authority, and Foucault’s focus on the structure of knowledge, on the 
other.  
 In Chapter 4, Foucault's Discipline and Punish takes us from archaeology to genealogy. In 
Colonising Egypt (1991), Mitchell transforms the concept of discipline in such a way that it 
produces important implications for the problematic relation between archaeological and 
genealogical approaches. One central issue here will be the way in which Mitchell develops 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power, but ultimately subordinates it to a concept of authority. 
Martha Kaplan takes an altogether different route, stressing the remnants of Eurocentrism in 
Foucault's concept of discipline. Her essay “Panopticon in Poona” (1995), drawing on Foucault's 
work while criticizing it, presents a nuanced critique, especially in the light of Spivak's “Can the 
Subaltern Speak?” (1994), which is also discussed in this chapter. Through Kaplan and Spivak, 
these sections aim to provide insight into Foucault’s purported Eurocentrism and the implications 
for postcolonial thought.  
 The next concept, biopower, continues in certain ways the work of the concept of 
discipline, but does not necessarily perpetuate its problems. Developed by Foucault in both The 
History of Sexuality, vol. 1, and Society Must be Defended, the concept of biopower has been 
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transformed in Ann Laura Stoler's Race and the Education of Desire (1995). Here again we will 
note the subordination of Foucault’s concepts to the concept of authority. Achille Mbembe 
effects an even more marked transformation in his essay “Necropolitics” (2003), in which the 
confrontation between Foucault and Agamben makes for an explosive yet productive cocktail. 
Moreover, Mbembe’s emphasis on technologies of colonial power will be read as a counterpoint 
to the focus on authority noted above.  
 Before a concluding chapter returns to the question of a Foucault effect in postcolonial 
studies, chapter 6 will further develop this distinction between a conceptualization of power as 
authority and power as an ensemble of technologies and strategies. Only the latter corresponds 
to the notion of governmentality Foucault developed in his lectures on the topic. Through a 
reading of David Scott’s “Colonial Governmentality” (1995), this chapter will demonstrate that 
the postcolonial obsession with authority is not absolute. James Duncan’s In the Shadows of the 
Tropics (2007) serves finally as an illustration of the fact that the conceptualizations of power as 
authority and power as activity can be combined into a single analysis of colonial power. 
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2. Reading Concepts in Contexts 
2. 1. The Concept of Concept 
 
What has travelled from the work of Foucault to postcolonial studies consists not so much of 
ideas, knowledge, or theory, but rather scholarly concepts. Postcolonial scholars have invariably 
incorporated one or more Foucauldian concepts into their own work, without necessarily 
incorporating the political intentions, epistemological limitations, or theoretical foundations that 
informed Foucault's use of them. If the current project focuses on travelling concepts, this is not 
primarily a question of perspective, but rather the direct result of the finding that the 
postcolonial engagement with Foucault's work is in this sense conceptual: at stake is the use of 
specific concepts, their definitions, and their relevance in other contexts. 
The broad strokes of how one can understand this postcolonial engagement with 
Foucault have been sketched on various occasions. One of the founding works of postcolonial 
studies, The Empire Writes Back (1989), claims that 'it is possible to argue that postcolonial 
discourse may appropriate what it requires from European theory' (166). For Ashcroft, Griffiths, 
and Tiffin, this process of appropriation is not just a process of selection, but an ideological 
operation that challenges and subverts norms and values. Correspondingly, postcolonial 
appropriations of Foucauldian concepts can be understood as a challenge to the Eurocentric bias 
his work displays.7 The goal of such an appropriation, to borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s phrase, is 
to 'provincialize Europe' (2000). From such a perspective, the postcolonial engagement with 
Foucault appears as one part of a larger struggle to decolonize the humanities from within,8 and 
to point out the Eurocentric and universalist assumptions in scholarly concepts. 
Although such an impetus is an irreducible part of the intertextual web in focus, I want to 
argue that the transfer of Foucauldian concepts to postcolonial studies cannot be grasped in 
terms of appropriation alone. As the previous chapter has shown, neither Foucault's oeuvre nor 
the field of postcolonial studies should be understood as homogeneous entities. The implication 
is that we cannot limit ourselves to the broad narrative of how concepts travel from one group of 
texts to another, but that we must also take into account the minute conceptual movements 
within oeuvres, within fields, texts, and chapters. Concepts do not only travel between 
                                                 
7
 For a discussion of what it can mean to claim that something is Eurocentric, see chapter 4. 
8
 This perspective corresponds to what Sergio Costa categorizes as a 'mild postcolonial program': ‘Dabei 
geht es um eine Kritik, die weder die Wissenschaft ablehnt noch nach Ersatzwissensformen sucht, sondern 
versucht, eine Umgestaltung der Wissenschaft zu bewirken.’ (2011: 46) 
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continents, decades, disciplines, and academic communities, but also between different 
subsections of the same volume, and even between sentences. 
 In this respect, this study differs from Mieke Bal's Travelling Concepts. While her focus on 
concepts and their transformations presents a useful starting point for analyzing the manner in 
which concepts travel from Foucault to postcolonial studies, it may be less attuned to the minute 
movements that occur even within single texts. This is a logical outcome of her desire to promote 
concepts as the methodological basis for interdisciplinarity in the humanities (5): although Bal 
discusses various kinds of travel, it is the transformation of concepts between disciplines and 
academic communities that dominates the argument. Such a programmatic aspect is absent 
here: the present study does not focus on concepts because they facilitate meaningful 
interdisciplinarity, but simply because the engagement of postcolonial studies with Foucault has 
been focused on specific concepts. The task for this chapter is therefore to develop a theoretical 
framework and approach that can account for both the migration of concepts from Foucault to 
postcolonial studies, as well as between and within the individual texts. While this first section 
aims to provide a theoretical framework to conceptualize concepts and their transformations, 
section 2.2 will translate the theoretical framework into a workable method. 
 
Before we can even begin to understand what happens when a concept travels, we need a 
working definition for the term ‘concept’ itself. That such a definition is by no means self-evident 
becomes visible in Bal's first chapter, which opens with the following entry from the Longman 
Dictionary of the English Language: 
 
Concept 
- something conceived in the mind; a thought, notion 
- a general idea covering many similar things derived from study of particular instances 
synonyms: see IDEA (22)  
 
In terms of a semiotic triangle consisting of a signifier, a signified, and a referent, concepts in this 
sense fulfill a role similar to signifieds. However, this is not quite the definition with which Bal 
then proceeds to work: instead, she understand concepts as 'shorthand theories' (23) or 
'miniature theories' (22). Neither of these two definitions fully covers the focus of this study. As 
for the Longman Dictionary definition, it is absolutely crucial to point out that ideas, thoughts, or 
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signifieds as such are not necessarily the travellers that we will be inspecting: to simply 
presuppose that ideas have travelled from Foucault to postcolonial studies would prematurely 
foreclose the possibility that postcolonial scholars have used signifiers commonly associated with 
Foucault in combination with completely different signifieds. With respect to Bal's definition of 
concepts as 'shorthand theories,' something similar can be argued: the assumption that the 
travelling of certain signifiers is accompanied by the travelling of certain theoretical frameworks, 
which are negotiated or transformed in the process, cannot be substantiated prior to analysis.  
 From the above, it follows that an analysis of the postcolonial engagement with Foucault 
requires a consistent differentiation between signifiers, signifieds, and referents. A concept will 
not be understood as a signified as such, but as the semiotic triangle of signifier, signified, and 
referent. Accordingly, the phrase 'travelling concepts' will be appropriated to refer to the 
transformations that occur when a concept moves from one context into another, along the 
different levels of signifiers, signifieds, and referents. This leaves us with three potential variables 
in the process of travel: the signifier changes when a new word is used in the old sense to refer to 
the same referent, the signified changes when the same word is used with a new meaning, and 
the referent can change when the same word with the same meaning is used to refer to a new 
object.  
 Still, Bal's idea of concepts as 'shorthand theories' can serve as a useful reminder that the 
triangles described above do not appear in isolation. As Bödeker has pointed out, 'from the 
outset, a concept exists within a theoretical constellation or conceptual diagram. A single 
concept can hardly be understood without reference to other concepts' (1998: 55). In this 
respect, concepts do not differ from other signs, which are also understood to be relational. 
However, in the case of academic concepts, there seems to be an extra dimension: in what Mieke 
Bal calls 'the standard view of the methodological status of concepts' (23), there is a consensus 
that concepts 'need to be explicit, clear, and defined' (22). In other words, scholarly texts try to 
arrest or freeze the relations between signifiers and signifieds in the process of building a specific 
vocabulary or conceptual apparatus. The three variables outlined above are therefore not at all 
contingent: their transformations are constrained by other concepts, other texts, traditions, 
disciplinary structures, and research cultures. 
 This implies that concepts are designed, used, or transformed in a specific context, 
without which one cannot understand their meanings and functions. The notion of context, 
however, is a slippery one: when insufficiently defined, it refers to anything except the concept 
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itself, ranging from the sentence in which a concept appears to an institution, or the neoliberal 
economy of knowledge. It can thus include textual as well as non-textual elements. Following up 
on the work that has been done during the past decade around the notion of intertextuality, this 
project aims to, if not undo, at least suspend the distinction between the textual and the non-
textual by taking into account the non-textual insofar as it manifests in the textual. The point 
here is not so much to make grand theoretical claims about the text and whether it has an 
outside or not, but rather to lay bare the methodological choice to understand 'context' as a set 
of interlinking texts. Consider the following provisional definition of intertextuality by Norman 
Fairclough: 
 
The intertextuality of a text is the presence within it of elements of other texts (and 
therefore potentially other voices than the author’s own) which may be related to 
(dialogued with, assumed, rejected, etc.) in various ways (see dialogicity). The most 
common and pervasive form of intertextuality is reported speech (including reported 
writing and thought), though there are others (including irony). Reported speech may 
or may not be attributed to specific voices, and speech (writing, thought) can be 
reported in various forms, including direct (reproduction of actual words used) and 
indirect report (summary). (2003: 218-219, emphasis in original) 
 
Not only is it the case that the postcolonial texts we will be looking at quote extensively from 
Foucault and from each other, the use of concepts itself can be understood as the presence of an 
element from another text that is akin to the shortest possible instance of reported speech. 
Indeed, if scholarly texts negotiate concepts, the concept itself is the intertextual element par 
excellence.  
 In that sense, concepts are not free-floating signifiers, but elements that carry with them 
the contexts in which they have been used. What Bakhtin has argued about words in general 
applies a fortiori to travelling concepts: 
 
The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes "one's own" only when the 
speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the 
word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. (…) And not all words 
for just anyone submit equally easily to this appropriation, to this seizure and 
transformation into private property: many words stubbornly resist, others remain 
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alien, sound foreign in the mouth of the one who appropriated them; they cannot be 
assimilated into his context and fall out of it; it is as if they put themselves in quotation 
marks against the will of the speaker. Language is not a neutral medium that passes 
freely and easily into the private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is populated – 
overpopulated – with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to 
one's own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process. (293) 
 
This considerably complicates an understanding of the postcolonial engagement with Foucault as 
an appropriation that simply subverts a Eurocentric bias: scholarly concepts may be especially 
hard to sever from their context, as they only take on meaning in a larger conceptual apparatus 
or theoretical framework. 
However, the reverse is also true: because their meanings and functions depends on the 
context in which concepts operate, the recontextualization of a concept is bound to affect those 
meanings and functions. Again, thinking of speech in general, Bakhtin has argued 'that the 
speech of another, once enclosed in a context, is - no matter how accurately transmitted - always 
subject to certain semantic changes' (1981: 340). Because meanings and functions of concepts 
are context-dependent, there can be no such thing as a simple transfer of a concept. An element 
of transformation is inevitable: changes can be semantic, as Bakthin points out, but there can 
also be a change in function, or a combination of the two. 
 
An important consequence of understanding scholarly concepts as intertextual elements is that 
the crisis of meaning discussed in theories of intertextuality bears directly on the status of 
concepts. Given that the question of the meaning of concepts is one of the central tenets of this 
project, it is worth going into the issue of how different theories of intertextuality offer a 
different perspective on meaning. Indeed, the concept of intertextuality is itself a concept that 
has appeared in different theoretical constellations, traditions, and contexts. As Graham Allen 
puts it, 'that poststructuralist critics employ the term intertextuality to disrupt notions of 
meaning, whilst structuralist critics employ the same term to locate and even fix literary 
meaning, is proof enough of its flexibility as concept' (2000: 4). Similarly, Heinrich Plett has made 
a distinction between 'progressives' and 'traditionalists' (1991: 3), with the former using the term 
intertextuality to overthrow traditional notions of stable meaning, and the latter drawing on the 
notion of intertextuality  to analyze specific techniques, including quotation, allusion, parody, etc. 
Naturally, the classifications are not as neat as Allen and Plett make them out to be, and our 
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current analysis of concepts as intertextual elements coincides with neither of these categories. 
In drawing on the conceptual arsenal of intertextuality to analyze a set of texts with obvious 
intertextual links, this project has little in common with the revolutionary intentions of the 
'progressives.' But that does not imply that it continues to promote a traditional understanding 
of fixed and stable meaning that can be traced through intertextual references. Quite the 
opposite, Bakhtin’s discussion of the process of appropriation has made it clear that the meaning 
of concepts is neither stable nor unified.  
This fragmentation of meaning can be identified through Bakhtin's concept of hybridity. 
In "Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin defines a hybrid construction as 
 
an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical [syntactic] and compositional markers, to 
a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two utterances, two speech 
manners, two styles, two "languages", two semantic and axiological belief systems. We 
repeat, there is no formal - compositional and syntactic - boundary between these 
utterances, styles, languages, belief systems; the division of voices and languages takes 
place within the limits of a single syntactic whole, often within the limits of a simple 
sentence. It frequently happens that even one and the same word will belong 
simultaneously to two languages, two belief systems that intersect in a hybrid 
construction - and, consequently, the word has two contradictory meanings, two 
accents (...). (1981: 304-305) 
 
The implications for the analysis of concepts are clear: concepts as intertextual elements both 
carry with them the meaning they have taken on in previous contexts, as well as the meaning 
they acquire in their target context. In that sense, they are hybrid concepts. Moreover, there is 
no reason why this process should be limited to two layers that come together: every time a 
concept appears in a new context, a new layer of meaning negotiates the previous composite 
construction. The opposite is equally possible: concepts can shed layers of meaning when their 
intertextual character is no longer recognized or actualized. By way of example, one can think 
here of Foucault's concept of biopolitics. Although it originally appeared at the beginning of the 
20th century with a quite different meaning, it is now commonly attributed to Foucault (cf. 
Lemke 2011a: 9), with new layers still being added in the work of philosophers such as Agamben, 
Esposito, and Hardt & Negri. However, if the metaphor of layers suggests a process of subtraction 
and addition, this demands correction: conceptual layers of meaning do not simply add up, but 
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can also compete with each other, contradict each other, or transform each other. Because they 
are not necessarily compatible, they present cracks and ruptures, and open up indeterminacies 
that follow directly from the recontextualization of a concept. 
 To trace these layers and to note the potential frictions between them are undeniably 
interpretative acts, and with the question of meaning, a hermeneutic dimension comes into play. 
Although one could argue that the following of intertextual traces results in an analysis that is 
primarily descriptive, the boundaries between a description and an ‘inscription’ are not always 
clear-cut, given that the question of what is in a text and what is outside of it is not always easy 
to answer. The notion of implicit content problematizes such a distinction: 
 
Surprisingly, on the face of it, the contrast between presence and absence from texts is 
not a sharp one. In addition to (significant) absences from a text, what is 'in' a text may 
be explicit or implicit. Two categories of implicit content which have received extensive 
discussion are presupposition and implicature (Levinson 1983). The implicit content of a 
text is a sort of halfway house between presence and absence.  (Fairclough 1995: 5) 
 
Scholarly texts and concepts are no exception, and the fact that people often need training to be 
able to read and understand them illustrates the enormous amount of presupposed knowledge. 
At bottom, this can again be seen as a form of intertextuality: concepts presuppose the 
knowledge of other texts, fields, disciplines, and traditions, and to trace these presuppositions is 
an interpretative act. Implicatures are equally important here: in order to understand the 
meanings and functions of concepts, it will be imperative to reconstruct the conceptual 
architectures of specific texts. Because a text hardly ever lays bare its conceptual architecture, 
such a reconstruction needs to build on implied content. 
 
If the ground covered so far has focused on the issue of how concepts as intertextual devices are 
profoundly affected in their meanings and functions by the contexts in which they operate, this 
still leaves us with the task of looking at the inverse operation: concepts are not only 
transformed by their context, they also transform the context. Rather than meanings and 
functions, at stake here are the effects concepts can have on their destination context. As Lakoff 
and Johnson have put it, 'our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the 
world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in 
defining our everyday realities' (2003: 3). The relevance for scholarly concepts is clear: they too 
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structure perception, by making visible or producing certain phenomena while obfuscating 
others. 
 In that sense, conceptual architectures can be understood as what Nelson Goodman 
describes in the eponymous volume as 'ways of worldmaking' (1978). As Nünning & Nünning 
have paraphrased, ways of worldmaking 'serve to construct or indeed make the worlds that we 
regard as reality or as the real world by imposing form and order upon a chaotic reality' (2010: 9). 
To avoid confusion, it is worth highlighting that it is concepts that make worlds, not subjects. This 
distinction matters, because, as the above discussion of intertextuality has shown, the meaning 
of a concept is not to be understood as the expression of an individual intention, but as the result 
of its position within an intertextual web. This is not to say that individual agents cannot change 
the meanings and functions of a concept – as the following chapters will demonstrate, they have 
done exactly that – but rather that the specific outcome supersedes the control of the writing 
subject. With this caveat in mind, it is easy to see how a conceptual apparatus is not just a toolkit, 
but a highly normative and ideological device. A comparison of the different worlds concepts 
create allows us to explore the insights they may yield or the pathways they may foreclose, as 
well as to examine whether the perspectives they offer provide a critical approach to colonial or 
postcolonial power.  
 
2.2. Methodological Orientation: Analyzing Travelling Concepts in Three Steps 
 
From the theoretical excursus above, it follows that the analysis of the postcolonial engagement 
with Foucauldian concepts requires an approach that can account for the minute, mutual 
transformations of concepts and contexts in a specific corpus of texts. Although the notion of 
intertextuality has proven its value in providing a starting point for a theorization of travelling 
concepts, it offers comparatively little in the way of methodological guidelines for the analysis of 
specific concepts. One of the models one might turn to in order to fill this gap is the German field 
of 'Begriffsgeschichte,’ which revolves entirely around the analysis of specific concepts.9 It shares 
with this project its focus on meanings and functions of concepts, as well as the changes they 
undergo. Moreover, 'Begriffsgeschichte’ also opens up the question of effect, given that it 
conceives of language as an instance without which reality cannot be understood (cf. Koselleck 
                                                 
9
 For a very short introduction to what ‘Begriffsgeschichte’ is and does, written by one of the founding 
members of the field, see Koselleck, Reinhart. 2006. Begriffsgeschichten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
pp. 99-102. 
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2006: 99). One particularly relevant version of writing 'Begriffsgeschichte' is the Reallexicon der 
deutschen Literaturwissenschaft, with its systematic distinction between ‘Wortgeschichte,’ 
‘Begriffsgeschichte,’ and ‘Sachgeschichte.’ This corresponds roughly to the history of a signifier, 
signified, and referent respectively, and dovetails with the current necessity to distinguish 
carefully between these three levels in the postcolonial engagement with Foucault. 
 However, there is a crucial difference between 'Begriffsgeschichte' and the analysis of 
concepts as intertextual elements that relates to the object of study. Although the object is in 
both cases a concept in context, 'Begriffsgeschichte' is a conceptual history in the sense that it 
focuses not only on the history of concepts, but also on the concepts that have structured social 
history. Such a concern with history not only leads to a wider scope, but also to a different way of 
describing change: 
 
The programmatic statements about Begriffsgeschichte, share with social history the 
tendency to see history as a field of impersonal processes, in which humans are almost 
passive vehicles. Conceptual change is a process, the locutions characteristically used to 
describe its dynamics are natural metaphors: 'flow, processes, phenomenon, structure', 
rather than being driven by identifiable agents. (Hampsher-Monk 1998: 49) 
 
In the changes that occur in the postcolonial engagement with Foucault, however, the agents are 
clearly identifiable, and the texts in which these transformations are visible are not necessarily 
exemplary of a broader historical process. Although the following chapters arrange postcolonial 
transformations chronologically, the analysis is hardly a conceptual history in the sense outlined 
above, but rather a tracing of transformations as they unfold within an identifiable intertextual 
web. 
 
In order to do justice to this intertextuality of travelling concepts, the following chapters will 
approach Foucauldian concepts in three basic steps. Each text will be analyzed in terms of the 
context it invokes, the cotext it provides the concept with, and the concept itself. This 
corresponds to the interplay of concepts and contexts discussed in section 2.1, with the slight 
modification that what was previously referred to as the context of a concept has now been 
divided for the sake of clarity into the cotext of a concept (meaning the text in which a concept 
appears) and the context proper. 
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 The first, contextual analysis aims to position the text in relation to other texts by 
charting the intertextual traces. At its most basic level, this simply means tracking quotations, 
paraphrases and references to other texts, and determining their function. However, this can 
only be a first step, and it does not always lead very far. Particularly in the case of Foucault, 
references to other specific texts are extremely rare. In an afterword to Foucault's Society Must 
Be Defended lectures, Alessandro Fontana and Mauro Bertani note that 'it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to know which books Foucault is referring to, either directly or indirectly' (286), and 
that 'he was not fond of debates with individual authors' (287). This considerably complicates the 
task of contextualizing his work, to the point where a reconstruction of this context seems 
impossible. Still, by attending to intertextual traces in a broader sense, one can at least position 
texts in relation to other groups of texts. Even if the text is void of all references, it can still react 
against something, and if it does, the argument presupposes its antagonist. Something similar 
can be argued about the contribution texts claim to make: a contribution per definition is a 
contribution to something else, which can be a discipline, field, research community, tradition, or 
culture. By attending to these implicit invocations, both Foucauldian and postcolonial texts can 
be understood in terms of what they build on, negotiate, or react against. 
 The cotextual analysis aims to position the concept within the text. This is to be done on 
a formal and a functional level. The formal level looks at quantity (the absolute number of times 
the concept appears in the text), frequency (the number of times the concept appears in relation 
to the length of the text), and the distribution (the frequency within different sections of the 
text) of a concept. This is the syntagmatic dimension of a concept: its position within a 
conceptual system.10 The term 'conceptual architecture' will be used to refer to a more or less 
stable set of links between concepts as they crystallize in the process of interpretation. That this 
is a hermeneutic process rather than a simple abstraction will become evident from the fact that 
sometimes different conceptual architectures can be reconstructed from the same text. This is an 
opportunity rather than a problem, because it is in this process that the different meanings, 
functions, and effects of concepts become visible. 
 Finally, the conceptual analysis looks at how contexts and cotexts produce a concept with 
particular effects. A first step in this process is usually to locate the definitional meaning of the 
                                                 
10
 I have borrowed this distinction between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimension of a concept from 
"Lost or Found in Translation? The risks and Promises of Conceptual Transfer,”  a lecture delivered by 
Nünning and Hallet at a 2009 conference entitled The Transnational Study of Culture: Lost or Found in 
Translation. 
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concept, and to compare it with its meanings as they unfold when the concept is used rather 
than defined. Besides its denotation, this includes connotations and associations. The focus lies 
on the paradigmatic dimension of a concept, its relation to other concepts in absentia 
(synonyms, hyponyms, hyperonyms, antonyms) as well as the collocations in which a concept 
finds itself. The idea of layered meaning as presented above reveals its usefulness here: 
oftentimes the meaning of the concept cannot be reduced to one single, stable meaning, and 
different conceptual architectures within the same text create different functions for different 
layers of meaning. It is the task of the conceptual analysis to lay bare the different layers, and to 
spell out how they interact. Once these different meanings and functions have been charted, we 
can turn to the question of effects: what are the normative implications for analyses of 
colonialism that draw on said concept? Which layers dominate, and which elements of colonial 
power dominate the picture? This is a critical part of the analysis, and its ground from which to 
conduct critique is in a sense the context we set out with. Indeed, it is only in relation to other 
conceptualizations that we can evaluate which parts of the picture have been lost, added, or 
modified. Loss or gain are not absolutes, but relations to a previous text, a previous analysis of 
power, or a previous picture of colonialism. 
 
While the steps outlined above can render visible the meanings, functions, and effects of 
Foucauldian concepts in postcolonial studies, there are also elements they cannot possibly shed 
light on, and which are worth acknowledging. The crux of the matter is that these steps work 
with finished texts and interpretations of them, leaving out the material and institutional 
contexts of production and reception. These are aspects Johannes Angermüller’s Nach dem 
Strukturalismus: Theoriediskurs und intellektuelles Feld in Frankreich (2007) and Graham 
Huggan’s The Postcolonial Exotic have focused on, providing a sociology of knowledge and a 
Bourdieuan perspective on the production of theory in France, and the phenomenon of 
postcolonial theory and literature respectively.  However, there is a tension, related to the 
question of meaning, between these sociological approaches and the main questions this project 
seeks to answer. While this aspect is central to the understanding of travelling concepts aimed at 
throughout the following chapters, neither Angermüller nor Huggan explains how the 
institutional-material context relates to the meaning of individual texts and concepts, and 
Angermüller even characterizes his ‘formal-qualitative’ discourse analysis as an approach that 
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seeks to bracket interpretation (cf. 104), making it a difficult fit with the hermeneutic impetus of 
this project.  
 As long as these methodological restrictions are acknowledged and kept in mind, the 
absence of attempts to explain concepts out of the larger social, material, and institutional 
context even helps to problematize some of the pervasive misunderstandings that have followed 
from explanations that start from the social context and take it to determine the meanings, 
functions, and effects of individual concepts. The example of the value accorded to the events of 
1968 can clarify this. It has now become somewhat of a commonplace to identify 
 
a shift in political-cum-intellectual climate in France over this time with the tail-off of 
post-1968 radicalism, and a concomitant shift in Foucault’s own interest, from looking at 
the nefarious social power effects in the prison system and the constitution of modern 
sexuality, to less insidious interpersonal and governmental relations, first in the 
development of modern governmental techniques, and then in ancient ethical practices 
(Kelly 2009: 59). 
 
As the following chapters will illustrate, however, there is very little textual evidence to support 
such a narrative, and the extent to which this social context determines the effects of some of his 
concepts is very much open to debate. Again, the point here is not so much to ignore this context 
altogether, as to bracket it until the minute conceptual transformations that follow from an 
intertextual dynamic have revealed themselves. Only then can we cease to think of concepts as 
passive, pre-determined tools, and begin to approach them as actors of their own.   
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3. Discourse 
 
When Michel Foucault died on June 25, 1984, the concept of discourse was at its apex. Invading 
both the social sciences and the humanities, ‘discourse babble’ (Henriques et al., 1984: 105) 
proliferated in as diverse a set of fields as anthropology, psychology, linguistics, feminist theory, 
sociology and many others. In spite of its ‘extravagant vagueness’ (ibid.), or perhaps owing to this 
vagueness, the notion of discourse has become virtually omnipresent in the study of culture.  
As far as this imprecision is concerned, Sara Mills goes as far as to suggest that the 
concept ‘has perhaps the widest range of possible significations of any term in literary and 
cultural theory, and yet it is often the term within theoretical texts which is least defined’ (1997: 
1). In Discourse, Mills attempts to clarify the use of the term by focusing ‘on how Michel 
Foucault’s ideas on discourse have been integrated into various disciplines in different ways’ (10). 
In doing so, she faces a triple challenge: not only are there differences between the disciplines as 
such, but disciplines are also divided internally in their use of Foucault. Finally, Foucault’s body of 
work itself does not present a consistent definition of discourse either: between the different 
books, articles and interviews, its meaning shifts considerably.  
Laudable as Mills’s attempt may be, it is already compromised from the outset. For to 
write a book on the use of the concept of discourse, and to confine oneself subsequently to the 
appropriations of Foucault’s notion, in effect posits Foucault’s work as the starting point of all 
contemporary meanings of the concept. However, ‘discourse’ as a theoretical term was not 
simply born on October 15, 1926, and its use is by no means restricted to Foucault. In an 
extremely convincing archaeology of the concept, R. Keith Sawyer takes issue with the automatic 
association of the concept of discourse with Foucault (2002), which is so pervasive in Anglo-
American cultural studies. Sawyer concludes that ‘if one is to attribute the broad usage of the 
term ‘discourse,’ it should either be attributed to British cultural studies collectively, to Lacan, or 
to the French Marxist discourse analysts working in the 1960s and 1970s’ (450). It was only in the 
1980s that the concept began to be linked exclusively to Foucault.  
Whereas the general (mis)understanding of the history of ‘discourse’ is beyond the scope 
of this project, its history within postcolonial studies certainly is a central concern here. 
Unfortunately, the field of postcolonial theory does not seem to form an exception in this regard: 
Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin unambiguously attribute the concept of discourse to Foucault in 
their Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (1998: 70). Even more problematically, their entry 
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on ‘colonial discourse’ weaves the concept of discourse, Foucault’s oeuvre, and Said’s 
Orientalism into a coherent narrative, drawing a straight line from Foucault to colonial discourse 
analysis, an important constituent of postcolonial studies (41-43). At bottom, this narrative 
illegitimately combines ideas from different and at times incongruent Foucauldian texts and 
posits this strange amalgam as the origin of the equally generalizing category of colonial 
discourse analysis.  
Through the analysis of specific texts and those texts only, this chapter aims to 
problematize this narrative. Edward Said’s 1978 Orientalism presents itself as a logical starting 
point, as this seminal study of Europe and its Oriental Other marked the entry of Foucault’s ideas 
into what would post hoc become known as postcolonial studies. Because Said describes 
Orientalism as being indebted to the theory of discourse Foucault outlines in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge and Discipline and Punish, the task at hand will be to shed light on these two works 
before we move on to an analysis of Orientalism.  
The second portion of this chapter will consist of a reading of two essays written by Homi 
Bhabha, viz. The Other Question and Of Mimicry and Man. Both texts have been published in The 
Location of Culture (1994) and weave another strand into the intertextual web between Foucault 
and Said. Moreover, they propose a highly original and yet deeply problematic transformation of 
the concept of discourse.  
 
3.1. Foucault and Orientalism: A Controversial Relationship 
 
When Edward Said published his landmark Orientalism in 1978, the adjective ‘post-colonial’ was 
generally used by historians to designate the period after colonization. Although Said himself did 
not use the term and cannot be held responsible for any of its later ideological, political, and 
theoretical implications, he is nevertheless regarded as one of the founding fathers of 
postcolonial studies. In his historical introduction to postcolonialism, Robert Young claims that ‘it 
was Edward Said’s critique in Orientalism (1978) of the cultural politics of academic knowledge 
(...) that effectively founded postcolonial studies as an academic discipline’ (2001: 383). 
 Trying to account for the success of Orientalism, one could say that Said’s analysis of 
Orientalism as a discursive formation that creates and regulates the Orient, enabled an academic 
critique of Eurocentrism, colonialism, and imperialism. His scrutiny of the complex relations 
between knowledge, power, language, and representation brought questions of Western 
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hegemony right into the heart of the humanities at a moment when poststructuralist thinkers 
had been trying to provoke a radical decentring of the Western sovereign Subject.  
 However, it seems that this explanation only covers one side of the coin. Influential 
though Orientalism may have been, it has been criticized extensively, not least by reviewers 
sympathetic to the overall argument. The proliferation of critical comments on Orientalism’s 
theoretical underpinnings has led Young to say that ‘you could argue that postcolonial studies 
has actually defined itself as an academic discipline through the range of objections, reworkings 
and counter-arguments that have been marshalled in such great variety against Said’s work’ 
(384).  
 The list of Orientalism’s theoretical problems is long and all too well known.11 As many of 
them have a direct bearing on the relationship between Foucault’s work and Orientalism, we 
cannot but rehearse some of them briefly – if only to diagnose their common roots later on.  First 
of all, there is a tension in Orientalism between the idea of a misrepresentation, and the idea of a 
discourse that creates its object. If orientalist discourse created the Orient, how can it 
misrepresent it unless one reintroduces some kind of real Orient (Clifford 1988: 260, Young 1990: 
130)? Second, as O’Hanlon and Washbrook have pointed out, the dedication to social change can 
be read as incompatible with the poststructuralist impetus of the book. Said is trying to ‘ride two 
horses at once’ (1992: 167). Third, Ahmad wonders how it is at all possible to combine Foucault’s 
anti-humanist work with the celebration of humanist values in Orientalism (Ahmad 1992: 168). 
Said indeed refuses to give up the notion of a true knowledge in a way that seems hard to 
reconcile with Foucault’s emphasis on the construction of truth. Fourth, the idea of a discourse 
that spans the entire West and that is somehow present from Aeschylus until the present comes 
dangerously close to assuming a homogeneous and static Occident (Clifford: 267, on the absence 
of German Orientalism; Ahmad: 166, on Said’s ahistoricism). Fifth, Said emphasizes the 
importance of the individual in Orientalist discourse. However, this contradicts the main thesis: if 
Orientalism is a discursive formation that regulates what can be said about the Orient, how does 
that fit with individuals who make significant changes to the system (Clifford: 269, Young 1990: 
134)? Finally, Orientalism manifestly lacks a theory of agency and resistance. If Orientalism is as 
totalizing a system as Said portrays it, from what position can one speak against it? How did Said 
manage to escape its clutches (Young 1990: 137)?  
                                                 
11
 For a more elaborate discussion of these issues, see e.g. Clifford 1988, Young 1990, Young 2001, Childs; 
Weber; Williams 2006, Varisco 2007. 
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 Remarkably, these six critiques all adhere to the same structure: underlying all of them is 
the idea that Said will have to make a choice between a Foucauldian approach and an alternative 
in order to achieve consistency. Thus, six choices are staged: between discourse as a self-
referential structure of signs or as representation, between relativism or social activism, between 
anti-humanism or humanism, between the history of discontinuity or the teleology of 
imperialism, between discursive confinement or the creative potential of the individual, and 
between the omnipresence of power and the hope of resistance.  
 Many of these oppositions are misleading, reductive and programmatic, and yet, they 
provide the structure for an equally programmatic debate. Neil Lazarus has questioned the value 
of criticisms which attack Orientalism because ‘it falls short of Foucauldian orthodoxy’ (2005: 
115) – a pertinent remark, and a missed opportunity, because the efforts to appropriate 
Orientalism as a materialist rather than Foucauldian critique may be equally debilitating. Thus, 
Timothy Brennan argues that ‘in spite of a Foucauldian patina, both the method and the 
substance of the book are adamantly opposed to the French thinker's views’ (2000: 579). 
According to Brennan, ‘when one sees Orientalism in its proper time and place, it becomes clear 
that its central construct is not discourse but institution’ (582). One can only guess what such a 
‘proper time and place’ may be, but it seems that Brennan’s interpretation is trying to force 
Orientalism into yet another orthodoxy: a materialist framework that ranks institutional 
components of power over the discursive. On the other side of the spectrum, Valerie Kennedy 
states that Orientalism is ‘unimaginable without Foucault's concepts of discourse and of 
discursive formations, his discussions of the relationships between power and knowledge, and 
his view that representations are always influenced by the systems of power in which they are 
located’ (2001: 25). Are Brennan and Kennedy making the choices Said refused to make? Are 
there two Orientalisms? These are questions worth keeping in mind until the analysis of the 
concept of discourse proposes some modest answers.  
 
In summary, to try and posit Orientalism somewhere between ‘very Foucauldian’ and ‘not 
Foucauldian at all,’ or between ‘too Foucauldian’ and ‘not Foucauldian enough’ reads Said’s work 
through the lens of something external to itself and thereby inevitably reduces it. But there is a 
second problem inherent in such an approach. As stated above, Orientalism refers to The 
Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish as the sources of its concept of discourse. 
Between the publication of these two major works, six years passed – as Sawyer points out, this 
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constituted ‘the longest pause between books of [Foucault’s] career’ (441) – during which 
Foucault moved away from structuralism. ‘Do not ask me to remain the same’ (19), Foucault 
warned in The Archaeology of Knowledge, and he certainly did not. If one insists on asking ‘how 
Foucauldian Orientalism really is,’ which Foucault are we talking about? As far as the concept of 
discourse is concerned, the answer to the question of whether there are multiple Foucaults must 
be a resounding yes.  
 
3.2. Foucault and Discourse: Archaeologies of Knowledge 
 
If Foucault has ever developed a fully-fledged theory of discourse, The Archaeology of Knowledge 
is the place to find it. Originally published in 1969 as L’Archéologie du savoir, the book aims to 
provide the tools that enable us to analyze the structure of knowledge. The English translation of 
the title is slightly ambiguous: knowledge can either refer to ‘savoir,’ which is the general field of 
knowledge, or to ‘connaissance,’ which refers to a specific, localized subset of ‘savoir.’ It is the 
former that draws Foucault’s interest. However, for contemporary readers of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, there is a much more alarming issue, illustrated by the authoritative 2002 Routledge 
edition. The cover text argues that ‘The purpose of The Archaeology of Knowledge is to suggest 
how rhetoric can be studied and understood in its relationship with power and knowledge.’ The 
statement is not exactly surprising, at first sight: it is not hard to read the early Foucault through 
the lens of the power-knowledge connection. Thus, Madness and Civilization exposes psychiatry 
as a corpus of knowledge that holds power over madmen, The Birth of the Clinic analyzes power 
in the doctor-patient relationship, and The Archaeology of Knowledge spells out and enhances his 
earlier methods. Tempting though this narrative may be, it is a post-hoc imposition: the power-
knowledge connection only came to the fore after the publication of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, and if the word ‘power’ figures in it at all, it is certainly not as a theoretical concept. 
This tendency to conflate Foucault’s different texts signals the difficulty for contemporary 
readers to contextualize each work. The following section will attend to this question of 
contextualization, first as far as The Archaeology of Knowledge is concerned, and then with 
regard to Discipline and Punish. 
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3.2.1. Context: A Structuralist Approach to Knowledge 
 
One of the things that seem to have become progressively unclear is the position of Foucault 
between the different academic disciplines. His work has become a reference point in disciplines 
ranging from philosophy over sociology to psychology, and a source of inspiration for the broad 
field of cultural studies. Yet the introduction to The Archaeology leaves no room for 
interpretation as to where his real concerns were situated at that point: the discipline of history. 
Foucault is not content to merely add to the field, but rather intervenes in order to change it 
radically. He distinguishes between, on the one hand, ‘history proper’ and ‘the history of ideas, 
the history of science, the history of philosophy, the history of thought, and the history of 
literature’ on the other (4). It is the second group that concerns Foucault the most, with the 
history of ideas being ‘a discipline then enjoying a period of intellectual fashion’ (Sawyer 2002: 
436).  
 Why was Foucault especially interested in the history of ideas? More than anything else, 
it was because his intervention into the field of history is conceived of as an attack on the idea of 
a sovereign subject that somehow controls history. It is exactly in this history of ideas that the 
illusion of a sovereign subject proves most recalcitrant (13). If history proper needs to relinquish 
the idea that the multitude of events can be turned into a continuous chain, the history of ideas 
needs to rid itself of the idea of a subject that forms the principle of continuity in the field of 
knowledge. Thus, the possibility of a history that ‘draws all phenomena around a single centre’ 
disappears (11). Foucault’s archaeological method is therefore a method to write history without 
the subject as its foundation.  
 The removal of the subject as the foundation of history also implies the death of the 
knowing subject: indeed, the principle of continuity is the continuity of an interpreting subject. 
The foreclosure of the subject in archaeology is also then a way of bypassing hermeneutics and of 
developing a method of analysis that does not rely on interpretation.  
 Clearly, Foucault realizes that he is not the first to begin such an endeavour. At this point, 
two major groups of intertextual references come into play: references to some of his 
contemporary French thinkers (4-5), and references to Foucault’s earlier work (16). The attempt 
to undermine the myth of the subject that masters a continuous history is what unites them. 
34 
 
Thus, Gaston Bachelard’s notion of epistemological thresholds arrests the continuous 
development of knowledge, Georges Canguilhem illustrates the discontinuities in the existence of 
concepts and the contingent nature of the present ordering of the past, Martial Guéroult’s 
concept of architectonic unities provides an alternative to a transcendental unity, and Michel 
Serres analyzes the history of sciences as a series of synchronic cuts.  
 In the History of Structuralism: The Rising Sign, 1945-1966, François Dosse establishes a 
line from Bachelard over Canguilhem to Serres, concluding that the latter was ‘doubtless the first 
philosopher to have defined a comprehensive and explicitly structuralist program in philosophy, 
as early as 1961’ (89). In combination with the reference to Althusser’s structural Marxism, which 
emphasizes the discontinuities in the process of a science revealing its ideological past (5), and a 
mention of literary analysis, which purportedly prefers the structure of a given text over the 
continuity of tradition (5), it is obvious that Foucault is hinting at the value of structuralism in the 
search for histories of discontinuity.  
 However, Foucault does not make the above references in order to add his name to the 
list or to subscribe to this emerging tradition. Foucault is reluctant to use the label ‘structuralism’ 
to describe these challenges to classical historiography (12). The fact that his archaeology is at 
best an atypical structuralism may well have fuelled his dislike of the term. Certainly, the idea of 
autonomous rules governing the production of knowledge is strongly reminiscent of the 
Saussurean idea of autonomous rules governing the production of language. But, if structuralism 
tends to propose as its object of analysis a certain deep structure, The Archaeology vehemently 
opposes this idea of depth.  The comparison Sawyer sets up between Foucault’s archaeological 
method and Chomsky’s transformational grammar is extremely helpful in this respect (439, table 
1). Indeed, whereas Chomsky established an opposition between performance as a surface, and 
competence as a deep structure, making this deep structure the object of his analysis, Foucault 
does something very different. The emphasis in The Archaeology of Knowledge on the concept of 
discourse is an emphasis on language in use, thereby giving rise to what Sawyer calls ‘a 
structuralism of practice’ (440).  
 The second group of intertextual references consists of Foucault’s remarks on his 
previously published books, viz. Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of 
Things (16). He claims that ‘it was time that they were given greater coherence’ (16) and that The 
Archaeology ‘is the result’ (16). The relevant point for this chapter is that none of these earlier 
works used discourse as a concept. Although the word ‘discourse’ occurs on some occasions, it 
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does not deviate from what Sawyer calls the ‘standard usage’ of the word: it ‘refers to a unit of 
language larger than a sentence’ (434). Moreover, ‘language’ and ‘discourse’ seem to be used as 
quasi-interchangeable categories in these early works.  
 Thus, the concept of discourse The Archaeology of Knowledge advances does not derive 
directly from structuralist sources, nor from any of Foucault’s preceding works: although the 
book obviously intervenes in a particular debate, the theory of discourse it proposes was 
something quite new. Perhaps this accounts for some of the difficulties readers have faced in 
trying to make sense of The Archaeology of Knowledge: because Foucault aimed to stress the 
originality of his approach, he tried to decontextualize his own work as much as possible. A case 
in point is his furtive reference to ‘myths, kinship systems, languages, sexuality, or desire’ (15), 
refusing at the same time to even mention the names of Lévi-Strauss or Lacan. Even more 
flagrantly, Foucault discusses ‘the speech act referred to by the English analysts’ (93), desperately 
avoiding the names of Austin and Searle. Whether Foucault deliberately adopted this strategy in 
order to claim a ‘blank space’ (18) for himself is debatable, but it seems fair to conclude this 
contextual analysis with the observation that the form of The Archaeology of Knowledge is such 
that it resists contextualization. 
 
If the above analysis revealed that The Archaeology gave birth to a new concept of discourse, a 
quick glance at Foucault’s next book, Discipline and Punish, reveals that the theory was short-
lived. The central role accorded to discourse disappears here and on those few occasions where 
it is actually used, it has been stripped of its technical sense. A second major difference is that 
unlike The Archaeology, Discipline and Punish immediately applies the method it proposes. More 
accurately, it can be argued that Discipline and Punish develops its method through its objects of 
analysis, to the point where method and application become virtually inseparable.  
 Consequently, Discipline and Punish is not a theoretical exploration of either discourse, 
knowledge, or power as such, but a sharp analysis of the transformations of the penal systems in 
modern Western societies. Foucault poignantly challenges the idea that the evolution from the 
horrifying techniques of torture and the gory public executions of the 18th century to the 
meticulously planned carceral system of the 19th and 20th century was an evolution from 
barbarity to humanity. Rather, this evolution illustrates the rise of a new form of power, viz. 
discipline. Disciplinary forms of power, which manifested themselves in the penal system but 
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found their way to schools, hospitals, and armies, produced a form of individuality that enabled 
bodies to perform their tasks in modern society.   
 Bearing in mind the earlier findings about The Archaeology as an intervention in the field 
of history, Discipline and Punish seems to be similar in this respect. Thus, the opening chapter 
‘The Body of the Condemned’ presents the book as ‘a correlative history of the modern soul and 
of a new power to judge’ (23), ‘a common history of power relations and object relations’ (24), 
and ‘a history of the body’ (25). However, there is a marked difference: Discipline and Punish is a 
‘history of the present’ (31). Whereas the archaeological method was content to stick to the 
description of discursive formations and their discontinuities, this new approach relinquishes this 
positivism in order to enable the expression of meaningful statements about the lives we live. 
Briefly put: the analyst no longer aspires to a position outside of history.  
 This impossibility of making meaningful statements was not the only problem facing the 
archaeological approach. A second issue was the idea of discourse as an autonomous system: if 
discursive formations are characterized by rules, we end up with the strange notion of 
‘regularities which regulate themselves’ (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982:  84). As Foucault’s reasons for 
abandoning the archaeological method fall outside of the scope of this chapter,12 it suffices to say 
that they have had important effects: the move away from structuralism, the abandonment of 
discourse, and the creation of a very different approach altogether. If The Archaeology of 
Knowledge still referred to structuralist thinkers and Foucault’s earlier work, intertextual 
references to secondary sources are even rarer in Discipline and Punish. One of the few 
exceptions is the reference to Durkheim (23) and Rusche & Kirchheimer (24), but the link is 
thematic rather than theoretical or methodological. Thus, Foucault pushes the strategy of 
decontextualization to its limits in order to underscore the originality of his new approach. The 
cotextual analysis will shed more light on the discrepancies between the old archaeological 
method and the genealogical alternative. 
                                                 
12
 For a more detailed discussion, see Part I, Chapter 4 “The methodological failures of Archaeology” (79-
100) in Dreyfus, H.L.; Rabinow, P. 1982. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
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 3.2.2. Cotext: Knowledge and its Relation to Power 
 
Before digging into the meanings and uses of the concept of discourse, an analysis of how the 
concept relates to other concepts in The Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish will 
illustrate how the position of discourse is fundamentally different in their respective conceptual 
architectures. In anticipation of the conceptual analysis in 3.2.3, a provisional working definition 
of discourse as either ‘the general domain of all statements’ or ‘an individualizable group of 
statements’ will do (AK 90). 
 As far as The Archaeology is concerned, this notion of discourse13 provides a logical 
starting point. A first issue to be tackled is the relation to its objects. The crux of the matter here 
is that the archaeological theory of discourse is not a theory of representation: it severs the link 
between signs and their supposed material correlates. Rather than these material objects, what 
is at stake are discursive objects: as soon as discourse is created, a discursive object is created 
that is in a sense the material object in the process of being named, defined, designated, 
demarcated, measured, qualified, etc. (AK 102-103). 
 Besides the exclusion of non-discursive objects, non-discursive practices are equally 
‘explicitly excluded from consideration’ (Sawyer: 441). This is not because Foucault considers 
them irrelevant, subordinate to discourse, or non-existent, but because their effects can be 
traced in the analysis of discourse itself. He tries to salvage his claim that discourse can be 
analyzed as an autonomous system by admitting that non-discursive factors, such as desire, have 
an important role to play, but that neither 
 
the relation of discourse to desire, nor the processes of its appropriation, nor its role 
among non-discursive practices is extrinsic to its unity, its characterization, and the laws 
of its formation. They are not disturbing elements which, superposing themselves upon 
its pure, neutral, atemporal, silent form, suppress its true voice and emit in its place a 
travestied discourse, but, on the contrary, its formative elements. (76) 
  
Succinctly put, these external factors do not corrupt discourse, but create it. This brings us to the 
real concern of The Archaeology: it was not designed to replace a theory of language with a 
theory of discourse, but to provide insight into the status of knowledge. Given that ‘knowledge is 
                                                 
13
 In all cotextual sections, the concepts that are central to the conceptual architecture of the analysed text 
will be printed in bold. 
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that of which one can speak in a discursive practice’ (201) and that discursive practices form a 
self-referential system rather than a reflection of a material reality, the distinction between true 
and false knowledge recedes from view. Thus, the above quotation also means that, whereas 
desire could be understood as an external influence that corrupts the truth of knowledge, the 
archaeological approach reads it as constitutive of knowledge – a point worth keeping in mind in 
the analysis of Said’s Orientalism.  
 A second major point about the place of knowledge in The Archaeology is that it is 
inextricably linked to discourse: ‘there is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; 
and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms’ (201). This inverts the 
commonsensical order: the act of speaking/writing in a sense precedes knowledge. It is in this 
context that Foucault brings in the concept of the historical a priori, ‘defined as the group of 
rules that characterize a discursive practice’ (144). More concretely, the archaeological approach 
presupposes that there are certain rules that govern what can be said within a particular 
discourse. These are ‘a priori’ because they prestructure what can be said, but they are 
‘historical’ because they are far from universal. To the contrary, it is the task of the archaeologist 
to illustrate how discontinuities in these sets of rules account for discontinuities in the archive, 
meaning ‘the general system of the formation and transformation of statements’ (146, emphasis 
in original). Thus, the general domain of statements is broken up into discontinuous units. The 
discrepancies between certain disciplines with regard to which statements can be made are a 
case in point, but disciplines themselves also show discontinuous patterns, e.g. the break 
effected by the emergence of genetics within biology.  
 Thus, the task of archaeology is to analyze this archive, to isolate different discourses, to 
describe the rules that give rise to different kinds of knowledge, thereby replacing the idea of 
scientific progress with the discontinuities between different systems, and the idea of the subject 
as the source of knowledge with the notion of rules that govern knowledge production.  
 
Repeating this exercise with Discipline and Punish, a wholly different conceptual architecture 
presents itself. Two main concepts take over the central role discourse used to have: power and 
knowledge. Power, which was largely absent in The Archaeology, mainly manifests itself in the 
book as disciplinary power: a complex system of power relations that creates individuals and 
compels them to take up their role in society. As Foucault’s concept of power will be discussed 
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more extensively in a separate chapter, at this point it suffices to say that clusters of power 
relations have the ability to move societies in particular directions.  
 Knowledge, on the other hand, is the collection of things held to be true within a society 
or a subset of it, plus the ensuing techniques and skills held to be effective. In Western societies, 
there has been ‘a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where 
the power relations are suspended’ (27). This tradition holds that knowledge needs to be 
shielded off from power to avoid its corruption.  
 One could therefore assume that when Foucault claims that ‘power-knowledge relations 
are to be analysed’ (27), he aims to study the way in which power corrupts knowledge. Yet, this is 
emphatically not the case. Consider the following passage: 
 
‘there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, 
nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations’ (27) 
 
To conclude that Foucault argues that knowledge is always corrupted by power would be a 
mistake for two interdependent reasons. A first objection is obvious: if knowledge is by definition 
corrupted, there is no such thing as true knowledge. If there is no true knowledge, power cannot 
corrupt it. The second reason is less obvious, and yet it is hard to overstate its importance: power 
and knowledge do not affect each other because they are essentially the same thing. This is not 
to repeat the Baconian aphorism that knowledge is power, but rather, that it is more helpful to 
see power and knowledge as a single concept than as two interrelated notions. 
 Thus, what is really central is the concept of power-knowledge (27): the shocking claim in 
Discipline and Punish is not that techniques serving the power to punish derive from the human 
sciences, nor that the human sciences provided the instruments for the penal system, nor even 
that both processes mutually reinforced each other. The point Foucault tries to make is that 
disciplinary power and the human sciences share the same root. The epistemological mutation 
taking place in history where the human being becomes an object is the enabling moment for 
both disciplinary power and the human sciences: the human being becomes ‘effect and object of 
power,’ ‘effect and object of knowledge’ (192). It is the objectification that forms the power-
knowledge nexus. 
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 This nexus led to the political investment of the body: ‘the body is also directly involved 
in a political field’ (25). The body as an object of knowledge and power stands in ‘complex 
reciprocal relations’ (25) with economic use and the laws of production, violence, ideology, 
psychical and material force, institutions, and the state apparatus (26). A second consequence of 
this investment is the production of the soul: 
 
‘It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the 
contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the 
body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and, in a more 
general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at 
home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and 
supervised for the rest of their lives.’ (29) 
 
With the soul as a product of power-knowledge, the theme of an attack on the sovereign subject 
returns: the notions of ‘psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.’ have been built on 
the reality-reference of the soul (29-30). Thus, subjectivity returns in Discipline and Punish as a 
product of power, whereas The Archaeology had tried to remove the subject from analysis 
altogether. 
As illustrated above, archaeological analysis tried to achieve this removal of the subject 
through an insistence on discourse. In Discipline and Punish, however, discourse has been 
relegated to the periphery. The word has lost its technical sense. Consider for instance the 
following quotation: 
 
‘The great empirical knowledge that covered the things of the world and transcribed 
them into the ordering of an indefinite discourse that observes, describes and 
establishes the ‘facts’ (...) had its operating model no doubt in the Inquisition (...).’ (226) 
 
Whereas in The Archaeology discourse theoretically precedes knowledge, here the order has 
been inverted again: discourse is simply the formulation of the knowledge that inspired it. 
Consequently, the conceptual architecture in which the concept of discourse finds itself is 
fundamentally different. In summary, the analysis of knowledge through discursive formations 
called archaeology has been replaced with a genealogy of the subject: the analysis of how power 
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and knowledge give rise to specific forms of subjectivity, taking into account both discursive and 
non-discursive practices.  
 
3.2.3. Concept: Discourse as the Structure of Knowledge 
 
Now that the relationships between the concept of discourse and the other concepts in both The 
Archaeology and Discipline and Punish have been clarified, the time has come to look into the 
concept of discourse itself. For if the previous section proposed a working definition of the 
concept, it did not fully work out the distinction it proposed between a technical and a non-
technical sense of the word. This non-technical sense coincides with what Sawyer calls ‘standard 
usage,’ when ‘discourse refers to a unit of language larger than a sentence’ (434, emphasis in 
original). Hardly a definition, this notion of standard usage tries to capture the many meanings of 
the word ‘discourse’ by finding their common root: a dialogue, a treatise, an article, and a lecture 
are all units of language larger than a sentence. The first instances of ‘discourse’ in The 
Archaeology refer to this standard usage, with phrases like ‘the discourse of the historian’ (10, 
twice), ‘his (...) discourse’ (14), or ‘the discourse of one man’ (24). Thus, discourse is something 
which one can possess.  
 However, this use quickly becomes overshadowed when Foucault goes on to argue that 
‘discourse must (...) be (...) treated as and when it occurs’ (28, my emphasis). The verb is 
intransitive and in those rare cases where its subject is animate, the action is generally not 
intentional.14 Thus, discourse is no longer something a sovereign subject possesses, but an 
autonomous system. Ultimately, this is the very opposite of the standard usage described above. 
These definitions do not compete in The Archaeology: the former is only used to get to the latter. 
Thus, although Foucault scattered tentative definitions of the concept throughout the text, he 
does not provide these definitions with a ‘full meaning’ (131) until page 131: ‘We shall call 
discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation.’ Note 
that this is only a definition for ‘discourse’ as a count noun; the mass noun apparently retains its 
definition as ‘the general domain of all statements’ (90).  
                                                 
14
 Although the translation differs considerably from the original French, this verb transmits this non-
intentional and intransitive aspect of the action well. The original reads: ‘Il ne faut pas renvoyer le discours 
à la lointaine présence de l’origine ; il faut le traiter dans le jeu de son instance.’ (1969 : 37, my emphasis) 
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 The reason why it takes The Archaeology so long to come to its final definition is that it 
needs to develop the concepts of ‘statement’ and ‘discursive formation’ first. A discursive 
formation is already defined on page 41: 
 
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of 
dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic 
choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, 
transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a 
discursive formation (...). (41) 
 
‘Statement’ also needs to be defined, because it neither coincides with a series of signs, a 
proposition, nor a sentence: 
 
We will call statement the modality of existence proper to that [or any] group of signs: a 
modality that allows it to be something more than a series of traces, something more 
than a succession of marks on a substance, something more than a mere object made by 
a human being; a modality that allows it to be in relation with a domain of objects, to 
prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, to be situated among other verbal 
performances, and to be endowed with a repeatable materiality. (120) 
 
The point of combining these two definitions in the claim that a discourse is a group of 
statements belonging to the same discursive formation is to break up the traditional unities such 
as the book, the oeuvre, and the discipline, and to replace them with a system that explains why 
certain statements can be made in certain discursive practices, but not in others. It also points 
towards the creation of knowledge in discontinuous units, governed by certain rules of formation 
that are not imposed upon discourse, but that are present from the outset.  
 In short, the notion of discourse in The Archaeology of Knowledge aims to analyze 
knowledge as a discontinuous field in which various structures can be isolated. The task of the 
archaeologist is to detect the rules that govern the production of discourse and knowledge. If, as 
in Discipline and Punish, the idea of rules that govern discourse disappears, the whole concept of 
discourse as The Archaeology proposes it loses its value entirely. As far as this evolution from 
archaeology to genealogy is concerned, Dreyfus & Rabinow claim that ‘archaeology, while it still 
plays an important role, is subordinated to genealogy’ (103). Yet, given the drastic changes 
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between The Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish, one may well wonder 
whether archaeology has a place within genealogy at all. As the analysis of the concept of 
discourse has shown, archaeology and genealogy are irreconcilable without serious 
modifications.  
 
3.3. Orientalism and Discourse: Exit Knowledge, Enter Identity; Exit Power, Enter Authority 
3.3.1. Context: Between Marxism and Literary Studies 
 
Whereas Foucault at times deliberately downplayed the context in which his work was set, the 
introduction of Orientalism renders Said’s position very explicit, both within academia as well as 
in the broader realities of ordinary life. First and foremost, his work is of course a critique of 
Orientalism, defined in three ways: Orientalism is, first of all, the activity of the Orientalist; 
secondly, a ‘style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made 
between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident”’ (2). Thirdly, it is ‘a discourse,’ ‘as 
described by [Michel Foucault] in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish’ (3). 
If this threefold definition spans both Orientalism as a discipline and as a frame of mind affecting 
the average European, something similar can be said about Said’s critique of it: ‘the nexus of 
knowledge and power creating “the Oriental” and in a sense obliterating him as a human being is 
therefore not for me an exclusively academic matter’ (27). Said claims to write for an audience 
ranging from ‘students of literature’ (24) to the ‘formerly colonized people’ (25). This activist 
impetus is coupled with a strong ‘personal dimension’ (25).  
 Thus, the project differs from the archaeological method before Said can even begin to 
apply it: unlike the archaeological Foucault, Said does not intend to provide a descriptive, 
positivist account. As has been pointed out above, the impossibility of archaeology to go beyond 
a simple relativism was one of the reasons for the transition from archaeology to genealogy. But 
Said’s account of Orientalism is not a pure genealogy either, as it maintains the idea of discourse 
as a structure. As a more detailed account of the theoretical underpinnings will be provided in 
section 3.3.2., the relevant point for this contextual analysis is that Orientalism does not present 
itself as a pure application of a Foucauldian method. Not only does Said claim to deviate from 
Foucault as far as the status of the individual is concerned (23),15 he also sees the need to 
                                                 
15
 The question of whether this supposed deviation is a significant methodological choice, or simply a 
misunderstanding of Foucault’s work, will be dealt with later on. 
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combine Foucault’s notion of discourse with Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (7) and lists 
Foucault’s name together with Antonio Gramsci and Raymond Williams (14). In short, Said 
presents his method as a combination of very heterogeneous elements. 
 Approaching the issue negatively, this ideosyncracy of Orientalism also expresses Said’s 
discontent with the methods available to him. The root of the problem for Said is the difficulty in 
connecting culture and imperialism. Marxist approaches easily end up subordinating the realm of 
culture and ideas to imperial domination ‘mechanically and deterministically’ (12), whereas 
‘literary studies in general’ (13) clings to the idea that ‘a literary scholar and a philosopher, for 
example, are trained in literature and philosophy respectively, not in politics or ideological 
analysis’ (14). Neither does the history of ideas offer a valid alternative, because it overlooks the 
connections between ideas and their material effects (cf. 23). The following section will have a 
closer look at how Said aims to solve this problem. Can the concept of discourse provide the 
missing link between the ideal and the material?  
 
3.3.2. Cotext: A Double Conceptual Architecture 
 
To reconstruct a conceptual architecture of Orientalism is by no means an easy task. With the 
debate in mind as to the degree of ‘Foucauldianness,’ summarily sketched in section 3.1., 
Orientalism indeed seems to be vacillating between two different structures. The core of the 
problem resides in the relations between the concepts of discourse, power and knowledge. From 
the signifiers ‘discourse,’ ‘power,’ and ‘knowledge,’ Orientalism constructs two architectures in 
which these concepts possess different signifieds. This section will illustrate how these three 
signifiers can be combined to form two radically different conceptual architectures. 
 
The previous sections have sought to emphasize the importance of understanding power and 
knowledge in Discipline and Punish as a single concept, but this is not the line of argument Said 
consistently follows. Instead, he sets up a conflict between knowledge and power. Consider for 
instance the following quotation: 
 
I doubt that it is controversial, for example, to say that an Englishman in India or Egypt in 
the later nineteenth century took an interest in those countries that was never far from 
their status in his mind as British colonies. To say this may seem quite different from 
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saying that all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and 
impressed with, violated by, the gross political fact – and yet that is what I am saying in 
this study of Orientalism. (11, emphasis in original) 
 
If academic knowledge is ‘tinged,’ ‘impressed,’ or ‘violated’ by colonial power, power and 
knowledge may be interdependent, but certainly not coincident.  Knowledge is distorted from 
the outside. Thus the possibility of true knowledge is never at issue and Said retains the 
possibility of contrasting a mendacious discipline like Orientalism with knowledge that ‘genuinely 
seemed to be advancing’ (63). Moreover, whereas Foucault understood knowledge as a set of 
discursive formations with a particular truth-effect, thus separating it from other discursive 
formations like literature or myth, these distinctions remain undiscussed in Orientalism. At times 
it seems that Said is not so much interested in knowledge as such, but in any discursive 
articulation of identity – a concept Foucault simply did not use. Indeed, Said ‘tries to show that 
European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort 
of surrogate self’ (3). What Orientalism discusses as knowledge includes ‘elaborate theories, 
epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts’ (2), which, taken together, support ‘the 
idea of European identity as a superior one’ (7). More than just knowledge, it is identity that is at 
stake. 
 Power, the other half of the power-knowledge cluster, assumes many different shapes. 
Thus, Said distinguishes between ‘power political,’ ‘power intellectual,’ ‘power cultural,’ and 
‘power moral’ (12). These forms of power ‘exist in an uneven exchange’ with discourse (12). 
Thus, discourse itself is not a power-knowledge unit, but merely a supposed representation of an 
object. This representation is to be situated on a scale between two opposed forces: raw power 
and pure knowledge. Orientalist discourse, on this scale, is on the side of power: the scholarship 
of Orientalism is ‘based finally on power and not really on disinterested objectivity’ (148). But 
what this power, for Said, exactly is remains unclear. Consider the following two quotations: 
 
‘The discourse of Orientalism and what made it possible – in Napoleon’s case, a West far 
more powerful militarily than the Orient – (...).’ (95) 
‘The scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier was in, or thought 
about, the Orient because he could be there, or could think about it, with very little 
resistance on the Orient’s part.’ (7, emphasis in original) 
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It seems here that power is not something Orientalism analyzes or explains, but something it 
takes for granted. Rather than the consequence of a particular subject-object relationship, as in a 
Foucauldian architecture, it appears more akin to military and logistical power. What Orientalism 
explains, then, is not power per se, but authority:  
 
There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, 
disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of 
taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and 
from traditions, perceptions, and judgements it forms, transmits, reproduces. Above all, 
authority can, indeed must, be analyzed. (19-20) 
 
Authority in this case is the capacity to represent the relationship between the West and the 
Orient in such a way that the West is able not only to know the Orient, but also to decide what is 
best for it. Rather than the manipulation of the objects of power, what Said describes is the 
process that legitimizes the use of military power. The question this first possible conceptual 
architecture aims to answer, therefore, is how the fiction of European superiority, inspired by a 
will to power, manages to mask itself as truth.  
With Orientalism as an expression of a Western will to power, the notion of gaze loses its 
relevance for Said: ‘gifted pilgrims like Nerval and Flaubert preferred Lane’s descriptions to what 
their eyes and minds showed them immediately’ (177). Other concepts, however, quickly take its 
place: with the new-found distinction between true and interested knowledge, the possibility of 
an individual that makes its own choices returns. In practice, however, Orientalism is cast as so 
authoritative that ‘no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking 
account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism’ (3). Said’s description 
of Marx is enlightening in this respect:  
 
That Marx was still able to sense some fellow feeling, to identify even a little with poor 
Asia, suggests that something happened before the labels took over, before he was 
dispatched to Goethe as a source of wisdom on the Orient. It is as if the individual mind 
(Marx’s, in this case) could find a precollective, preofficial individuality in Asia – find and 
even give in to its pressures upon his emotions, feelings, senses – only to give it up when 
he confronted a more formidable censor in the very vocabulary he found himself forced 
to employ. (155) 
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What Said is essentially saying is that Marx was not an Orientalist until something outside himself 
took over. In that sense, Said reinstalls an opposition between the individual and the social, 
which is exactly what Foucault set out to avoid: Discipline and Punish had located individuality as 
a product of disciplinary power, not as its antagonist.  
 This return of individuality poses a problem that is more significant than a mere 
theoretical lapse or an intrusion of empiricism upon Foucault’s theory. Quite to the contrary, the 
individual has a foundational role in this conceptual architecture: it prepares the ground for the 
concept of hegemony. Said refers to Gramsci’s claim that hegemony is the domination of certain 
ideas through ‘consent’ (7), an idea which accords a role to the individual that does not fit in with 
either archaeology or genealogy.  
 Of course, there is no reason why Said should stay true to Foucault’s method. After all, 
the advantages of this second conceptual architecture are considerable: it allows an analysis of 
the treacherousness of representation, without discarding the possibility of a more objective 
knowledge. Moreover, in retaining a notion of reality, it opens up a path for resistance: the 
discrepancy between reality and Orientalist representation can undermine domination.  
 Nevertheless, this first model fails to provide a sound base for the most ambitious of 
Orientalism’s claims, viz. that Orientalist discourse played an active and foundational role in the 
Western domination of the Orient. Indeed, Said argues that ‘the Orient needed first to be known, 
then invaded and possessed’ (92). Similarly, he emphasizes that ‘knowledge of subject races or 
Orientals is what makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, more 
power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information 
and control’ (36). As Young points out, this ‘implies that the misrepresentation nevertheless 
worked effectively when it encountered the reality which it distorted’ (2001: 400). In other 
words, the problem with this architecture is that it leaves unexplained the question of how false 
knowledge can give rise to this ‘dialectic of information and control.’ Unless we resort to a 
second conceptual model, this effectiveness cannot be accounted for. 
 
With the same signifiers, a second constellation can be constructed. If a representation is, as Said 
argues, ‘eo ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things 
besides the “truth,” which is itself a representation’ (272), then the very possibility of a ‘true 
knowledge’ ceases to exist. Indeed, knowledge is then a fact of discourse: it is ‘embedded first in 
48 
 
the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer’ 
(272). As this discursive knowledge ceases to be a representation of the truth, it is inextricably 
tied up with questions of power: representation is no longer the re-presentation in discourse of 
something that is ‘out there,’ but the creation of a discursive object. As the analysis of the role of 
objects in The Archaeology of Knowledge has shown, this discursive object is a material object in 
the process of being named, defined, designated, demarcated, measured, qualified, etc. 
Combining this insight with the stress Discipline and Punish places on power, one can read 
Orientalist discourse as a power-knowledge nexus: it is a discourse that works on its object. Thus, 
the suggestion made in 3.2.2 to think of power-knowledge as a single concept finds its realization 
here, where the concept of discourse ties knowledge and power together.  
 Still, one may wonder how it is possible to combine the notion of autonomous discourse 
as one finds it in The Archaeology with some of the non-discursive practices emphasized in 
Discipline and Punish. More concretely, how can Said privilege discourse as his object of analysis 
while making regular references to the importance of the gaze? It is my contention that although 
Said refers to the Benthamite Panopticon (e.g. 127), which is one of the principal themes of 
Discipline and Punish, his concept of the gaze owes more to Foucault’s early work than to 
Discipline and Punish itself. Perhaps the only way to make sense of this odd combination of 
discourse and the gaze is to claim that both of them share the same structure, if, as Foucault put 
it in The Birth of the Clinic, there is something like ‘the spoken structure of the perceived’ (xii).  
Ironically, it is Said’s reference to the book Foucault wrote to move away from 
structuralism that forces us into this conclusion, but it also appears that Orientalism, in any case, 
never took much trouble to avoid a connection to structuralism anyway. Thus, Said regularly 
speaks of the ‘structure of Orientalism’ (e.g. 6, 43) and plays with the term in Chapter 2, 
‘Orientalist Structures and Restructures’ (111-198). It is not hard to see the value of this 
approach: the concept of discourse indeed bridges the gap between ideas and material reality. 
Indeed, by emphasizing how discursive structures are already situated from the start, this 
approach does away with the opposition between the ideal and the material and gives rise to the 
study of the materiality of discourse instead.  
Looking back at the analysis of the introduction offered in section 3.3.1, however, the 
question arises as to whether this conceptual architecture is really the book Said intended to 
write. After all, this liberal application of Foucault’s quasi-structuralist method presents 
considerable problems in this context. Not only is there the obvious problem of a lack of agency 
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and the impossibility of resistance, the elimination of truth also forecloses the option of 
contrasting orientalist representation with a more neutral version. Moreover, one would still 
need to locate the matrix that gives rise to the power-knowledge cluster. Whereas Discipline and 
Punish located this matrix in the appearance of Man as an object of knowledge and power, 
Orientalism is simply silent on this issue. To assume that one can simply transplant this argument 
into Orientalism would be erroneous: for Foucault, the objectification of Man gives rise to the 
human sciences as a whole, whereas Said argues that Orientalism is in a ‘retrogressive position 
when compared with the other human sciences’ (261). One might argue that Said offers an 
alternative under the form of ‘positional superiority’ (7), or that the binary opposition between 
Self and Other forms this matrix, but such an argument moves far beyond the actual text.  
 
Although the conceptual architecture presented above is mobilized in Orientalism, it is also 
contradicted at several points. If Orientalism is a discursive regularity, with rules that govern the 
production of knowledge, what is the point of stressing ‘the determining imprint of individual 
writers,’ as Said does (23)? A second obvious contradiction is that Said does not consistently 
accept the consequences of the impossibility of truth. As Young points out, his approach ‘implies 
an ideology-versus-reality distinction, or signifier-signified distinction, which Foucault’s analyses 
explicitly reject’ (2001: 399). Thus, Said speaks of Orientalism that ‘pressed ideological myths into 
service, even as knowledge seemed genuinely to be advancing’ (63). This does not differ from 
what Clifford already pointed out in 1988 (269). But what both Young and Clifford fail to 
acknowledge is that this is not a mere contradiction within Said’s approach. Neither is it a 
straightforward combination of Foucault’s theories with the commonsensical idea that there is a 
reality ‘out there’. The crux of the matter is that Orientalism harbours two methods, each 
approach an uncanny double of the other.  
 
Putting these architectures together, Said attempts to make two different claims: that knowledge 
of the Orient creates the authority to wield power over the Orient, and that knowledge is an 
active agent in the subjection and manipulation of the actual Orient (and is thus a form of 
power). In doing so, he superimposes two incompatible architectures, assisted by the fact that 
both constellations are formed with the concepts of discourse, power, and knowledge. For ease 
of reference, this chapter will henceforth call the first architecture ‘instrumentalist,’ hinting at 
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the fact that it presents knowledge as an instrument of power, and the second ‘Foucauldian,’ 
because it clings to the Foucauldian idea of a power internal to knowledge.  
 
3.3.3. Concept: Double Trouble 
 
The question that needs to be addressed in this final section is how the doubling of the 
conceptual architecture affects the concept of discourse itself. In the instrumentalist 
architecture, discourse is not autonomous at all: it is corrupted by a power external to itself. 
Power ceases to be an effect of Orientalist discourse and becomes its precondition. Rather than 
contributing actively and directly to the subjection of the Orient, discourse merely legitimizes and 
authorizes power. In this constellation, the concept of discourse does not cancel the opposition 
between the ideal and the material – it is situated on the ideological side of the divide. 
Orientalism, then, is the ideology that legitimates Western domination. It does not only restrict 
itself to the production of (false) scholarly knowledge, but also invades other discursive 
formations: travel writing, poetry, the media, and, any other type of statement that contributes 
to ‘the idea of European identity as a superior one’ (7). Ultimately, it explains the question of 
how discourse creates authority, rather than the power relationship within discourse. 
In the Foucauldian architecture, by contrast, the concept of discourse effectively avoids 
the opposition between the ideal and the material. It is understood as a power-knowledge 
cluster. Thus, ‘discourse’ forms a structure that creates and affects its objects. Based on the 
analyses above, one can argue that this concept weds the autonomy of discourse proposed in 
The Archaeology to the emphasis on power-knowledge that forms the core of Discipline and 
Punish. It is this amalgam that forms the concept Said refers to whenever he seeks to drive home 
the point that knowledge plays a foundational role in the subjection of the Orient. Rather than 
discourse as authority, it presents discourse as power-knowledge. The Foucauldian model, 
descriptive as it is, can account for the effects, functions, and methods of discourse, but never for 
what legitimizes its actions. Rather than discourse as authority, it presents discourse as power-
knowledge. 
In combination with Young’s earlier observation that this second model fails to account 
for the effectiveness of discourse, the argument comes full-circle again: the Foucauldian 
architecture explains the effects of discourse, but fails to pinpoint the motives that engender it, 
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or the authority that legitimizes it, whereas the instrumentalist architecture sheds light on this 
authority, but cannot possibly understand the actual mechanisms of subjection. 
   
Taking a step back from this technical analysis, I believe that these two concepts of discourse are 
broadly indicative of two conflicting impulses in Orientalism. First of all, there is the tendency to 
critically engage Foucault’s notion of discourse on its own terms: however hard Brennan may 
deny it (2000: 579), a substantial part of Orientalism hinges on Foucault’s work. However, at 
times there appears to be a tendency to use the term discourse for reasons that have less to do 
with the value of Foucault’s work than with the problems encountered in different approaches. 
As the contextual analysis in 3.3.1 has shown, Said took issue with Marxist models which 
approached culture deterministically. As Sawyer puts it, ‘‘Culture’ generally refers to a realm of 
ideas, concepts and symbols; the term implies that this realm can be distinguished from material 
realities and concrete social practices’ (448). Similarly, the term ‘ideology’ implies ‘a radical 
separation between a realm of ideas and material and social reality’ (449). This is the problem 
that the more or less Foucauldian conceptualization of discourse had solved, but by doubling its 
architecture, Orientalism ends up in double trouble.   
 
To say that both the Foucauldian and the instrumental architecture can be traced in Orientalism 
is one thing, to find out which one has gained the upper hand is another altogether. The 
discussions in the chapters to come will shed further light on how the distinction between the 
two approaches continues to stir up trouble in postcolonial studies – not only in relation to the 
concept of discourse, but also in relation to divergent notions of power and knowledge.  
In conclusion, let us rehearse briefly the absolutely crucial ways in which Orientalism 
doubles the meaning of each of these terms. In the case of discourse, this involves the 
discrepancy between an autonomous system and a system of representation. When it comes to 
power, this can either be understood as a particular subject-object relationship or as the 
authority that legitimates acts of colonialism. Finally, ‘knowledge’ can be understood as that 
same subject-object relationship Foucault characterizes, or as a larger set of statements that 
ultimately supports notions of identity.  
The importance of these three reconceptualizations can hardly be overstated: as the 
following chapters will show, Foucault will continue to move towards actual technologies of 
power, whereas postcolonial studies focus heavily on authority and identity – two concepts 
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Foucault never used. For now, the task at hand is to find out how this tension plays out in the 
work of Homi Bhabha. 
 
3.4. Bhabha and Discourse: Further Down the Psychosocial Road 
3.4.1. Context: Poststructuralism Meets Psychoanalysis 
 
Having located this split in Said’s conceptual architecture, one might wonder where the value of 
these theoretical reflections lies. After all, in spite of its theoretical weaknesses, Orientalism’s 
attack on Western ethnocentrism was largely unambiguous and its exposure of the role of 
knowledge in processes of colonization left little room for misunderstanding. However, only in 
Homi Bhabha’s work and the fiery reactions it provokes does this split attain its full significance. It 
is this complex intertextual web between Foucault, Said, and Bhabha that we now turn to.  
 As a postcolonial theorist, Bhabha has been extremely prolific: his essays have challenged 
the notion of fixed identities, promoted the concept of cultural hybridity, and proposed an 
original account of the encounter between colonizer and colonized. Moreover, he has engaged 
the notions of multiculturalism, of the nation and of cultural rights, establishing himself as a 
virtually inescapable beacon for postcolonial studies.  
 Rather than attend to Bhabha’s multiple references to Foucault and Said, scattered 
throughout his extensive oeuvre, this section will focus on his appropriation of the concept of 
discourse as developed in two specific texts: “The Other Question” and “Of Mimicry and Man.” 
Although both texts have taken their final authoritative shape in The Location of Culture (1994), 
earlier versions of these texts were published soon after the arrival of Orientalism, in 1983 and 
1984 respectively.16  
 In anticipation of a more profound analysis of Bhabha’s theory of discourse, a brief 
exploration of the main arguments propounded in these two essays will allow us to situate them 
in the larger context they evoke. “The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the 
Discourse of Colonialism” presents a revision of the concept of stereotype. The stereotype, 
Bhabha argues, as a primary instance of colonial discourse, does not have the degree of stability 
it is usually attributed. It vacillates between the fixity of an alleged essence, and the change that 
                                                 
16
 Bhabha, H. 1983. “Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism” IN Barker, F.; Hulme, P.; 
Iversen, M.; Loxley, D. The Politics of Theory: Proceedings of the Essex Conference on the Sociology of 
Literature, July 1982.  Colchester: University of Essex. pp. 194-211.  
Bhabha, H. 1984."Of Mimicry and Man: the Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse." October,  28:1, 125-133. 
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inevitably occurs in a different enunciative context. On a psychic level, the stereotype is a 
confrontation of the recognition of difference and its disavowal, of narcissism and aggressivity. 
Although the stereotype thus reveals colonial anxieties, it is this instability which makes it 
effective as a strategy of control: its ambivalence allows it to contain the contradictions that run 
through the representation of the colonized: ‘The black is both savage (cannibal) and yet the 
most obedient and dignified of servants (the bearer of food); he is the embodiment of rampant 
sexuality and yet innocent as a child (...)’ (82). 
 This ambivalence is not unique to the stereotype: it is a feature of colonial discourse in 
general, as “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse” proceeds to explain. 
Mimicry, in Bhabha’s appropriation of a Bakhtinian concept, is the desire of the colonizer to 
create a colonial subject that is almost the same as the colonizer, but not quite. This colonial 
strategy creates colonial subjects which, due to their similarity, can be known and controlled, 
but, due to their difference, legitimate the continued presence of the colonizer as surveillant. 
This production of subjects that are almost the same, but not quite, can easily turn into a 
menace, a resistant subjectivity, when the subject is almost completely other, but not quite. As 
an instance of colonial discourse, the Bible can be seen as an illustration of how the play of 
sameness and otherness resists and undermines colonial discourse: although the colonized gladly 
obtain a copy (sameness), they reportedly use the Bible as wrapping paper (otherness).17 Thus, 
the displacement of colonial discourse subverts it and creates potential for resistance. 
 The question of how exactly Bhabha locates this ambivalence in colonial discourse will be 
dealt with in detail below. For now, what matters is that Bhabha follows up on Said’s attempt to 
analyze the ensemble of Western writings on the colonized as a discourse. Thus, a 1984 version 
of “The Other Question” acknowledges Said’s great influence, because Orientalism offers a 
‘profound meditation on the myths of western power and knowledge which confine the 
colonized and dispossessed to a half-life of misrepresentation and migration’ (149). 
 That being said, Bhabha’s acceptance of Orientalism is far from uncritical: if the earlier 
reading of Orientalism located a crucial split between colonial texts as representations that justify 
colonialism, or colonial texts as a discourse that plays an active role in processes of colonization, 
Bhabha clearly tends towards the latter: 
 
                                                 
17
 Bhabha briefly mentions this example in the final lines of “Of Mimicry and Man”, but elaborates on it in 
Bhabha, H. 1994. “Signs Taken for Wonders” IN: The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. pp. 102-122. 
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However, having introduced the concept of ‘discourse’ [Said] does not face up to the problems it 
creates for an instrumentalist notion of power/knowledge that he seems to require. This problem 
is summed up by his ready acceptance of the view that, ‘Representations are formations, or as 
Roland Barthes has said of all the operations of language, they are deformations.’ (72) 
 
The word ‘deformation’ is what bothers Bhabha in this formulation: it implies an outside 
influence perturbing an accurate representation and sets up a conflict between knowledge and 
power, rather than embracing the Foucauldian approach in which knowledge and power at times 
coincide. Bearing in mind the two conceptual architectures traced in Orientalism, it becomes 
apparent that Bhabha builds on the Foucauldian rather than the instrumentalist framework. 
Dissolving the possibility of unproblematic knowledge, he also dispenses with the enlightened 
subject that came with Said’s humanist impetus.  
  
However, to argue that Bhabha continues to work along the lines of Foucault and the 
Foucauldian interpretation of Said would be extremely reductive. As a notorious eclectic, Bhabha 
deployed this model only in conflictual opposition to other approaches, both literary and 
theoretical. Although the final version of these two essays acknowledge these influences only 
sparingly, an earlier version states that “The Other Question” is ‘indebted to traditions of post-
structuralist and psychoanalytic theory, especially in their feminist formulation’ (OQ 1986: 149). 
This invocation of feminist theory is surprising, to say the least: for all Bhabha’s talk of race and 
sexuality as ‘modes of differentiation, realized as multiple, cross-cutting determinations, 
polymorphous and perverse’ (OQ 1994: 67), Young rightly observes that ‘Bhabha’s model 
nowhere broaches the question of a gendered colonial subject’ (1990: 154). Moreover, the 
occasional reference to Kristeva aside, it is the names of Foucault and Derrida that are ubiquitous 
in these essays. Interestingly, in contrast to these theorists, Bhabha does adopt the label 
‘poststructuralist’ to describe this heterogeneous ensemble. Poster’s provisional definition of 
what poststructuralism is might prove helpful here: 
 
Poststructuralist writers, especially Michel Foucault, reevaluate the nature of the subject 
of theory and the theoretical subject, basing the reevaluation in large part on new ways 
of conceptualizing language. Poststructuralists question the easy assumption that the 
theoretical subject can generate a discourse that represents the real, unmasks 
domination in the real, without himself/herself introducing new forms of domination. 
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Poststructuralists criticize the assumption of much of modern thought that theoretical 
discourse is a direct expression of a truth in the theorist’s mind, that this truth in some 
way captures historical reality, and that the question of freedom entails the 
appropriation of this truth by historical agents and their subsequent action to actualize 
it. Poststructuralists point to various ways in which language materially affects the 
relation of the theorist to his or her discourse and the ways in which the social field is 
composed of linguistic phenomena – Foucault’s discourse/practice, Baudrillard’s code, 
Derrida’s écriture, Lyotard’s phrases and le différend. (1989: 3-4)  
 
This definition dovetails neatly with the theory of discourse Bhabha develops, and particularly 
with his attention to the discursive structure of the social. As such, Bhabha’s work and the 
category of poststructuralism provide a point of attack for those who consider the emphasis on 
linguistic phenomena within postcolonial studies to be excessive. Before diving into a more 
technical analysis of the extent to which Bhabha’s work constitutes an example of excessive 
textualism, however, it is crucial to note how Bhabha combines this poststructuralist impetus 
with concepts derived from psychoanalysis. Thus, if one labels his theory of discourse 
‘poststructuralist,’ this poststructuralism is always already affected by psychoanalytic categories, 
developed in dialogue with Freud, Lacan, and Fanon.  
  
The main concept that ties Bhabha to Freud, Lacan and Fanon is that of the ‘mirror stage,’ a term 
coined by Lacan as an addition to Freud’s account of the formation of the ego.18 It refers to the 
moment when a baby senses a contrast between its own lack of coordination and the image of 
itself as a whole in the mirror. While attracted to this image, the child also perceives this image 
as a rival. The tension between this narcissism and aggression is resolved in the moment of 
primary identification when the child perceives this image as its own.  
Two additions Lacan made are crucial for both Fanon and Bhabha’s appropriation of the 
concept. First, this moment of identification does result in a stable identity. As Sarup puts it, ‘the 
subject will never be truly ‘himself’ or ‘herself’. The child sees itself in the mirror, but the image is 
                                                 
18
 Lacan introduced the term at the Fourteenth International Psychoanalytical Congress in 1936. For an 
English translation of his paper, see “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I” in Lacan, J. 
1977. Ecrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock. pp 1-7. For a description of how Lacan’s concept of the mirror 
stage changed throughout his work, see Evans, D. 1996. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge. pp. 114-116. 
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reversed’ (1992: 65). Identification therefore ceases to be a phase in life and becomes rather a 
continual process.  
 Second, the image the subject identifies with need not be reflected in a real mirror. Evans 
explains that ‘even when there is no real mirror, the baby sees its behaviour reflected in the 
imitative gestures of an adult or another child; these imitative gestures enable the other person 
to function as a specular image’ (190). The connection between the idea of the specular image 
and theories of colonial discourse can be established through a common focus on power: indeed, 
the specular image has a specific yet ambiguous power effect, brought together in Lacan’s 
concept of ‘captation.’ Captation plays on the meanings of ‘captivation’ and ‘capture,’ thus 
referring to both ‘the fascinating, seductive power of the image’ and ‘the more sinister power of 
the image to imprison the subject in a disabling fixation’ (Evans 1996: 20).  
 It is exactly this power Fanon experiments with in Black Skin, White Masks. This 1952 
publication presents what Gates has called ‘the originary irruption of Lacan into colonial 
discourse theory’ (1991: 461). Fanon asserts that ‘when one has grasped the mechanism 
described by Lacan, one can have no further doubt that the real other for the white man is and 
will continue to be the black man’ (161). Because the other is ‘perceived on the level of the body 
image, absolutely as the not-self,’ the black man as a specular image blocks identification. For the 
black man, however, the specular image is colour-neutral, thus admitting identification of blacks 
with whites and the ensuing ambivalent feelings of admiration and rivalry.  
 Although Fanon’s invocation of Lacan has clearly inspired “The Other Question” and “Of 
Mimicry and Man,” Bhabha’s acceptance of Fanon’s idea is not unqualified: in his foreword to 
Black Skin, White Masks, Bhabha insists that this other should not be seen as an opposed 
presence, a fixed counterpoint, but rather as the negation of identity (xviii). In the words of 
Gates, ‘he wants Fanon to mean Lacan rather than, say, Jean-Paul Sartre’ (461).  
If earlier it became apparent that Bhabha’s Said is the Foucauldian rather than the 
instrumentalist Said, one can now conclude that Bhabha’s Fanon is a Lacanian Fanon. Given the 
association of Foucault’s theory of discourse with structuralism discussed earlier, and Sarup’s 
contention that ‘one of the things Lacan has done is to reinterpret Freud in the light of 
structuralist and post-structuralist theories of discourse’ (10), this goes a long way towards 
explaining how Bhabha manages to combine these highly divergent intertexts: he refracts both 
Said and Fanon through the lens of (post)structuralist theories.   
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Nevertheless, one may still question the compatibility of psychoanalysis with both Foucault’s 
work and colonial discourse theory. There are certainly crucial convergences between Foucault’s 
archaeological method and Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially when it comes to the status of 
the subject. Both Lacan and Foucault undercut the possibility of a sovereign subject and redefine 
it as an effect of language. As a consequence, reality ceases to be an unproblematic given and 
becomes something that is discursively constructed. Finally, the symbolic in Lacan and the 
discursive in Foucault have in common that they are both linguistic dimensions, to be analyzed as 
autonomous realms. Evans’s assertion that for Lacan ‘the symbolic order is completely 
autonomous: it is not a superstructure determined by biology or genetics’ (202) equally applies 
to the discursive order Foucault traces in The Archaeology of Knowledge.  
 Still, aside from the obvious discrepancies between interests and emphases, there are 
two major points where Foucault’s work and psychoanalytic theory clash. As argued in the earlier 
discussion of The Archaeology, Foucault opposed the idea of a subject that interprets discourse 
and discovers hidden meaning. Thus, if the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is, as Evans 
summarizes it, ‘to lead the analysand to recognize the truth about his desire’ (36), this betrays 
the hermeneutic impetus Foucault sought to avoid at all costs. Yet, in “The Function and Field of 
Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” Lacan introduces a ‘renewed technique of 
interpretation’ that was surprisingly similar to Foucault’s reading method, emphasizing the 
formal features of discourse and the need to read the analysand’s discourse as a sequence of 
signifiers (Lacan 1977: 82). 
 The second problem hinges on the link between power and desire. The crux of the 
matter resides in the first volume of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, which chapter 5 will deal 
with in more detail. For now, what matters is that Foucault took issue with a theorization of 
power as primarily repressive, stressing the productivity of power instead: even desire was 
conceptualized as a product of power. This stands in stark opposition to the Freudian idea of 
power, assuming the shape of the law, which represses desire. However, two nuances are called 
for here. First, Lacan revised this relationship between power and desire considerably by creating 
an interconnection rather than an opposition: while the law imposes limitations on desire, the 
law also produces desire. According to Evans, ‘desire is essentially the desire to transgress, and 
for there to be transgression it is first necessary for there to be prohibition’ (99). It appears thus 
that the issue does not consist of the discrepancy between power as either productive or 
repressive, but rather the tendency to equate power with the law. This brings us to the second 
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nuance: although it is certainly the case that the History of Sexuality attempted to break free 
from a conceptualization of power as law, this is less evident in The Archaeology of Knowledge: in 
fact, one may even argue that Foucault’s notion of rules fulfils a similar function. As Bhabha’s 
work presents a mixture of both archaeological and genealogical elements, this tension stands 
unresolved and the friction between Foucauldian and psychoanalytical elements remains.  
 
 The tension between Foucault and psychoanalysis is not the only faultline running through “The 
Other Question” and “Of Mimicry and Man.” The confrontation between psychoanalysis and the 
postcolonial is perhaps even more questionable. There is of course Deleuze and Guattari’s 
famous objection, voiced in Anti-Oedipus, that the universalization of the Oedipal drama 
constitutes a ‘colonialism pursued by other means’ (1977: 170). Second, as Gilman’s Freud, Race 
and Gender (1993) demonstrates, psychoanalysis as a practice has served colonial interests. It 
has operated as an instrument of normalization and is intimately connected to the bourgeoisie. 
As Loomba phrases the question, ‘is it at all possible, then, to use psychoanalytic paradigms to 
think productively about colonial relations, or are they too bound up with colonialist ways of 
ordering culture and biology’ (2005: 127)?    
 
Summing up, at least three potentially conflicting contexts can be found in “The Other Question” 
and “Of Mimicry and Man”: the Foucauldian, the psychoanalytic, and the postcolonial. The 
heterogeneity of these positions has led Ahmad to denounce Bhabha’s work as a ‘theoretical 
mélange which randomly invokes Lévi-Strauss in one phrase, Foucault in another, Lacan in yet 
another’ (1992: 68). The task at hand is to find out how Bhabha’s conceptual architecture houses 
these highly divergent positions.  
  
3.4.2. Cotext: Exit Knowledge, Enter Intersubjectivity 
 
To construct a conceptual architecture of “The Other Question” is more than ever a violation of 
the text. Indeed, as Huddart puts it, Bhabha’s essays ‘are not coherent mosaics in which all the 
pieces fit together harmoniously: their pieces often have jagged edges. They are mixed critical 
texts that use concepts or quotations in a patchwork critical form’ (2006: 14). This section aims to 
strike a balance between attending to these slippages and arresting a more stable framework, 
even if the latter activity runs against the spirit of Bhabha’s work.  
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 In order to comprehend the structure Bhabha outlines, an analysis contrasting it with 
Orientalism may be of use. As one recalls, Orientalism contained two distinct claims: Orientalism 
as a discourse performed a crucial role in the actual process of colonization, and Orientalism as a 
representation legitimated the colonization of the Orient. Each of these claims had its issues: the 
first failed to locate a matrix that could explain how orientalist discourse worked upon its object, 
and the second depended on the possibility of true knowledge. Bhabha, although fully conscious 
of these problems, combines both claims anyway: 
 
The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate 
types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of 
administration and instruction. (1994: 70) 
 
His solution is twofold: after dropping the architecture we referred to earlier as instrumentalist, 
he reintroduces this legitimizing function of representation as one of multiple functions of 
discourse, and finds in Fanon’s work the key to the effect of colonial discourse on the colonized.  
 Architecturally, this means that he takes as his starting point discourse as an instance of 
power-knowledge. Bhabha thus follows up on Said’s combination of Foucauldian archaeology 
with the power-knowledge concept. This combination, left incomplete by Said, allows Bhabha to 
understand statements as not just an ideological construction that represent their objects in an 
interested way to achieve specific effects, but as entities that create and affect their objects – by 
dividing, measuring, naming, and conceptualizing them, or any other activity that confirms them 
in their objecthood. Although the logic of objecthood was implicit in Orientalism, especially in its 
references to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, it was not developed into anything more than the 
constatation that Orientals were named as such and were described as lazy and unreliable.  
 Unsatisfied, Bhabha finds inspiration in the work of Frantz Fanon, whose description of 
the epidermal schema directed analysis toward the role of skin colour in processes of 
colonization. It is ‘skin, as a signifier of discrimination’ which ‘must be produced or processed as 
visible’ (Bhabha 1994: 79). In other words, this production of knowledge is played out in ‘those 
regimes of visibility and discursivity’ where the skin is the object of the gaze and discourse. This 
move enables him to explain what Said could not – in Young’s words, ‘how the representation 
articulates with the actual’ (1990: 142). 
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Taking a step back, it appears that Bhabha’s theory of discourse is the result of Said’s half-
hearted combination of The Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish, complemented 
with Fanon’s epidermal schema, and the idea of power-knowledge as the foundation of the 
whole. When it comes to the status of the subject, however, the picture gets more blurry.  Both 
in Foucault and Said, the subject, an effect of discourse, is not staged in its plurality. Bhabha has 
two main objections that complicate their notions of subjectivity. First, Bhabha argues, positing 
the subject as the subject of a homogeneous discourse has a misleading unifying effect: ‘the 
terms in which Said’s Orientalism is unified – the intentionality and unidirectionality of colonial 
power – also unify the subject of colonial enunciation’ (1994: 72). Contra Said, Bhabha will argue 
that the inherent, internal ambivalence of colonial discourse splits the colonial subject internally. 
Moreover – and this is the second objection – the subject can also be split between different 
discourses, as becomes evident in Bhabha’s description of the colonial subject as ‘primordially 
fixed and yet triply split between the incongruent knowledges of body, race, ancestors’ (80). 
Thus, as opposed to Said’s account of a single knowledge, viz. Orientalism, which projects a single 
subject and a single object, a multitude of conflicting knowledges come into play, shaping 
conflicting subject-positions.  
 As soon as Bhabha takes this path, he turns away from Foucault’s early work. The main 
concern of The Archaeology of Knowledge was to analyze the structure of knowledge, its 
functions, and its effects. Although it pays attention to the subject positions knowledge project, 
the question of who could occupy a certain subject position would constitute a logical 
contradiction: only after discourse does the individual even come into existence. As a result, 
Foucault’s archaeological method is blatantly unequipped for an analysis of relations between 
subjects, or intersubjectivity, since the only relationship it would admit was that between 
subject and object. Peter Dews notes in Foucault a refusal to acknowledge ‘the reciprocity 
specific to the social domain’ (1987: 198). Foucault’s approach, as well as Said’s interpretation of 
it, therefore devolves easily into a reductive one-way analysis, which explains some of the 
criticism Orientalism has received for lacking a notion of resistance. An earlier version of “The 
Other Question” notes that ‘there is always, in Said, the suggestion that colonial power and 
discourse is possessed entirely by the colonizer, which is an historical and theoretical 
simplification’ (OQ 1986: 158). That Bhabha’s theory of resistance is not unblemished either will 
be discussed later on. For now, what matters is that Bhabha complements this subject-object 
relation with a model in which subjectivity is the result of a two-way process.  
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 Foucault’s failure ‘to register the fact that socialization, the formation of subjects, 
depends upon a mutual recognition of subjects, however distorted’ stands in stark contrast to 
Lacan’s notion of the mirror stage (Dews 1987: 198). Indeed, for Lacan discourse is an 
intersubjective process in which ‘the allocution of the subject entails an allocutor’ (1977: 49). But 
this reciprocity is not only discursive, it is visual too: ‘in the objectification of the scopic drive 
there is always the threatened return of the look’ (Bhabha 1994: 81). Consequently, the subject is 
always already the object, and vice versa.  
A similar process takes place in the mirror stage referred to earlier, where the subject 
comes into being through its specular image. In a colonial context, it is the stereotyped Other 
that is the specular image. The stereotype therefore demonstrates the ambivalence located in 
the identification with the specular image: the fascination for the wholeness of the Other and the 
aggressivity that comes with the sense of rivalry. By arguing that the stereotype – as an instance 
of discourse – offers a primary point of identification for both colonizer and colonized, Bhabha 
links image and discourse, the imaginary and the discursive.  
But how does he do this? The realm of the image, what Lacan calls the imaginary, is 
‘always already structured by the symbolic order’ (Evans 1996: 83). It thus ‘involves a linguistic 
dimension. Whereas the signifier is the foundation of the symbolic order, the signified and 
signification are part of the imaginary order’ (83). Thus, if the previous paragraphs have 
explained why Bhabha needed to go beyond Foucault, here lies the key to the connection he 
establishes between Foucault and Lacan: the linguistic structure shared by Lacan’s symbolic and 
imaginary orders and Foucault’s discursive level enables Bhabha to move back and forth between 
them. 
 
3.4.3. Concept: Discourse as the Structure of Intersubjective Relations 
 
Having explored the manner in which Bhabha constructs a bridge between discourse theory and 
psychoanalysis, the next step involves taking a closer look at how Bhabha transforms the 
concepts of discourse used by Foucault and Said.  
 The previous sections should have made it abundantly clear that Bhabha, like Foucault, 
takes the notion of discourse to task for a lot more than mere (mis)representation. Orientalism, 
on the other hand, did not consistently do so, and occasionally invokes a contrastive reading of 
representation and reality. If Orientalism lacks a theory of resistance, at least it provides a space 
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for an author to expose Orientalism as misrepresentation. The poststructuralist problematization 
of truth, however, forecloses this path and renders an alternative notion of resistance all the 
more urgent.  
 In The Archaeology of Knowledge, for reasons that will be illuminated below, the concept 
of resistance is totally absent, leaving Bhabha no other option than to integrate one himself. 
Although the strategies of resistance he describes seem to be quite diverse, they all hinge on his 
linguistic model of discourse. Huddart, in a sympathetic assessment of Bhabha’s work, argues 
that: 
 
his work stresses and extends the agency of colonized peoples, whose participation in 
resistance to colonialism has often been underplayed when it does not fit our usual 
expectations of violent anti-colonial opposition: importantly, he develops a linguistic 
model of this agency. (2006: 3) 
  
Discourse, in Bhabha’s linguistic model, is fundamentally unstable, in at least three different, yet 
interrelated, ways. First of all, discourse is unstable because it consists of a chain of signifiers, 
along which meaning is continually deferred. A second source of instability resides in the 
intersubjective nature of discourse: the enunciation already depends on an Other to 
acknowledge it. Finally, Bhabha’s introduction of the concept of mimicry in a colonial context will 
have an important discursive component that undermines the authority of colonial discourse. As 
a strategy of colonial domination, mimicry: 
 
is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is 
almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is 
constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually 
produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. (Bhabha 1994: 86) 
 
This quotation, moving from re-formation and re-cognition to difference, suggests the 
mechanism that renders discourse unstable and provides the colonized with a means of 
resistance: the play of repetition and difference, brought together in ‘the Derridean idea of 
iteration’ (Huddart 2006: 17). In combination with Foucault’s concept of the statement, this leads 
Bhabha to observe that: 
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‘Despite the schemata of use and application that constitute a field of stabilization for 
the statement, any change in the statement’s condition of use and reinvestment, any 
alteration in its field of experience or verification, or indeed any difference in the 
problems to be solved, can lead to the emergence of a new statement: the difference of 
the same.’ (1994: 22) 
 
Against the stability Foucault described in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Bhabha posits not only 
the subverting effect of the Other in the enunciative situation, but also the potential of the 
colonial Other to repeat and thereby transform colonial discourse.  
 
This theory of resistance is, to say the least, idiosyncratic: in spite of Huddart’s claim that Bhabha 
‘extends the agency of colonized peoples’ (3), resistance is framed as an effect of colonial 
discourse. Loomba points out that for Bhabha ‘resistance is a condition produced by the 
dominant discourse itself’ (2005: 149), thus recentring this so-called agency completely around 
the colonizer. Moreover, one can object that this alleged instability of colonial discourse did not 
prevent it from playing a role in any number of atrocities and injustices. In a less than kind 
review, Benita Parry laments that ‘theoretical moves directed at erasing inscriptions of inequality 
and conflict in the material colonial world are evident in Bhabha’s disdain for that anti-colonialist 
tradition which perceived the struggle in terms that were antagonistic rather than agonistic’ 
(2004: 63). In other words, in Bhabha’s work a delocalized and dehistoricized theory of resistance 
supplants the violent histories of anti-colonial resistance. 
 Rather than to rehash the allegations Parry makes so convincingly in Postcolonial Studies: 
A Materialist Critique, the crux of the matter for the purposes of this chapter is to find out how 
these problems relate to Foucault’s concept of discourse. In order to do so, a preliminary 
question needs to be answered: why did the early Foucault not have a concept of resistance? In 
Discipline and Punish, as the next chapter will discuss, the absence of resistance is striking. 
However, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, where Foucault proposes his theory of discourse, the 
absence of resistance makes more sense: leaving the notion of power untouched, he focuses on 
how one can speak ‘in the true,’ how knowledge is constructed and formalized. His approach was 
essentially positivist: the object of study is the set of rules that govern a particular body of 
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knowledge. This is not to be confused with a general theory of discourse. As Rabinow & Dreyfus 
aptly put it in their discussion of Foucault’s early work: 
 
The discursive practices are distinguished from the speech acts of everyday life. Foucault 
is interested only in what we will call serious speech acts: what experts say when they 
are speaking as experts. And he furthermore restricts his analyses to the serious speech 
acts in those “dubious” disciplines which have come to be called the human sciences. 
(1982: xx) 
 
The importance of this point can hardly be overstated: Foucault’s interest was in those 
discourses which had Man as both subject and object of knowledge. This takes us to the root of 
the problem in Bhabha’s theory of discourse, which goes back to Said’s distinction between 
latent and manifest Orientalism. Bhabha picks up on this division and paraphrases it as a polarity 
between ‘on the one hand, a topic of learning, discovery, practice; on the other, it is the site of 
dreams, images, fantasies, myths, obsessions and requirements’ (1994: 71). It is obvious that this 
goes far beyond the domain Foucault outlined: his problematization of knowledge does not 
conflate it with myth – to the contrary, it is his specification of its enunciative modalities that sets 
it apart as a very specific corpus of statements.  
 Consequently, when Loomba claims that ‘the meaning of ‘discourse’ shrinks to ‘text,’ and 
from there to ‘literary text,’ and from there to texts written in English because that is the corpus 
most familiar to the critics’ (2005: 84), this might be misleading. If, rightly or wrongly one 
considers Foucault to be the source of the concept of discourse within postcolonial studies, one 
notes exactly the opposite: Bhabha broadens rather than shrinks it. He extends the Foucauldian 
terminology that was designed to perform an archaeology of knowledge to the analysis of film, 
poetry, novels, and the Bible, until it includes just about everything. Whereas Foucault coined the 
concept of discourse as a means to get to the specificity of knowledge, and knowledge only, 
Bhabha follows Said in expanding the functionality of the concept. 
 And there is more Said and Bhabha have in common: both of them attempt to deploy the 
work of Foucault in combination with a category the latter refrained from using: identity. If one 
understands identity as a discursive construct, and Foucault developed the concept of discourse, 
Foucault’s work can be used to discuss identity – or so it seems. Said’s undeveloped observation 
that the discourse of Orientalism depicted the Orient as ‘a sort of surrogate and even 
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underground self’ (3) leaves the door wide open for combining Foucault’s concept of discourse 
with psychoanalytical approaches. 
However, if Foucault’s discussion of the subject-position as an effect of discourse 
suggests a concern with subjectivity as a psychosocial category, this deserves immediate 
correction. At the time Foucault developed his theory of discourse, he was interested in the 
subject only insofar as it constituted a category of analysis he sought to remove. In Discipline and 
Punish, the subject appears only insofar as it relates to an object in the structure of the human 
sciences. As the cotextual section indicated earlier, Bhabha moves back and forth between a 
Foucauldian and a Lacanian notion of the subject. In contrast to Foucault’s notion of a historically 
produced subject, the Lacanian subject appears to be universal and ahistorical: Susan Van Zyl 
points out that ‘there is nothing in Lacan that accounts in advance for how colonial Others are 
different from any others’ (1998: 87-88). Loomba senses a similar problem in Bhabha’s work: 
 
Thus, ironically, the split, ambivalent, hybrid colonial subject projected in his work is in 
fact curiously universal and homogeneous – that is to say he could exist anywhere in the 
colonial world. Hybridity seems to be a characteristic of his inner life (and I use the male 
pronoun purposely) but not of his positioning. He is internally split and agonistic, but 
undifferentiated by gender, class, or location. (150) 
 
Playing with Evans’s definition, it is my contention that the relation between Foucault’s subject 
and Lacan’s subject is one of identification, a process ‘whereby one subject adopts as his own 
one or more attributes of another subject’ (Evans 1996: 80). The specific subject-position 
Foucault describes merges with the universal Lacanian, which prevents Bhabha from attending to 
a local, specific subject, or, put in a more profane way, an actual individual who lives with the 
realities of colonial life.    
 These sections on Bhabha presented a long detour to get to Bhabha’s transformations of 
the concept of discourse. However, the combination of the contextual, contextual, and 
conceptual illustrates both the way in which Bhabha has transformed the concept, as well as the 
effect of this transformation. As for the former, we have found that Bhabha uses the concept in 
connection to any set of statements rather than specific systems of knowledge. The result is the 
conflation of two concepts of subjectivity, with a universal Lacanian subject imposed upon the 
Foucauldian subject-effect.   
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3.5. Conclusion: Knowledge Versus Identity, Authority, Intersubjectivity 
 
From the start, it has been the contention of this chapter that the circulation of the concept of 
discourse within postcolonial theory cannot be attributed unproblematically to Foucault. Yet, 
unless one bears in mind the goal of this chapter, its narrow focus may be misread as doing 
exactly that which it sought to challenge: the purpose has been to highlight the transformations 
of the concept of discourse in postcolonial theory, insofar as it is framed as being Foucauldian – 
never the transformations of the concept of discourse as such. In doing so, this chapter has cast 
Foucault’s ‘discourse’ as an extremely specific, contingent concept. That this move may 
underplay the manifold ways in which Foucault’s concept was always already embedded in 
intellectual debates of 1950’s France, may very well be true.19 This explains the relative absence 
of Althusser, Pêcheux, or Derrida. Neither does the chapter include the postcolonial theorists 
who have drawn on these alternative conceptualizations, such as Spivak or Ashcroft, Griffiths, 
and Tiffin.  
 Nevertheless, I believe that to approach Foucault’s concept of discourse and the ensuing 
transformations in their specificity provides an extremely helpful strategic counterpoint to the 
tendency to conflate divergent conceptualizations under the header of ‘colonial discourse.’ 
Indeed, even if we confine ourselves to those theorists who explicitly link their concept of 
discourse to Foucault – in this case Said and Bhabha – ruptures and discontinuities immediately 
surface.  
 
In Said and Bhabha’s work, as in the reactions they provoke, one particular fault line running 
through postcolonial studies has revealed itself: the tension between a theory of discourse that 
conceptualizes discourse as an autonomous system, and the understanding of discourse as 
ideology that legitimates colonial action. This tension, which we also identified in the double 
architecture of Orientalism, radicalizes in Bhabha’s preference for the former, and the 
overwhelming criticism directed against this choice.  
 Many of the above-mentioned flaws in Bhabha’s work have been brought together under 
the banner of ‘textualism.’ Thus, Benita Parry’s final assessment of Bhabha’s work is that it offers 
                                                 
19
 For this entirely different approach, see Eribon, D. 1994. Michel Foucault et ses Contemporains. Paris: 
Fayard.  
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‘the World according to the Word’ (1994: 9). Dirlik, for his part, argues that ‘increasingly from the 
1990s, the postcolonial has dissipated into areas that had nothing to do with the colonial and 
rendered into a literary reading strategy rather than a social and political concept - largely under 
the influence of the likes of Bhabha’ (2007: 99). This allegation demonstrates that the problem 
supersedes the work of Bhabha: the tendency to overemphasize the importance of signifying 
practices is said to be closely connected with literary studies as a disciplinary setting of 
postcolonial studies. Paul Gilroy asserts that ‘textuality becomes a means (...) to enthrone the 
literary critic as mistress or master of the domain of creative human communication’ (2000: 77).  
 Moreover, this prioritization of discourse has been denounced as a theoretical move that 
downplays the political potential in postcolonial studies. In Wars of Position, Timothy Brennan 
goes so far as to say that ‘the practitioners of theory in the poststructuralist ascendant saw their 
task as burying dialectical thinking and the political energies – including the anti-colonial energies 
– that grew out of it’ (2006: 10). Majid dismisses poststructuralist postcolonial theory as ‘literary 
conceits and language games’ (2008: 150), and McMurtry detests its ‘dematerializing wordplays’ 
(2008: 229). Contra poststructuralist theory, these critics underline the necessity of taking into 
account the material processes involved in colonization. Often influenced by historical 
materialism, the likes of Ahmad, Dirlik, Parry, Lazarus, Brennan, and many others have sought 
ways to integrate the cultural and the material through a revision of the concept of ideology in 
ways that at times come very close to Said’s instrumentalist architecture. Interestingly, the 
accusation of textualism, which they level so readily at Bhabha, has never been directed against 
Orientalism: the fact that his concept of discourse at times becomes synomous with the notion of 
ideology allows Said’s work to be recuperated as a more materialist approach. This explains why 
Timothy Brennan’s “The Illusion of a Future” places so much weight on the differences between 
Orientalism and Foucault’s work: he is wresting Said out of poststructuralism, downplaying the 
influence of Foucault in favour of Raymond Williams (569).  
 Brennan’s contention that ‘it is simply stunning that critics consider Orientalism 
Foucauldian’ seems to be buttressed by Said’s own comments after 1978, many of which have 
been published in The World, the Text, and the Critic. An almost hostile Said urges that ‘we must 
not let Foucault get away (...) with letting us forget that history does not get made without work, 
intention, resistance, effort, or conflict, and that none of these things is silently absorbable into 
micronetworks of power’ (245) – and this is only one attack out of a great many. 
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However, as the history of Said’s comments on Foucault has been represented at length 
in Chuaqui: 2005 and Racevskis: 2005, they will not be repeated here. Rather, I would like to 
question the ability of this approach to shed any real light on the connection between 
Orientalism and Foucault’s work. Said’s vicious comments seem to tell us more about the politics 
of academic discussion than about the links between their theoretical frameworks: when Said 
refutes Foucault’s work as dehistoricizing and lacking agency and resistance, this is strangely 
reminiscent of the criticism Orientalism has had to bear.  Moreover, no matter how many times 
one denies the central role of Foucault in Orientalism post hoc, the earlier intertextual analysis 
clearly established the fact that this archaeological architecture can be traced in Orientalism. 
Therefore, it is my contention that the struggle over Said’s legacy and the multiple attacks on 
Bhabha’s work should be read in light of the larger conflict over the role of the textual versus the 
material.  
 
Tragically, this opposition between the textual and the material was never there to begin with. As 
the earlier analysis of Foucault’s concept of discourse has shown, it approaches discourse in its 
materiality. Any charge of textualism leveled against Foucault should therefore necessarily be 
more accurate than the mere allegation of ignoring the material, which is a gross 
misunderstanding of his archaeological method. Rather than sweeping these criticisms under the 
carpet, however, it has been my contention that they can be accounted for through the 
contrastive analysis of Foucault and Bhabha’s work. The root of the problem is not textualism as 
such, but the very fact that Bhabha dislocates a particular subject-object relation revolving 
around the knowledge of Man and expands it into a theory of discourse which goes far beyond 
the category of knowledge, eventually subsuming psychosocial categories such as subjectivity 
and identity. 
 In this sense, Bhabha’s concept of discourse has a lot in common with Said’s. Both Said 
and Bhabha use Foucault’s concept as an ancillary concept to analyze power as a psychosocial 
phenomenon that can be understood as consisting of relations of identity, subjectivity, and 
authority. Ultimately, what Bhabha and Said both present is an understanding of colonial power 
reduced to an authority that is based on identity. As the following chapters will illustrate, these 
notions of identity and authority will continue to appear alongside and in tension with 
Foucauldian concepts, resulting in conflicting conceptualizations of colonial power.  
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4. Discipline  
 
Whereas the previous chapter had to begin with the conceptual confusion surrounding the 
notion of discourse, both the origin and meaning of ‘discipline’ as a concept appear considerably 
less muddled. As far as postcolonial studies is concerned, its use is virtually always attributed to 
Foucault. If other scholars have elaborated homophonous concepts, their work has not been 
acknowledged in the canonical postcolonial texts. Neither has ‘discipline’ achieved the same 
currency as ‘discourse’: there is no equivalent of ‘discourse babble’ whatsoever, in postcolonial 
studies or elsewhere.  
 This disparity in status between the two concepts is reflected in the source material of 
this chapter: whereas the work of Said and Bhabha has been reviewed extensively, the names of 
Timothy Mitchell and Martha Kaplan do not necessarily figure in introductions to postcolonial 
studies.20 One of the key tasks of this chapter will therefore be to determine whether the relative 
peripherality of the concept of discipline in postcolonial studies is due to an inherent conceptual 
problem. This will be effected through an analysis of both Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt and 
Kaplan’s “Panopticon in Poona,” in relation to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. 
 However, before we turn to Discipline and Punish, there is another way in which this 
chapter as well as the next two differ from Chapter 3 – a difference that hinges on the notion of 
power. Looking back at Orientalism and “The Other Question,” it becomes apparent that the 
power to colonize, and the power over the colonized, was intimately connected to the concept of 
discourse in Said’s and Bhabha’s analysis. For Bhabha, the ambivalence of discourse created both 
the power effect and a corresponding instability. In Said’s double architecture, power was either 
the effect of a discourse, or an undefined force that instrumentalized discursive knowledge.  
 It is my contention that both the reduction of power to an effect of discourse and the 
invocation of a concept of power without a proper definition are detrimental to any critical 
analysis of colonialism. To the extent that postcolonial studies seeks to understand colonial 
domination, racialization, and the shaping of subject positions, the question of power is a central 
one. The postcolonial engagement with the concept of discipline, though limited, foregrounds 
the necessity of taking the question of power beyond the realm of discourse.  
                                                 
20
 Ania Loomba’s Colonialism/Postcolonialism, one of the most comprehensive and authoritative 
introductions available, does not mention either Mitchell or Kaplan. Still, one should not overstate this: 
both Mitchell and Kaplan have been cited regularly – if they had not, their work would have escaped the 
search parameters of this project.   
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 Although this demand to move beyond discourse may seem to echo the criticism levelled 
at Bhabha discussed and redirected in the previous chapter, it is at most tangentially related to 
the accusation of textualism. Whereas the label of textualism implies an opposition between the 
textual and the material, urging us to move beyond discourse in order to take into account the 
power of material conditions, the concept of discipline challenges the reduction of power to 
discourse in a very different way: not through an opposition between the discursive and the 
material, but through an awareness of the heterogeneity of its modes of operation. Thus, the 
conceptual implication that also differentiates this chapter from the previous one is the refusal to 
reduce the notion of power to some other level, whether discursive or material. Instead, to put 
the concept of discipline to work is to try and determine specific technologies of power that may 
be articulated discursively, but may also derive from various spatial and temporal configurations. 
Understood in this light, Discipline and Punish is not Foucault’s compensation for an 
undervaluation of power in The Archaeology of Knowledge, but an entirely new approach in its 
own right.    
 
4.1. Foucault and Discipline: Reconceptualizing Power 
4.1.1. Context: From Archaeology to Genealogy 
 
In the six years that passed between the publication of The Archaeology of Knowledge and 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault moved from his archaeological method to genealogy. Although 
the differences between these approaches have been touched on in Chapter 2, a more 
systematic exploration21 of their relationship will prove valuable in situating the texts of Mitchell 
and Kaplan – not because they emulate a genealogical model, but because they experiment with 
the boundaries of Foucault’s approach.  
 Genealogy, to a certain extent, is the continuation of Foucault’s anti-subjectivist project: 
if The Archaeology of Knowledge emphasized that the subject is not the source of knowledge, 
Discipline and Punish emphasizes how it is also not the possessor of power. The ‘anti’ in anti-
subjectivism thus refers both to an attack on the illusion of an autonomous subject, and to a 
rejection of the subject as a methodologically sound starting point.  
                                                 
21
 Needless to say, this exploration is still far from exhaustive: it singles out those characteristics of 
genealogy required for a better understanding of Mitchell and Kaplan. For more details, I refer again to 
Dreyfus, H.L.; Rabinow, P. 1982. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, in particular Chapter 5 – “Interpretive Analytics”. 
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 Apart from that, genealogy differs from archaeology in a great many ways. The task of 
the archaeologist was to isolate the rules that govern discursive practices. The descriptive 
character of its approach supposedly enabled archaeology to ‘slip free of institutional, 
theoretical, and even epistemic bonds’ (Rabinow & Dreyfus 102). The genealogist, however, 
realizes that this position is untenable: if s/he aims to diagnose and grasp the significance of 
social practices, s/he does so from within. This involvement explains Foucault’s claim that he is 
writing ‘the history of the present’ (D&P 31): genealogy is a form of history that attempts to 
explain the coming into being of the multiple relationships between power, knowledge, and the 
body in modern society.  
 Obviously, this history of the present differs from other forms of historiography – at least 
in theory. In a moment of lyricism, Rabinow & Dreyfus assert that 
  
Genealogy opposes itself to traditional historical method; its aim is to “record the 
singularity of events outside of monotonous finality” (NGH 139). For the genealogist 
there are no fixed essences, no underlying laws, no metaphysical finalities. Genealogy 
seeks out discontinuities where others found continuous development. It finds 
recurrences and play where others found progress and seriousness. It records the past 
of mankind to unmask the solemn hymns of progress. Genealogy avoids the search for 
depth. Instead, it seeks the surfaces of events, small details, minor shifts, and subtle 
contours. (106)  
 
The extent to which all of this is applicable to Discipline and Punish is highly debatable. Does 
Foucault not establish a line of increasing individualization, rather than a collection of 
discontinuities? Does he not interpret the prison as a model of objectification, rather than to 
stick to the surface of events? Does he not describe an entire disciplinary society, rather than 
focus on small details?  As the analysis of Martha Kaplan’s “Panopticon in Poona” will 
demonstrate, these questions are far from rhetorical.  
 For now, though, contrasting Foucault’s genealogy with both the work of Max Weber and 
the long tradition of Marxism might provide some clarity. According to Rabinow & Dreyfus, 
‘Foucault does differentiate himself from Weber methodologically’22 (132). They locate the 
difference in the status of acts of interpretation: 
                                                 
22
 Rabinow & Dreyfus’s formulation is slightly misleading, for, as Kelly reminds us (36), Foucault admitted 
that he did not know the work of Max Weber when he was writing Discipline and Punish. 
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Weber’s ideal type is a device which retrospectively brings together a variety of 
historical considerations, so as to highlight the “essence” of the historical object being 
studied, for example, Calvinism, capitalism, wordly asceticism. It is the ideal type which 
brings disparate phenomena into a meaningful model from which the historian can 
explain them. Foucault maintains that his approach differs in that he is interested in 
isolating “explicit programs” like the Panopticon, which functioned as actual programs of 
action and reform. There is nothing hidden about them; they are not invented by the 
historian to bring together an explanation. (132) 
 
Thus, after the archaeological phase, Foucault acknowledges the inevitability of interpretation, 
but refuses to treat it as the uncovering of hidden meaning. After all, he maintains the 
groundlessness of interpretation, thereby rejecting the truth-claims of ‘Weberian science’ 
(Rabinow & Dreyfus 166), but reasserts its usefulness in a method with ‘a central place for 
pragmatic concern’ (166). This tension between the arbitrariness of interpretation and the 
guidance of pragmatic concerns stands unresolved. However, it does point to the fact that 
Foucault, unlike Weber, intended to start from specific technologies of power rather than a 
larger interpretive grid.  
 Helpful though this contrast with Weber may be, the context Foucault invokes in 
Discipline and Punish is much larger. By insisting on the common matrix of power and knowledge, 
he repudiates ‘a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where 
the power relations are suspended’ (27). A Marxist tradition as Foucault perceived it is perhaps 
the most obvious example of a method that presupposes the externality of knowledge and 
power, for as Kelly reminds us ‘in Foucault’s intellectual milieu in the early 1970s, what did loom 
large was (...) Marxism’ (2009: 37). Besides the ideology problem, broached in the previous 
chapter, Foucault also takes issue with a Marxist approach that analyzes power as ‘the ‘privilege,’ 
acquired or preserved, of the dominant class’ (26): power is not something to be possessed. 
Neither should it be reduced to class relations or institutions (27).23 This is not to say that Marx 
figures solely as an antagonist: the disciplinary organization of the workhouse discussed by 
                                                 
23
 The point of this section is to illustrate how Foucault carves out his method in relation to implied others. 
This should not be confused with an analysis of actual relations between Foucault’s work and (the 
heterogeneous tradition of) Marxism, which falls outside the scope of this chapter. 
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Foucault testifies to the key role of mechanisms of discipline in a capitalist mode of production.24 
The difference between a Foucauldian genealogy and a Marxist approach has less to do with the 
importance they accord to the structure of capitalism than with their respective 
conceptualizations of power.   
 As an alternative to both Weber and Marx, Foucault provides some suggestions on how 
to approach power. Mark Kelly has extrapolated five of these methodological suggestions, but 
frames them as ‘characteristics of power’ (2009: 37). Given that the concept of power itself is 
contested, it may be more useful to understand the sum of Foucault’s propositions about power 
as a specific approach to power, rather than a theorization of what power really is. Modifying 
Kelly’s list accordingly, it appears that Discipline and Punish aims to analyze power as: 
 
1. [impersonal or subjectless], (...) not guided by the will of individual subjects (DP 26 (...)) 
2. [relational], (...) always a case of power relations between people, as opposed to a 
quantum possessed by people (DP 27 (...)) 
3. [decentred], (...) not concentrated on a single individual or class (DP 27 (...)) 
4. [multidirectional], not [flowing] only from the more to the less powerful, but rather 
“[coming] from below,” even if it is nevertheless “nonegalitarian” (DP 27 (...)) 
5. [strategic], [having] a dynamic of its own, [being] “intentional” (DP 26 (...)) (Kelly 2009: 37-
38) 
 
A sixth characteristic can be added to this list: contrary to Kelly’s belief that the productive 
dimension of power only comes to the fore in Foucault’s later work (cf. 38), the intention to read 
power as productive rather than merely repressive is already present in Discipline and Punish and 
should be added to this list. Not only does Foucault stress the ‘possible positive effects’ of 
punitive mechanisms (23), he also focuses on the soul as a product of disciplinary power – an 
idea that will turn out to be crucial in Colonising Egypt. Together, these six guidelines make it 
possible to study what Foucault calls the microphysics of power. With this phrase, he refers to 
the analysis of concrete techniques and technologies of power working on the body. It is these 
                                                 
24
 In a lecture called “Re-reading Discipline and Punish,” delivered at the Radical Foucault Conference 
(September 2011, Centre for Cultural Studies Research, University of East London), Stephen Shapiro and 
Anne Schwan questioned the tendency in the Anglophone world to see Foucault and Marx as antagonists. 
Shapiro pointed to Rabinow’s selection of Foucault’s essential work, which leaves out those pieces where 
Foucault spoke more highly of Marx.  
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techniques and technologies as they appear in the penal apparatus that form the starting point 
of Foucault’s microphysics of discipline.  
 
4.1.2. Cotext: Three Rationalities of Power 
 
In terms of conceptual architecture, the contrast between three major concepts constitutes the 
crux of Discipline and Punish: torture, punishment, and discipline. They point to three different 
regimes of penality, and more generally to three different rationalities of power. The relationship 
between them is one of ‘historical transformation’ (209): although these rationalities face each 
other in the second half of the eighteenth century, ‘in the end it was the third that was adopted’: 
discipline (131). But in order to understand the latter, one must understand ‘torture’ and 
‘punishment.’  
‘Torture’, in this context, is a translation of the French ‘supplice,’ which refers specifically 
‘to the public torture and execution of criminals that provided one of the most popular 
spectacles of eighteenth-century France’ (Translator’s Note, ix).  It is closely connected to the 
concept of sovereignty, which denotes a configuration of power in which torture is the dominant 
penal technique. 
Although the notion of sovereignty is not as elaborated in Discipline and Punish as it 
would be in The History of Sexuality, one can still extrapolate six principal characteristics – 
characteristics that the next section will contrast with the concept of discipline. First of all, 
Foucault’s notion of sovereignty describes a historical situation in which power is centered 
around the body of the king. He is a ‘material and physical presence,’ and the origin of a ‘force 
that he himself deploys or transmits to some few others’ (208).  
Second, the concept of sovereignty connects relations of power to the law: ‘the force of 
the law is the force of the prince’ (47). Every crime is an attack on the sovereign, since ‘the law 
represents the will of the sovereign’ (47). In the practice of torture, ‘the tortured body is first 
inscribed in the legal ceremonial that must produce, open for all to see, the truth of the crime’ 
(35). The physical violence used to extract confessions is thus not an individual transgression, but 
a legal technique that grounds the power of the sovereign in the realm of truth.  
Third, torture as punishment operated by way of example: it needed to ‘show the crime 
and at the same time to show the sovereign power that mastered it’ (93). Indeed, executions 
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were necessarily carried out in public as ceremonial displays of monarchic power over the 
offender, and were highly ritualized.    
As a fourth and fifth characteristic, the excessive and discontinuous nature of sovereign 
penality stands out. To instil terror in the spectators, ‘the punishment is carried out in such a way 
as to give a spectacle not of measure, but of imbalance and excess’ (49). Consequently, the 
exercise of sovereign power is discontinuous and irregular (130): it is concentrated in brief 
outbursts of violence.  
Finally, power marked the body physically, through dismemberment or branding: torture 
acted immediately on the body of the offender. Sovereign power took the body as its major 
target of penal repression (8).  
 
This violence of torture, inflicted on the body, created a space for reformers who advocated a 
more humane approach. Reforming jurists introduced the idea of punishment as ‘a procedure for 
requalifying individuals as subjects, as juridical subjects; it uses not marks, but signs, coded sets 
of representations, which would be given the most rapid circulation and the most general 
acceptance possible by citizens witnessing the scene of punishment’ (130-1). But opposed to all 
narratives of increasing humanization, Foucault observes that penal systems have not lost their 
hold on the body. Rather, the reforms signal a change in the status of the body: ‘if one intervenes 
upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is 
regarded both as a right and as property’ (11). Thus, the body functions as an intermediary.  
 In Foucault’s account, these techniques of torture and punishment have been overtaken 
by what he calls discipline. He illustrates a historical transformation from a sovereign rationale of 
power operating through torture to a society in which discipline replaces these more primitive 
techniques. What he describes is ‘the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their spread throughout the whole social 
body, the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society’ (209). Thus, 
disciplinary technology would become the dominant mode of power. But what is this discipline, 
and how does it work? 
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4.1.3. Concept: Is Discipline a Totalizing Concept? 
 
Discipline, as a general technology of power, is best understood in its most condensed form: 
panopticism. This concept, which will be central in Kaplan’s text, refers to the structuring 
principles of the panopticon, a model for a prison designed by Jeremy Bentham.  The idea is 
familiar by now: an annular building divided into cells holds the inmates, and a tower in the 
center which can accommodate a supervisor. The windows are arranged in such a way that the 
inmates can be seen at all times, but they cannot know for sure whether they are being watched 
or not.  
 Visibility is thus a central disciplinary mechanism, and it involves much more than 
passively being watched: 
 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for 
the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes 
in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes 
the principle of his own subjection. (DP 202-3)  
 
Given that Said’s Orientalism refers on multiple occasions to the gaze of the Orientalist, relating it 
to the idea of panopticism, it is important to spell out the difference again between the status of 
the gaze in panopticism and in Orientalism. Said, apparently unaware of this difference, describes 
a continuity between the visible and the sayable (127). But as Rey Chow reminds us in 
“Postcolonial Visibilities,” visibility in Discipline and Punish ‘should be understood as a realm that 
has become irreducible to the order of articulation that is words, statements and the sayable’ 
(2010: 65). In short, disciplinary techniques cannot be grasped in terms of discourse alone, as the 
visibility Foucault describes is primarily a spatial technique.  
The sovereign model of power cannot account for disciplinary techniques either. A 
comparison of disciplinary panopticism to the six characteristics of sovereignty extrapolated 
before makes this abundantly clear. First of all, in disciplinary power the figure of the king is no 
longer the center. As Foucault puts it, ‘the right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of 
the sovereign to the defence of society’ (90). In the panopticon, this anonymity is reflected in the 
status of the supervisor: the illusion of his presence is enough to create the power dynamic (201).  
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 Second,  disciplinary power does not aim to enforce the law, but a norm. The operations 
of differentiation, hierarchization, homogenization, and exclusion all revolve around a split 
between the normal and the abnormal. The disciplinary gaze is a normalizing gaze (183).  
 A third, related point is the visibility of punishment: it is no longer staged as an example 
of what happens to those who challenge the sovereign, but takes place in an isolated place away 
from the public. The appearance of a scientifico-legal complex contributes to a specialization of 
punishment that moves it out of the realm of the general public. This complex consists of 
‘psychiatric or psychological experts, magistrates concerned with the implementation of 
sentences, educationalists, [and] members of the prison service’ (21), all of which create the 
frame of normalization referred to above. Evidently, the analysis of disciplinary power does not 
only need to be repositioned in relation to the law, but also to the state.  
 Fourth and fifth, disciplinary power does not display its strength as sovereignty did. 
Rather, it tends to hide, very much like the supervisor in the tower who cannot be seen. 
Ceremonies and rituals have lost their purpose now that ‘power has its principle not so much in a 
person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes’ (202). It follows 
that this distribution generates a certain continuity of power: ‘surveillance is permanent in its 
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action’ (201).  
 Finally, the purpose of power relations that work on the body is not to mark them, but to 
turn them into docile bodies, bodies ‘that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’ 
(136). Rather than the signifying elements of the body, what is at stake is ‘the economy, the 
efficiency of movements, their internal organization’ (137). This grip on the body is a grip that 
attends to the particularities of the individual, that ‘explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it’ 
(138). Power thus not merely destroys bodies in order to subject others to its will, but works 
directly on them to bring them in line with the norm.   
  
Importantly, this grip on the body is only one among many processes of individualization in 
disciplinary technologies of power. As discussed at length in the previous chapter, the common 
root of disciplinary power and knowledge is that they take Man as their object. This objecthood is 
the root of individualization. In the context of penality, this creates a situation in which ‘a whole 
corpus of individualizing knowledge was being organized that took as its field of reference not so 
much the crime committed (at least in isolation), but the potentiality of danger that lies hidden in 
an individual and which is manifested in his observed everyday conduct’ (126). Thus, when 
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Foucault claims that ‘discipline ‘makes’ individuals’ (170), he points to the individualizing effect of 
power-knowledge. 
 This individualization does not limit itself to an investment of the body: it produces the 
modern ‘soul’ (29). This soul is neither an ideological construct nor an illusion, but rather a reality 
reference projected by power-knowledge. This reality reference forms the basis of concepts like 
psyche, subjectivity, personality, and consciousness (29), and for sciences such as psychology, 
psychiatry and pedagogy. At bottom, this means that the human sciences, the prison system and 
disciplinary technologies in general share a common base:  they are all produced from the 
power-knowledge cluster that takes Man as its object, viz. discipline.   
 
If the above has attempted to formulate something like a tentative definition, its imprecision also 
hints at one of the major problems with the concept of discipline. As the contextual section has 
pointed out, Foucault claimed to analyze specific technologies rather than general principles of 
societies. But if discipline is not only the dominant mode of power in prisons, but also in military, 
medical, educational, and industrial institutions (314 n1), one may wonder whether this system is 
not total after all. Moreover, Foucault argues in a footnote that he could also have taken 
examples from ‘colonization, slavery and child rearing’ (314 n1). He even claims that disciplinary 
technologies have created the ‘Man of modern humanism’ (141) and the human sciences in 
general, which seems to confirm an interpretation of discipline as a ubiquitous power relation.  
In Foucault’s Discipline, John S. Ransom reacts to this problem of a totalizing concept by 
arguing that: 
 
No doubt a distinction should be made between the goals and dreams of these 
reformers and their capacity to give effect to them. Failure to make such a distinction – 
and Foucault’s writing sometimes encourages such a lapse – dupes us into reading 
Discipline and Punish as the description of a fully realized and inescapable disciplinary 
society. (33) 
 
 Although this distinction certainly needs to be made, one may wonder whether this ‘lapse’ is not 
more than a misreading that follows from Foucault’s rhetoric. In short, the problem may be 
conceptual: the limits to discipline’s expansion are undefined. The crux of the matter is then to 
determine the value of the concept in the analysis of that other project of expansion, 
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colonisation, and to take account of what processes of colonisation tell us about discipline and its 
boundaries. 
 
4.2. Mitchell and Discipline: Disciplinary Power as the Power of Modernity 
4.2.1. Context: Understanding Modernity 
 
Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt (1988) is not about the colonisation of Egypt, whatever its 
title may say. Rather, it focuses on a historical process that started much earlier: long before the 
British army marched into Egypt and colonized it, the notion of structure had invaded the 
country. Rather than loose ensembles of men and things, suddenly it was structures that were 
perceived and installed everywhere, Mitchell’s argument goes. The clearest example of this 
process is no doubt the Egyptian army, which transformed from a formless and chaotic group of 
men into an ordered war machine. The new army, with its coordination, arrangement, and 
distribution of men, created ‘the effect of an apparatus apart from the men themselves’ (xii). In 
other words, it is the discipline of the army that creates the idea of ‘a structure independent of 
the men who composed it’ (xii).  In making this point the central thesis of his work, Mitchell does 
not stop at Foucault’s description of the microphysics of power, but proceeds to explain how this 
microphysics produces its metaphysical counterpart.  
 The way Mitchell links the microphysical and the metaphysical becomes quite clear in his 
analysis of the representation of Cairo at the 1889 World Exhibition in Paris. Just as the discipline 
of the army produces the meta-physical effect of an apparatus that is more than the sum of its 
elements, the careful coordination of the objects on exhibit and their spatial distribution 
produces a meta-physical effect: the idea of a representation of an Oriental city.   
 According to Mitchell, this metaphysical idea of structure and order deriving from 
disciplinary processes such as coordination and distribution pervaded social life as a whole. 
Appreciating the visibility or legibility of representation in the exhibition, visitors who actually 
went to visit Cairo were in for a disappointment. Because ‘they took representation to be a 
universal condition’ (22), European visitors expected Egyptian cities to have the same kind of 
legibility and order. But these cities had not been built according to a plan or structure that 
precedes its elements; it was not built as the representation of something else. Visitors were 
confronted with the impossibility of grasping what they saw, because it had not been laid out for 
them like the ‘reality’ the exhibition had represented – in short, they found ‘disorder.’  
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 Trying to grasp reality as representation, Europeans found it hard to represent Egyptian 
society at all, ‘since the Middle East had not yet been organised representationally’ (29). To 
overcome this frustration, ‘Egypt was to be ordered up as something object-like. In other words it 
was to be made picture-like and legible, rendered available to political and economic calculation’ 
(33). Official colonization was soon to follow. 
 
Keeping the above in mind, how is the subject of Colonising Egypt not the colonisation of Egypt? 
As Mitchell himself emphasizes, ‘while focussing on events in Egypt in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, its argument is addressed to the place of colonialism in the critique of 
modernity’ (ix). Yapp’s criticism that ‘it is difficult to discern what distinguishes the 
representations of Egypt from that of other phenomena’ (1039) misses the mark entirely: 
Mitchell is looking into the reasons that made the very idea of representation possible, as 
opposed to the ‘content’ of representation. More to the point, Segal argues that ‘in Mitchell’s 
subtle analysis, colonizing and modernizing are aspects of a single historical phenomenon’ (389). 
It is my contention that Mitchell even subordinates the question of colonialism to modernity: the 
split between things and their representation, between the material and the conceptual is not 
just what made colonialism possible, but also the defining feature ‘for understanding the 
peculiarity of capitalist modernity’ (xii). The singularity of capitalist modernity is what is really at 
stake in Mitchell’s work.     
 
4.2.2. Cotext: Foucault’s Microphysics Meet Derrida’s Metaphysics 
 
An emphasis on modernity as a single system obviously implies the existence of something pre-
modern. Mitchell’s claim that Western society was organized representationally hinges on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s ‘ethnography of the Kabyle house’ (167), which concluded that the houses of Kabyle 
people were not constructed according to a structure that stands apart from its elements. Given 
that the Kabyle people are actually Algerian, rather than Egyptian, Rivlin is right to point out that 
this ‘seems quite irrelevant to Egypt without further documentary evidence’ (361). This may well 
be a symptom of a larger problem: this broad distinction between modern and pre-modern 
societies can quickly lapse into a homogenizing division. Mitchell seems well aware of the 
difficulty in setting up such a binary:     
 
81 
 
I run the risk of setting up this other as the very opposite of ourselves. Such an opposite, 
moreover, would appear inevitably as a self-contained totality, and its encounter with 
the modern West would appear, again inevitably, as its rupturing and disintegration. (...) 
Such consequences, though perhaps inevitable, are undesired and unintended. (49) 
 
As long as one acknowledges these dangers, they need not detract from the argument. Still, this 
issue appears to be linked to the difficulty in Discipline and Punish outlined above of determining 
the boundaries of the disciplinary society. Like the modern implies the pre-modern, or the West 
implies the non-West (32), the disciplinary implies the non-disciplinary: each binary suggests a 
homogeneity on either side of the divide that is insufficiently supported by evidence. This 
problem will be elaborated in the discussion of Kaplan’s “Panopticon in Poona.” But before doing 
so, the task at hand is to determine how Mitchell introduces the metaphysical into Foucault’s 
discussion of microphysics.   
 
In its attempt to pinpoint the peculiarity of capitalist modernity, Colonising Egypt draws on 
Derrida’s explanation of how meaning and the idea of the metaphysical are produced. In a highly 
condensed account, Mitchell recalls the importance of difference and repetition in the 
constitution of meaning: 
 
Meaning arises, then, because the word is always a repetition, in a double sense. It is a 
repetition in the sense of something non-original, something that occurs by modifying or 
differing from an other; and a repetition in the sense of the-same-again. Meaning is an 
effect of this paradoxical quality of sameness and difference, whereby a word always 
happens to be just the same only different. (145) 
 
This play of difference, Mitchell proceeds, is visible in the way Arabic as a language functions. 
European languages, by contrast, have suppressed this mechanism and produce instead a 
metaphysical effect: the idea that beyond the physical realm of the sign, there exists something 
else. One of the most obvious manifestations of this belief is the Saussurean division of the sign 
into a signifier, which constitutes the material element, and the signified, which belongs to the 
realm of the conceptual. Not only does Mitchell’s comparison of European languages and Arabic 
show that this dualism is not fundamental to language as such, it also suggests that this division 
of the material and the conceptual is highly contingent.This is the key to the question of the 
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peculiarity of capitalist modernity: the idea of organizing the world according to a 
material/conceptual dualism exists only in capitalist modernity – or so Mitchell argues.  
 
The contingency of this dualism does not make its effects any less real: it ultimately creates the 
political authority that legitimizes colonialism. As soon as one breaks loose from the idea that 
meaning resides in words themselves, one is bound to conceive of language as a semantic 
structure that is more than the sum of its words. The signifier now comes to signify something 
else, it re-presents something. 
This is where the concept of the author steps in: the idea that is being represented, if not 
contained in the words itself, must have originated in the mind of the author. Thus, as opposed 
to the material element, ‘the conceptual element is prior, closer to the original thought being 
communicated, to the author, to the origin’ (144). Indeed, texts are believed to represent the 
intention of an author, and in that sense they produce ‘authority.’ They are the material that 
functions as the vehicle for intentions and truth originating with an author. This author, in turn, 
consists of a body that forms the vehicle through which the mind communicates. Clearly, both 
language and the body here are thought of in dualistic terms.  
It is this dualism that underlies the production of the political authority that legitimizes 
colonialism:  
 
Just as meaning does not exist in the ‘material’ of the words themselves, but seems to 
belong to a separate mental or conceptual realm that words only ever re-present, 
political authority would now exist apart as something metaphysical, which in the 
material world is only ever re-presented. (154) 
 
At bottom, this means that politics is thought of as physical or material action that represents the 
ideal realm of an authority: bodies and armies move under the authority of a non-mechanical, 
non-physical, and invisible power separate from themselves. In a colonial context, ‘colonial 
authority appears as this unseen, yet ‘none the less real’, metaphysical power’ (159). Thus, the 
dualism of the material and the conceptual is not what bestows authority upon the colonizer, but 
that which makes possible the very idea of a metaphysical form of power like authority.   
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Importantly, Mitchell does not emphasize this dualism to deconstruct meaning and authority. 
Rather, he uses it exactly to demonstrate how they come into being. The crux of the matter lies 
in the hierarchy of the material and the conceptual: the latter has been considered ‘an order of 
meaning or truth existing somehow before and behind what would now be thought of as mere 
‘things in themselves’’ (178). Political authority vests itself in this order of truth, as an order that 
is ‘seemingly prior and superior’ to the realm of the material (179). Thus, colonial authority 
represents itself as profoundly metaphysical.    
  
4.2.3. Concept: A Non-Subjective Approach to Colonial Power 
 
Needless to say, this emphasis on the metaphysical contrasts sharply with the efforts of Discipline 
and Punish to work around it. Indeed, Foucault had tried to write a history of penal practice 
without recourse to the metaphysical myths of progress and humanity. In doing so, he leaves 
open the question of how these notions have gained the currency they have.  
 Nevertheless, there is one immediate connection to the metaphysical in Discipline and 
Punish: the idea of the soul. As explained in section 4.1.3, the disciplinary concentration on the 
body produced the idea of a soul as a reality reference.  Although Foucault merely posited this 
production of the soul, the psyche, and the mind without elaborating on it, this still provides the 
key to Mitchell’s connection between the metaphysical and the microphysical. As we have seen, 
modernity puts forward the idea of a body that is a vehicle of the mind. In that sense, it 
conceives of the conceptual as being prior to the material. Rather than reversing this hierarchy, 
Mitchell aims to demonstrate the origin of this division. Much like Foucault located the division 
between the body and the soul as a product of disciplinary mechanisms, Mitchell reads the 
broader division between the material and the conceptual as a product of discipline. 
 Indeed, disciplinary power creates a dualism: practices of arrangement and distribution 
give rise to the idea of an order or structure that exists independently of its elements. Just as the 
concentration of power on the body leads to the reality reference of the soul, the disciplining of 
soldiers creates the idea of an ordered army, the spatial arrangement of houses produces notions 
of urban planning, the distribution of words projects an author, and the actions of men project 
the idea of politics.  
 On a more abstract level, it is in the processes of the arranging, distributing and dividing 
of that which one now refers to as the material that the material is somehow doubled, 
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complemented with the idea of an order that is considered prior to the material. Ultimately, this 
explains not only how the metaphysical realm comes into being, but also the peculiarity of 
capitalist modernity sought by Mitchell.  
 
Having explained how Mitchell connects the rise of the metaphysical to Foucault’s microphysics 
of discipline, it is imperative to stress the ways in which Colonising Egypt goes beyond Foucault in 
order to explain the authority power proceeds with – a question Foucault did not pick up. The 
authority that accompanies disciplinary power hinges on this metaphysical realm: 
 
The world divided into two realms that I have been describing in these pages is a world 
where political power, however microphysical in its methods, operates always so as to 
appear as something set apart from the real world, affecting a certain metaphysical 
authority. (159-160) 
 
This dual logic of disciplinary power helps to account for the rapid spread of disciplinary 
techniques. Mitchell attempts to explain this in relation to education: the microphysical 
technology is what made education possible (e.g. through the production of classroom 
discipline), but ‘the creation of this metaphysical realm was what made the education of the 
individual suddenly imperative’ (94). If one replaces ‘education’ with ‘colonization’ in this 
quotation, the crucial role of the metaphysical in colonialism becomes abundantly clear.  
 Although Mitchell makes this advance over Foucault explicit, referring to it as a 
‘consequence of disciplinary power (...) that Michel Foucault does not discuss’ (xi-xii), he remains 
silent on the implications of the metaphysical for Foucault’s own work. However, these 
implications are not at all inconsequential. As we have seen, Discipline and Punish describes the 
rise of disciplinary mechanisms forming a disciplinary society.  This process, as Kelly’s fifth 
extrapolation has shown, has a dynamic of its own: it is strategic in nature. However, unless one 
invokes a figure (either a person or a state) that desires control, there is no reason why the 
strategy of disciplinary power should be what it is, nor why it should spread through the whole 
social fabric, and by extension, the world. This invocation would mean nothing less than a return 
to the paradigm of sovereignty, which was exactly what Foucault set out to avoid.  
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 Confronted with the problem of the directionality of power, Foucault would attempt to 
formulate a solution in The History of Sexuality. In a somewhat mystifying phrase, he proposes 
that power be studied as ‘intentional but non-subjective’ (94). What Foucault means is that  
 
the rationale of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the 
restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, 
becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but 
finding their base of support and their conditions elsewhere, end by forming 
comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is 
often the case that no one is there to have invented them (...). (95) 
 
This notion is acceptable as a solution to the general problem of directionality: it explains how 
individual power relations can coalesce and develop in a certain direction.  
However, it hardly begins to explain why power develops in the specific direction it takes. 
The Nietzschean emphasis on the role of chance and accident in the course of history surely plays 
an important part in Foucault’s decision not to pursue these questions any further, but this 
lacuna seems particularly unfortunate in the postcolonial context. Given that postcolonial 
critiques have gone to great lengths to demonstrate that colonialism is not an accident in the 
history of modernity,25 it seems insufficient for any genealogy of colonialism to take this 
contingency for granted.   
 Unwittingly, Colonising Egypt provides a theoretically sound alternative. It anticipates the 
spread of discipline by showing that disciplinary techniques are ‘by nature colonising in method’ 
(x). As should be sufficiently clear by now, disciplinary power produces a metaphysical idea of 
order that is by the terms of its own logic superior to disorder. Consequently, ‘the colonising 
process was to introduce the kind of order now found lacking’ (xv). Thus, Mitchell’s combination 
of the microphysical and the metaphysical leads to the conclusion that colonisation is a direct 
consequence of the coming into being of disciplinary techniques – without lapsing back into the 
sovereign paradigm or losing explicative value.  
 
                                                 
25
 The Latin-American Decoloniality Project is probably the clearest proponent of such a position. See for 
instance Mignolo, W. D. 2012. The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options. 
Durham: Duke UP. 
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Apart from the problem of directionality, there is a second way in which Colonising Egypt can be 
read as enhancing our understanding of Foucault’s work. It provides a welcome contextualization 
of the results that can be achieved with Foucault’s archaeological method. The discussion of the 
relationship between archaeology and structuralism, presented earlier in 3.2.1, achieves its full 
relevance here: Colonising Egypt can be read as a challenge to structuralism.   
 Before we take a closer look at the implications of Colonising Egypt for structuralist 
thought, it may be helpful to consider what Discipline and Punish can and cannot tell us about 
structuralism. In what appears as an offhand remark, Rabinow & Dreyfus argue that they ‘are 
reading Discipline and Punish broadly as a genealogy of structuralist discourse and associated 
practices’ (155). The clue to this reading is their observation that the disciplinary techniques of 
arrangement, distribution and coordination impose structure in a way that is reminiscent of the 
attempt of structuralism to read their objects of study as structures. However, this is a strong 
claim, and Rabinow & Dreyfus provide scant supporting evidence. Rereading Discipline and 
Punish with this claim in mind does very little to warrant the notion that Foucault had tried to 
make this point: the book in no way states that the idea of structure is produced by disciplinary 
power.  
 Colonising Egypt, by contrast, reserves a central place for the question of structure. As 
we have seen, it argues that one should not take for granted the idea of a structure that is prior 
to its elements: the distinction between the structure and its elements is itself already the 
product of power. Thus, Morsy’s claim that Mitchell falls back on structuralist analysis could not 
be further from the truth26: Colonising Egypt constitutes a radical challenge to structuralism’s 
potential to analyze power relations.  
 But what does that mean for Foucault’s archaeological method? Rabinow & Dreyfus’s 
interpretation of Discipline and Punish as a critique of structuralism hinges on the tendency of 
structuralism to think in terms of ‘universal principles’ (155). Given that The Archaeology of 
Knowledge argues in terms of historical rather than universal a priori, they are implicitly dragging 
archaeology out of the line of fire. But there is no reason why the universality of the principles 
should be the defining criterion for deciding whether this challenge to structuralism applies to 
                                                 
26
 Morsy 1990 : ‘Non point qu’il séduise nécessairement avec son pesant arsenal conceptuel, faisant appel 
à l’analyse structuraliste, à des modèles théoriques comme le schéma type du village kabyle, jadis proposé 
par le sociologue Bourdieu, ou à la définition moderne du ‘discours’ avec force références à ces 
intellectuels français que sont Derrida ou Michel Foucault.’ (320) 
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archaeology: the decisive question is whether it maintains this distinction between elements and 
a prior structure.  
At first sight, archaeology does not conceive of the rules that govern discourse as a 
structure in the sense that Mitchell uses it, namely as something that is ‘separate from the 
‘content’ distributed within it’ (79). Rather, as became clear in section 3.2, Foucault’s approach 
was essentially descriptive: its object of study was the discursive formation in its materiality, not 
the general principle that preceded it. Still, one may wonder how the notion of rules that govern 
discursive practice, as well as the concept of the historical a priori, can ever be purely descriptive: 
the idea of a structure that is prior to its content seems to run through Foucault’s archaeology as 
well. In that sense, Foucault’s early work seems fully embedded in disciplinary power, rendering 
it inadequate as a tool to expose this power.  
This constatation, however, opens the door to a combination of the archaeological 
approach and the kind of genealogy Mitchell proposes. In order to understand Mitchell’s 
contribution, one needs to go back to Foucault’s The Order of Things, which, significantly, had 
been published originally as Les Mots et les choses. In this book, Foucault the archaeologist could 
demonstrate the epistemological split between words and their referents, but because the 
positivity of his method refused to establish causal links, he failed to explain the genesis of this 
split. Mitchell’s contention that disciplinary power produces this dualism fills this gap and 
provides archaeological findings with a genealogical explanation.  
 
These advances over Foucault possess immediate relevance for the study of colonialism. When 
Mitchell demonstrates how disciplinary power creates the dualism that constitutes the working 
principle of European languages, emphasizing that Arabic works differently, he is demonstrating 
how disciplinary power is operative in the workings of discourse. This move establishes a strong 
connection between Foucault’s analyses of discourse and epistemes, and those of power – a 
connection that is simply not present in Foucault’s own work. More importantly, it makes it 
possible to employ the conceptual arsenal discussed in the previous chapter in the analysis of 
colonial power without encountering the problems Said and Bhabha ran into. 
 Indeed, this revised concept of discipline has important ramifications for the texts 
discussed earlier. First, the claim that the dualism of the conceptual and the material is produced 
by disciplinary power implies that it is insufficient to point to the falsity of representation, as 
Orientalism did in its instrumentalist architecture. Because it maintains the distinction between 
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reality and representation, this framework does not supersede the dualism disciplinary power 
created.  
 Second, the archaeological architecture we detected in Orientalism is not sufficient 
either: to stress the inevitable interestedness of representation is not necessarily to suspend the 
distinction between reality and representation, as long as one does not raise the question of 
whether the act of representation itself is by definition colonialist.  
 Third, it is theoretically unsound to locate power in particular subject-object relations, 
when it was actually power itself that produced the very distinction between the subject and the 
object. Consequently, the efforts of the archaeological Said and Foucault to locate power in the 
objectness of the represented misses the larger point of how one came to think in terms of 
objects and subjects. Something similar can be argued about Homi Bhabha’s emphasis on the 
problems on the level of subjectivity. As the previous chapter has argued, he followed Lacan in 
drawing a parallel between language and subject-constitution. Besides the problem of 
universality that has been discussed already, there is the larger issue that this approach does not 
address the question of how the distinction between subject and object has gained currency – 
both in experience and language.  
 Obviously, a focus on the foundational role of disciplinary power does not invalidate Said 
and Bhabha’s work. Rather, it places their concern with the question of the oppression of colonial 
subjects in a broader perspective on the peculiarity of modern power, a power that does much 
more than oppress. 
 
The consequences of this new approach to power are apparently hard to grasp, as some of the 
reviews of Colonising Egypt indicate. Merry’s review is a case in point, claiming that Mitchell 
focuses on ‘the ideological aspects of domination, examining power as it operates through the 
restructuring of consciousness’ (912). This is a blatant misunderstanding of Mitchell’s work: 
Colonising Egypt focuses on the power that makes it possible even to use concepts like ideology 
and consciousness in the first place. The rise of disciplinary power in both its microphysical and 
metaphysical forms precedes the legitimization of colonization: it is only after the coming into 
being of the dualism Mitchell analyzes that one can begin to question the categories of which 
Mitchell allegedly makes use. 
 Similarly, Cantori, claiming to have found ‘conceptual problems’ (403), objects to 
Mitchell’s account by arguing that Egypt adopted disciplinary power ‘voluntarily’ before the 
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British came (404). This observation is not a serious objection, for two reasons. First of all, as 
Gran observes, the ruling class ‘found it strategic to Europeanize itself and to remove the feature 
that made it an ‘other’ for Europeans’ (218). Cantori fails to acknowledge this class stratification, 
homogenizing Egypt in the process. A second reason why Cantori’s objection misses the mark 
completely lies in his insistence on the ‘voluntary’ nature of accepting disciplinary power. In 
categorizing this acceptance as voluntary, he assumes the existence of a collective Egyptian 
Subject that makes decisions. What Mitchell tried to show was that the idea of this subject is 
itself already the manifestation of disciplinary power.  
 At bottom, the problem here is a conflict between two contrasting concepts of power. 
For Cantori, power denotes first and foremost the ability to make choices, hence his insistence on 
the voluntary nature of the adoption of disciplinary techniques. Mitchell’s essay “Everyday 
Metaphors of Power” is helpful here: it observes that everyday metaphors of power tend to think 
of power as either persuading or coercing. In the case of persuasion, its target is the mind; when 
it is coercive, its point of application is the body (545). Underlying both metaphors is the concept 
of power one can also find in Cantori’s account: power as the ability to choose. 
 As should be amply clear by now, the concept of power Colonising Egypt puts forward is 
different from both persuasion and consent, and works neither on the mind nor the body – it 
produces, rather, that very distinction. The importance of this non-subjective approach to power 
can hardly be overstated: we have now cut off the head of the king in the analysis of colonialism. 
Colonialism is no longer about the movement of armies, commanded by a sovereign, but about 
the rise and spread of systems of power.  
 And yet, the greatest virtue of Colonising Egypt might well be its greatest weakness. If 
one posits the disciplinary production of the microphysical and the metaphysical as the crux of 
capitalist modernity through a contrastive approach that considers only a handful of Arabic 
sources, this effectively recenters global complexities around the concept of discipline. Indeed, 
how can a single concept provide a sufficient analysis of a multitude of power relations?  It is to 
these questions that Kaplan turns. 
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4.3. Kaplan and Discipline: Is the Concept Eurocentric? 
4.3.1. Context: Discipline in India 
 
Martha Kaplan’s 1995 “Panopticon in Poona: Essay on Foucault and Colonialism,” published in 
the journal Cultural Anthropology, attempts to determine the potential and limitations of 
Foucault’s work for an anthropological analysis of colonialism. In this “Essay on Foucault and 
Colonialism” there is, however, a certain slippage masked in the transition from the title to the 
subtitle: the name of Foucault, used so casually in the text to imply an identifiable theoretical 
framework, involves a lot more than his work on Bentham’s panopticon. Analogously, Poona, a 
city in Maharashtra, West India, is only one locus in a world shaped by colonialism. This 
transition, disavowed in the text, lays bare  Kaplan’s main tactic: implication. 
 In short, the main implication of “Panopticon in Poona” is that the work of Foucault may 
perpetuate in certain ways a colonialist line of thought. Referring to Foucault’s account of 
discipline as the dominant power formation of the modern West, she concludes somewhat 
hesitantly that ‘the story of a “modern” difference may turn out to be just another story’ (95). 
This hesitation springs perhaps from the realization that a relatively short essay exploring the 
workings of disciplinary power in Poona is insufficient to make such grand claims about the 
relation between Foucault and colonialism as such. In that sense, “Panopticon in Poona” reads 
more like an elaboration of its opening questions than an answer to them:  
 
Is Foucault correct that the modern European state and its discourse arises in a 
European historical trajectory from kingdoms to states, from power over death to power 
over life? Or is Foucault reading as real a European imagination of its own difference 
from its past and from the colonized other? Is he reading as real history a version of 
difference that arises and is made to seem real in the course of colonial projects like that 
of Mountstuart Elphinstone? (86) 
 
These questions and the critique they imply are reminiscent of an earlier questioning of 
Foucault’s usefulness for postcolonial studies. And indeed, it is not long before Kaplan mentions 
that ‘others have cautioned that Foucault's analysis itself reinscribes the West as subject’ (90), 
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hinting at Spivak’s infamous “Can the Subaltern Speak?”27 In doing so, Kaplan joins a long list of 
academics who have accused Foucault of Eurocentrism. The following sections will analyze the 
terms of this critique.  
 
But before delving into the question of Eurocentrism, we must not forget that Kaplan also puts 
her name on the list of those who have found Foucault’s exploration of the relation between 
knowledge and power useful: only the second half of “Panopticon in Poona” is dedicated to a 
critique of Foucault, the first half attempts to work with Foucault’s concepts of discipline and 
panopticism.  
 Kaplan’s analysis, inspired by Discipline and Punish, focuses on the writings of 
Mountstuart Elphinstone. This Scottish statesman and historian was appointed “Sole 
Commissioner for the Territories Conquered from the Paishwa” after the British conquest in 
1818. In his writings, he reflected on the question of efficient and profitable governance: his 
purpose was above all to ensure the maximization of revenue. However, Kaplan proceeds, 
Elphinstone has also been “lauded as a champion (...) of Maharashtrian custom and institutions’ 
(87), based on his great interest in the local population. Through questionnaires and censuses, 
Elphinstone inquired into Maharashtrian culture. This has led scholars to the conclusion, 
paraphrased by Kaplan, that ‘Elphinstone’s utilitarian interests, instantiated in the reading of 
Bentham, warred with his romantic desire to maintain Maratha institutions and ways of 
government’ (87). Thus, the maximization of profit and the study of culture are perceived as 
conflicting impetuses. Kaplan, for her part, refuses to take this contradiction at face value, 
suspecting instead that Elphinstone’s interest in local culture betrays the link between power and 
knowledge Foucault described in Discipline and Punish. She argues that ‘attention to “custom” in 
colonial contexts has been an exercise of power’ (88). This power is a disciplinary power, as ‘the 
questionnaire turns the people of Maharashtra into objects of scrutiny, like inmates of a 
panopticon’ (88). The connection between Elphinstone and panopticism is significant, even in 
practice: he built several panopticons in India. Importantly, the construction of panopticons did 
not only affect ‘criminals’: ‘even as the colonial scrutiny created “criminal tribes” and constructed 
Maharashtran abnormality, the scrutiny took place in the service of defining and controlling the 
normal’ (89). Thus, Elphinstone’s tactics of governance constituted an individualizing, disciplinary 
                                                 
27
 Spivak, G. C. 1994 (1988). “Can the Subaltern Speak?” IN: Williams, P.; Chrisman, L. Colonial Discourse 
and Post-Colonial Theory. A Reader. Harlow: Pearson Education. 
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regime to keep the colonized subjects in check. Like Mitchell, Kaplan reserves a central place for 
disciplinary power in the colonization process.  
  
4.3.2. Cotext: Against a Binary Architecture 
 
If Kaplan’s emphasis on the use of disciplinary techniques in the production of docile bodies is 
largely consistent with Foucault’s and Mitchell’s account, a less harmonious picture appears 
when one compares their conceptual architectures.   
 Looking back at the cotextual analysis of Discipline and Punish, presented in section 4.1.2, 
disicpline had as its most immediate antagonist the concept of sovereignty. ‘Sovereignty’ 
referred to a form of power in which torture was the dominant penal technique, a technique that 
sought to put on display the strength of the sovereign through excessive rituals. As section 4.1.3 
proceeded to demonstrate, sovereign power stood in opposition to disciplinary power in a 
number of fundamental ways.  
 Similarly, Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt sets up an antagonist to disciplinary power, albeit 
after a detour. Given that disciplinary power for Mitchell constitutes the peculiarity of capitalist 
modernity, he implies the pre-modern as the non-disciplinary. The discussion of the Kabyle 
houses earlier has already exposed the problem of constructing a homogenizing binary of the 
modern and the pre-modern, coinciding with the disciplinary and the non-disciplinary. Thus, it 
seems that both Foucault and Mitchell establish their account of discipline through its negation. 
 By contrast, Kaplan raises serious questions as to the validity of defining the disciplinary 
through negation. Her argument is framed as a critique of Foucault’s binary, but there is no 
reason why it should not equally apply to Mitchell. It consists of a double movement, 
problematizing both the Europeanness of discipline, and the discipline of Europeans. Or, 
reformulating the argument in Mitchell’s vocabulary: the Britishness of modernity, and the 
modernity of the British.   
 First, Kaplan argues that there is nothing ‘European’ about the link between knowledge 
and power. Focusing on the Peshwa rulers of Maharashtra, she points out that the Peshwa 
administration collected records on land arrangements and taxation, down to the level of the 
individual. Like Elphinstone, but long before the British came to Poona, they installed this system 
to increase the revenue of taxation. All information was kept in archives: ‘panopticists 
extraordinaire, not an action or transaction – including, for example, marriage – seems to have 
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taken place in Maharashtra without the bureaucracy of the Peshwa knowing and taxing’ (90). 
They kept censuses and created spatial divisions in neighborhoods to coordinate the taxing, all of 
which are techniques highly reminiscent of the disciplinary technologies Foucault describes. 
Moreover, their attempts to collect information did much more than maximize revenue: 
 
The Peshwa's information-gathering may have begun in order to keep a check on the tax 
gatherers to whom the power to tax had been "farmed." But to monitor those very 
intermediaries, the Peshwa needed, and created, a system of censusing that brought the 
inquiry of the state directly into the commercial and agricultural lives of individuals. 
Elphinstone's archives are in many ways the continuant of this local project. What then 
of Foucault's assumptions as to the European "modernity" of panopticism? (92) 
 
Kaplan’s question is tendentious, given that Discipline and Punish never claims panopticism is 
exclusively European, nor does it equate discipline and modernity (unlike Mitchell does). 
Nevertheless, the point of Kaplan’s interrogation is quite clear: locating disciplinary technologies 
in space and time may be a more daunting task than Foucault and Mitchell suspect.  
 Second, “Panopticon in Poona” also raises the question of how ‘modern’ the British of 
Elphinstone’s time actually were. Kaplan stresses that Elphinstone’s techniques of information-
gathering were highly inefficient and rudimentary, exemplified in his attempts to estimate the 
population through the total salt consumption (92). This kind of information-gathering, Kaplan 
argues, seems far removed from the meticulous approaches outlined in Discipline and Punish. 
However, this argument is perhaps a bit misleading: the efficiency of disciplinary procedures 
Foucault describes is not measured by the accuracy of the information amassed, but rather by 
the degree of individualization accomplished. 
 More to the point, Kaplan highlights the sovereign elements in this presumably 
disciplinary regime. Against Foucault’s historical narrative of a transformation from sovereign to 
disciplinary power, Kaplan insists on the predilection of the British for rituals of rule: splendid 
titles, the Union Jack, trumpets, and cannons all assist the British in displaying sovereign strength 
(93). This leads Kaplan to conclude that ‘at the very least, spectacle and capillary action, ritual 
and panopticon, coexist as technologies of power throughout the entire history of the colonial 
British’ (93, emphasis in original). Again, the spatial and temporal separation of sovereignty and 
discipline is problematized.  
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In sum, Kaplan questions both the temporal trajectory and spatial location of discipline in 
Foucault’s account, as well as Mitchell’s story of modernization through a scrutiny of the binaries 
that underlie their work. Although the evidence she produces to sever the links between 
discipline, on the one hand, and Europe or modernity, on the other is nowhere nearly sufficient 
for a total revision, it presents a useful warning against the dangers of totalizing readings of 
modernity and discipline. 
 
4.3.3. Concept: Discipline, Eurocentrism, Resistance 
 
If one takes seriously Kaplan’s reservations, what are the ramifications for the concept of 
discipline as a tool for analysis? Is the concept itself so flawed as to render dangerous any 
analysis that deploys it? “Panopticon in Poona” does not provide a conclusive answer, but 
suggests an alternative reading of ‘discipline’ that changes its ontological status. In Kaplan’s 
formulation: 
 
Is it a history of a real difference of technologies of power? Or is it an imagined history 
of temporal, civilizational difference, imagined in a colonial project insistent on the 
creation of difference to establish power? (90) 
 
In other words, Kaplan shifts the status of the concept from an alleged description of reality to an 
imagined history. This formulation is not exactly helpful, given that Foucault’s genealogy worked 
to undo this easy distinction of reality and imagination. Nevertheless, the real problem can be 
reconstructed from Kaplan’s questions: the crux of the matter is that Foucault took for granted a 
tradition of thought that enabled him to outline a disciplinary society that is roughly coextensive 
with Europe from the 18th century onwards. Foucault’s invocation of sovereignty as an antagonist 
through which he constructs ‘discipline’ negatively can then be read as an operation to construct 
‘Europe.’  
 This creation of difference is structurally similar to what Said described in Orientalism: 
the construction of the Self through the oriental Other. This difference then serves to establish 
and maintain the superiority of a European Self. Although it is hard to see how Foucault frames 
Europe as superior, he certainly does not question Europe as a valid, ‘different’ category, either. 
It leads Kaplan to conclude that ‘we need to be more sceptical regarding claims about "modern" 
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difference and see in them simply the effective – but challengeable – self-flattery of another 
among the series of history's momentarily dominant and powerful cultural cohorts’ (95).  
 This conclusion is reminiscent of Spivak criticism’s of Foucault in “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” – an essay Kaplan quotes approvingly (90). Because of the overlap between Kaplan and 
Spivak’s argument, the rest of this section will draw on Spivak’s work to provide a more thorough 
assessment of Kaplan’s suggestive criticism.  
 
Briefly put, the territory shared by “Panopticon in Poona” and its more famous accomplice 
consists of the suspicion that Foucault creates a new story of Europe. However, if one expects 
Spivak’s famous essay to yield a plethora of responses to its criticism of Foucault, one is in for a 
disappointment.28 How is it possible that a frontal assault on a central source of inspiration for 
postcolonial studies was apparently largely ignored?  Beside the complexity of Spivak’s critique, 
at least three factors can explain this relative silence.  
 First, the dramatic ending of “Can the Subaltern Speak?” has diverted the attention away 
from its theoretical opening. Based on the fate of Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, a young Indian woman 
involved in the struggle for independence, Spivak argues that the poor women of the South are 
doubly occluded. Bhuvaneswari, who committed suicide while menstruating to dispel rumours 
about illicit love and ensuing pregnancy, could not get her message out and her death was 
recuperated within a patriarchal and racist discourse. It follows, for Spivak, that ‘the subaltern 
cannot speak’ (104). Spivak’s revision of the essay, published a decade later as part of A Critique 
of Postcolonial Reason, admits that ‘it was an inadvisable remark’ (308). Inadvisable, because it 
gave rise to a debate with Benita Parry, who accused Spivak of ‘deliberate deafness to the native 
voice where it can be heard’ (1987: 39). This controversy certainly received more attention than 
Spivak’s technical reading of Foucault.29 
 A second reason why critical reception has not responded to her criticism of Foucault is 
perhaps that, despite its lengthy discussion of Foucault and Deleuze, Spivak’s real focus lies 
elsewhere. Indeed, her essay is an intervention into the work of the Subaltern Studies group, a 
collective of South-Asian scholars. Inspired by amongst others Foucault, their efforts can be read 
                                                 
28
 One of the recent exceptions is Robinson, A.; Tormey, S. “Living in Smooth Space: Deleuze, 
Postcolonialism and the Subaltern” IN Bignall, S.; Patton, P. 2010. Deleuze and the Postcolonial. Edinburgh: 
UP.  This essay deals with and refutes Spivak’s criticism of Foucault and Deleuze. However, its desperate 
conviction to salvage Deleuze from any accusation Spivak levels seriously compromises its value.  
29
 Loomba’s discussion of “Can the Subaltern Speak?” is a case in point. Loomba, Ania. 2005. 
Colonialism/Postcolonialism. New York: Routledge, pp. 192-204. 
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as attempts to reconstruct peasant consciousness. Thus, although Spivak frames her argument as 
a critique of Foucault, it is much more a critique of his legacy than of his original contributions.   
 Finally, Spivak does not deal with any of Foucault’s major works. In fact, her criticism 
hinges on a very short conversation between Foucault and Deleuze, printed as “Intellectuals and 
Power” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. She justifies this unusual choice by stating that 
she has ‘chosen this friendly exchange between two activist philosophers of history because it 
undoes the opposition between authoritative theoretical production and the unguarded practice 
of conversation, enabling one to glimpse the track of ideology’ (66). Taking issue with this 
approach, Warren Montag paraphrases her as suggesting ‘that what Foucault utters in 
apparently "unguarded" moments can only reveal a truth kept carefully hidden under a veil of 
appearance; such a procedure of reading resolves the apparent contradiction to restore 
Foucault's work to the bad totality that it has always been’ (4). Thus, Spivak does exactly what 
she accuses Foucault of: she restores the author as an absolute subject. More importantly, her 
engagement with the interview avoids dealing with the core of Foucault’s work, a factor that may 
have rendered a response less urgent.   
 
Given that both Kaplan and Spivak’s claim that Foucault reconstructs Europe or the West has 
hardly met any response, the task at hand is to determine its pertinence for any postcolonial 
analysis that deploys the concept of discipline. Is the concept inherently Eurocentric? And what 
are the consequences for Mitchell’s appropriation of ‘discipline’ in Colonising Egypt? In order to 
provide some tentative answers, it will be helpful to break down Kaplan and Spivak’s large claim 
into four parts. 
  The first and most clear-cut part of their critique is that what Foucault produces in 
Discipline and Punish is a self-contained history of Europe. This is an argument Mitchell had 
already made: 
 
Foucault’s analyses are focussed on France and northern Europe. Perhaps this focus has 
tended to obscure the colonising nature of disciplinary power. Yet the panopticon, the 
model institution whose geometric order and generalised surveillance serve as a motif 
for this kind of power, was a colonial invention. The panoptic principle was devised on 
Europe’s colonial frontier with the Ottoman Empire, and examples of the panopticon 
were built for the most part not in northern Europe, but in places like colonial India. (35) 
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The problem, in other words, is not so much that Foucault focuses on northern Europe, but 
rather that he largely ignores the way in which colonial encounters shaped the Europe he 
describes. There can be no quarrel here: on those rare occasions where Discipline and Punish 
mentions the colonies, it mentions them to give examples of disciplinary technologies, not as 
sites that played a foundational role in the genealogy of disciplinary power. The historical 
evidence Mitchell and Kaplan produce proves that this is not a minor omission: their insistence 
on the colonies as the ‘laboratory of modernity’ (Rabinow 1989: 289) seems entirely appropriate; 
a rewriting of Foucault’s genealogy of discipline seems most desirable. What is less clear, 
however, is the extent to which this affects the concept of discipline as such: the structural 
problems in Foucault’s genealogies have not prevented Mitchell and Kaplan from using 
‘discipline’ as a fruitful tool for analysis. It seems that their use of the concept works to save 
Discipline and Punish more than Discipline and Punish corrupts their work.   
 A second point of criticism, especially to be found in Spivak, is that Foucault restores the 
transparent subject rather than problematizing it. She bases her claim on Foucault’s active role in 
the Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons (GIP), a group Foucault co-founded in order to expose 
the questionable role of the prison system in society. For Spivak, however, the group’s attempt 
to give voice to the prisoners is a stumbling block:  
 
Foucault articulates another corollary of the disavowal of the role of ideology in 
reproducing the social relations of production: an unquestioned valorization of the 
oppressed as subject, the ‘object being’, as Deleuze admiringly remarks, ‘to establish 
conditions where the prisoners themselves would be able to speak’. Foucault adds that 
‘the masses know perfectly well, clearly’- once again the thematic of being undeceived – 
‘they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well’ (FD, pp. 
206, 207). What happens to the critique of the sovereign subject in these 
pronouncements? (69) 
 
The point Spivak makes is that Foucault’s naive attempt to give voice to the prisoners overlooks 
the way in which their voice, like that of Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, will be inscribed in the dominant 
discourse. In fact, it is always already moderated by the intellectual – an authentic voice, 
consciousness, or subject cannot be retrieved.  
While this is certainly a valid critique of the GIP, its relevance for Discipline and Punish 
remains unclear: at no point does Discipline and Punish pretend to have access to the 
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consciousness of the imprisoned, nor to any other consciousness. With the exception of Madness 
and Civilization, where the early Foucault naively invoked unreason as a counterpoint to society’s 
normalization, this point can be extended to all his major works. When it comes to Foucault’s 
legacy, Mitchell and Kaplan do not make this mistake either: there is no invocation of an 
oppressed consciousness whatsoever. As we have seen, Mitchell’s concept of discipline even 
worked against a naïve invocation of consciousness, arguing instead that the notion of 
consciousness itself is a product of disciplinary power. It therefore seems safe to say that 
discipline as a concept does not encourage a European subject to speak for the colonial subject.  
A third point is very much related: apart from reintroducing the subject, Spivak argues, 
Foucault also reintroduces the Subject. Discipline, in her reading, has as ‘an irreducible 
methodological presupposition’ (74), a Subject that controls power and imbues it with a certain 
rationale. She capitalizes this Subject to distinguish it from an individual subject, but the two 
share their illusion of autonomy and reason. Her accusation, then, is that Foucault reinstalls a 
certain rationale presiding over the directionality of power in Europe: 
  
Because of the power in the word ‘power’, Foucault admits to using the ‘metaphor of 
the point which progressively irradiates its surroundings’. Such slips become the rule 
rather than the exception in less careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an 
effectively heliocentric discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical 
sun of theory, the Subject of Europe. (69) 
 
But does Foucault really reinstall a European Subject presiding over disciplinary power? It seems 
not: Foucault never capitalized power or the subject. It would have been inconsistent with his 
notion of power, because he was interested in power relations rather than power as a monolithic 
whole – or so the story goes. Ransom, a staunch defender of Foucault, is one of those who 
propagate this narrative:  
 
Second, it seems a mistake to think of Foucault as writing about the power-knowledge 
regime. For as long as Foucault’s readers see him as describing a closed universe of a 
single kind of power à la the Frankfurt School, for that long will he be completely 
misunderstood. Examples of this kind of reading can be cited without end and stretch 
from the beginning of Foucault’s critical reception to the present. (119) 
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Ransom would probably add “Can the Subaltern Speak?” to this long list of misreadings, but 
perhaps one should wonder instead why the list is so long: it is my contention that it is not a 
misreading at all. Although Ransom’s interpretation is consistent with Foucault’s own claims in 
The History of Sexuality, there is no denying that Discipline and Punish comes dangerously close 
to ‘describing a closed universe of a single kind of power.’ If Foucault discusses what he describes 
as ‘the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, their spread throughout the whole social body, the formation of what 
might be called in general the disciplinary society’ (209), how are we not to interpret this as a 
closed universe of a single kind of power?  
 However, the fact that Foucault seems to describe discipline as a monolithic cluster of 
power relations after all does not mean that Spivak is right either. In fact, her claim that discipline 
has as an ‘irreducible methodological presupposition’ (74) a Subject that controls it overlooks the 
central feature of Foucault’s approach to power. As section 4.2.3 has pointed out, Foucault 
describes power as ‘intentional but non-subjective’ (74): it is the play of coalescing power 
relations that produces the specific rationale of disciplinary power, rather than the sovereign 
subject. Just as the panopticon does not necessarily need the presence of a guard to function, 
there is no overseer of the disciplinary society. Thus, Foucault does not install a ‘Subject of 
Europe’ either: although the increasing individualization is the outcome of the (possibly 
contradictory) intentions of agents, this outcome of their actions is unknown to themselves. 
Thus, if Foucault’s Europe is going somewhere, it does not know where. The concept of discipline 
does not reintroduce Europe as a sovereign subject. 
 Fourth and finally, there is Kaplan’s assertion that Foucault is creating just another 
version of European difference, which then buttresses claims of European superiority. Although 
Discipline and Punish actually undercuts such claims to superiority by dismantling the story of a 
more ‘human’ penal regime, it indeed fails to question the analytical value of the notion of 
‘Europe.’ Nevertheless, Foucault never explicitly linked the concept of discipline to Europe. 
Therefore, as the case of Mitchell proves, it is not hard to dislodge the concept from Foucault’s 
European framework. What one needs to be wary of is thus not so much the notion of discipline 
itself as the assumption that it is coextensive with ‘Europe.’ In making ‘discipline’ coextensive 
with ‘modernity,’ Mitchell certainly avoids this trap of Eurocentrism.   
 And yet, for Kaplan, this appears to be not quite good enough. Aware of contributions 
like Mitchell’s, which have substituted ‘modernity’ for ‘Europe,’ she still warns that theories that 
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‘postulate modernity as a universal, rather than European, stage’ (94) save Foucault’s temporal 
trajectory and again establish difference through negation, in relation to the pre-modern. This 
seems a fair critique: as Mitchell’s sloppy invocation of the Kabyle houses demonstrates, 
Colonising Egypt indeed introduces a questionable binary between the modern and the pre-
modern.  
Still, one may wonder which is more detrimental: establishing too rigid a binary 
distinction between the modern and the pre-modern, or abandoning the search for modernity’s 
specificity altogether. Clearly, Kaplan is equally unprepared to do the latter – in fact, when she 
reads Elphinstone ‘as an exemplar of a British colonial project,’ focusing on ‘culturally specific’ 
and ‘historically and culturally particular’ forms of rule (94), her essay works hard to introduce 
another mode of difference. In an attempt to justify this manoeuvre, Kaplan states she ‘would 
like to recognize a kind of difference – cultural difference – that does not require temporal 
ranking of any sort’ (94-95).  
How are we to understand this idea of ‘temporal ranking’? It is my contention that, 
rather than a merely temporal ranking, Kaplan hints at a normative ranking disguised as 
temporal: the idea that certain cultures are more ‘advanced’ is what Kaplan takes issue with. 
Again, one cannot help but think back to Foucault’s role in dispelling the notion of progress in his 
account of penality. The concept of discipline played a key role in problematizing this notion of 
progress and advancement.  
 
In sum, only the first of these four points of criticism is pertinent to Discipline and Punish: 
although the work produces a self-contained version of European history, it does not let a 
European subject speak for the colonial subject, it does not reintroduce a European Subject, and 
it does not create a version of European/modern difference that justifies colonial rule. Moreover, 
as Colonising Egypt demonstrates, this first point can be – and has been – addressed through an 
emphasis on the formation of disciplinary techniques in the colonial encounter. Therefore, it is 
my contention that there is nothing about the concept of discipline that renders it necessarily 
unfit for postcolonial analysis.  
 
Does that mean, then, that Foucault’s concept of discipline is not Eurocentric? Such an argument 
would certainly run counter to received wisdom in postcolonial studies. Indeed, for many 
scholars there can be no doubt that Foucault’s work is entirely Eurocentric. In a sweeping 
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conclusion, Loomba states that ‘Foucault’s own theories are Euro-centric in their focus, and of 
limited use in understanding colonial societies’ (49). If Loomba has the self-contained history of 
Discipline and Punish in mind, her observation is entirely justified. Moreover, the following 
chapter will show how Foucault’s History of Sexuality contains the same crucial flaw. So many 
theorists have preceded or followed Loomba in her assessment that she seems merely to be 
stating the obvious. And yet, there is something troubling about this critique: on closer 
inspection, the unified charge of Eurocentrism against Foucault disintegrates into a muddled 
collection of loose and at times incompatible accusations.   
 At bottom, the problem is that different theorists, apparently speaking in unison, have 
different notions of Eurocentrism. A brief exploration of the discussion around Foucault yields at 
least three different definitions, on top of the versions Kaplan and Spivak have produced. A first, 
very common definition is used by Rey Chow, who apllies the label of Eurocentrism because 
‘Foucault has paid scant attention to cultures and histories of the formerly colonised, non-
European world’ (2010: 64). In relation to discipline, she asks: 
 
if the multifarious social, ideological coercions accompanying Europe's arrival at modern 
rationalism can be demonstrated by Foucault in such copious detail, is not his relative 
silence on how such coercions were exercised in Europe's colonies, during exactly the 
same period when the institutions he studied became consolidated within Europe, 
indefensible? (2010: 64) 
 
If that were the problem, it would not be as indefensible as Chow seems to think. Indeed, Clifford 
has defended Foucault’s silence on the colonies, referring to his position as ‘scrupulously 
ethnocentric’ (1988: 264). In Clifford’s reading, Foucault takes care to avoid references to a world 
outside Europe because it would be methodologically unsound to contrast this to the West. In 
other words, it is perfectly acceptable to be silent on matters which one feels unqualified to 
comment on. This seems an acceptable defense against the charge of Eurocentrism, provided 
one accepts Chow’s definition. The problem, however, is that Chow’s definition overlooks the 
extent to which the idea of Europe is already a product of the colonial encounter. Consequently, 
her definition, as well as Clifford’s response, both reproduce the self-contained notion of Europe 
one also finds in Discipline and Punish.  
 A second definition of Eurocentrism is implicit in Timothy Brennan’s denunciation of 
Foucault’s work. The problem for Brennan is not so much that Foucault ignored the non-
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European, but rather that he ‘universalized the experiences of his own targeted identity in 
Discipline and Punish’ (2006: 13). Although Foucault fails to locate the boundaries of the 
‘disciplinary society’ he describes, it is hard to see how anyone could read Discipline and Punish 
as describing a universal condition, given Foucault’s insistence on locating disciplinary techniques 
in space and time.  
 A third notion of Eurocentrism can be found in Edward Said’s work. In his discussion of 
Foucault in “Criticism Between Culture and System,” Said claims that Foucault ‘seems unaware of 
the extent to which the ideas of discourse and discipline are assertively European’ (222). 
Whether Said’s claim that discipline is ‘assertively European’ refers to a positionality left 
mysterious or constitutes a lapse into essentialism is irrelevant here; what matters is that it runs 
counter to Kaplan’s assertion that there is nothing particularly European about disciplinary 
techniques. Whereas Kaplan and Said at first sight seem to be voicing the same criticism, they are 
actually making opposite claims.  
 Thus, if earlier this section has broken down Kaplan and Spivak’s arguments into four 
parts, and insisted on the multiplicity of the apparently simple charge of Eurocentrism, this is not 
a defensive gesture to divide the critique until the parts become invisible, but rather an attempt 
to determine which points of criticism bear directly on discipline as a concept. If one insists on 
using the label in spite of the above, one could conclude that although Discipline and Punish is 
Eurocentric in producing a self-contained version of European history, Mitchell and Kaplan 
effectively dislodge the concept of discipline from its Eurocentric context.  
 
Whereas the above has demonstrated that Mitchell and Kaplan’s work wards off the threat of 
Eurocentrism present in Discipline and Punish, the remainder of this section will focus on another 
way in which the spectre of Foucault haunts their work. The contours of this problem have 
already been sketched out in the earlier observation that, in spite of of Ransom’s claim, Discipline 
and Punish does present a monolithic account of power: Foucault depicts a society in which 
disciplinary power is ubiquitous. What, then, is the place of resistance in relation to the concept 
of discipline? Why was it absent from the conceptual architectures presented above?  
 In a sense, Foucault has always been criticized for failing to provide an account of 
resistance. It is an immediate consequence of that other perennial complaint, namely that 
Foucault’s relativist approach lacks a normative framework. As one of many to make this claim, 
Habermas has argued that ‘[Foucault] contrasts his critique of power with the ‘analysis of truth’ 
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in such a fashion that the former becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that it would 
have to borrow from the latter’ (108). In relation to Discipline and Punish, Michael Walzer 
concludes from this lack of normative framework that ‘the powerful evocation of the disciplinary 
system gives way to an antidisciplinarian politics that is mostly rhetoric and posturing’ (65). The 
implication here is that because Foucault does not have a set of norms on which to build his 
work, he cannot advocate resistance. However, when postcolonial critics have repeated this 
accusation of a lack of resistance, this was not a repetition of the charges of relativism and 
nihilism. In fact, the whole discussion of Foucault versus Habermas has been largely ignored in 
postcolonial studies. In line with this, I would argue that it is an absolute non-issue for analyses of 
the (post)colonial: whenever postcolonial theorists have drawn on Foucault’s work, they have 
done so within the framework of their own set of norms and values. To put it somewhat bluntly: 
they were largely in agreement that colonialism was undesirable.   
 Rather, when postcolonial theorists bemoan the lack of a theory of resistance in 
Foucault, they do not mean that a normative framework is lacking, but that the concepts and 
tools for an actual analysis of practices of resistance are missing. One does not need to look far in 
order to find postcolonial texts that denounce this lack: Colonising Egypt and “Panopticon in 
Poona” both point out that Foucault failed to provide such an account.  Mitchell’s observations 
are worth quoting at some length here:  
 
One should not overstate the coherence of these technologies, as Foucault sometimes 
does. Disciplines can break down, counteract one another, or overreach. They offer 
spaces for manoeuver and resistance, and can be turned to counter-hegemonic 
purposes. (...) At the same time, in abandoning the image of colonial power as simply a 
coercive central authority, one should also question the traditional figure of resistance 
as a subject who stands outside this power and refuses its demands. Colonial subjects 
and their modes of resistance are formed within the organisational terrain of the 
colonial state, rather than some wholly exterior social space. (xi) 
 
Importantly, although Mitchell faults Foucault for underplaying the potential of resistance, by 
refusing to locate resistance as external to power, he nevertheless suggests a notion of resistance 
that dovetails with both Foucault’s concept of power and his vague suggestions of the nature of 
resistance in The History of Sexuality (95-96). Analogously, Kaplan insists on the necessity of 
introducing a concept of resistance into a Foucauldian approach. Like Mitchell, she suggests 
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locating resistance within power relations rather than outside. Taking Gandhi as an example, she 
demonstrates how his actions subverted disciplinary power by turning the power of the gaze 
against the coloniser (93). Using the surveillance the British had installed to control him, Gandhi 
made sure his words and actions were visible to the public. This is structurally similar to an 
example Mitchell gives: the disciplinary training colonial subjects received in prisons and barracks 
could be deployed to anti-colonial ends (xi).  
 Whereas Mitchell’s and Kaplan’s criticism of Foucault is immediately followed by a 
proposal to remedy this hiatus, Edward Said has been less forgiving. In “The Imagination of 
Power,” Said ascribes to Foucault a ‘pessimistic view’ and a ‘singular lack of interest in the force 
of effective resistance to it’ (1986: 151). This leads Said to conclude that Foucault’s ‘interest in 
domination was critical but not finally as contestatory, or as oppositional as on the surface it 
seems to be’ (152) – a harsh assessment. One could object that Said conflates the levels of 
resistance as object of analysis and resistance as a practice of the theorist, but the point remains: 
Foucault did not provide analyses of resistance. Unlike Mitchell and Kaplan, who opted to 
complement Foucault’s work with suggestions towards a compatible concept of resistance, Said 
would abandon a Foucauldian approach altogether.    
 
If there is a text where Said’s criticism applies most, it must be Discipline and Punish. Foucault’s 
grim description of disciplinary society leaves little room for manoeuvring; and yet, some would 
insist that Said’s repudiation is the result of a misreading. The quotation from Ransom presented 
earlier is a case in point: stressing that Discipline and Punish does not describe a monolithic form 
of power, he claims that a potential for resistance is obvious in the internal contradictions 
between power relations. The common failure to acknowledge this part of Foucault’s work is 
subsequently ascribed to ‘Foucault’s writing’ (33). The problem, for Ransom, is not conceptual, 
but rhetorical. 
In fact, there is only one small passage in Discipline and Punish that warrants such a 
thesis: Foucault argues at some point that power relations ‘are not univocal; they define 
innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of 
conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations’ (27). 
However, this is only one sentence in an entire book that suggests that discipline is monolithic 
after all. In The History of Sexuality, something similar occurs: Foucault’s famous assertion that 
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‘where there is power, there is resistance’ (95) has come to serve as an alibi for the neglect of 
resistant practices. 
A strategy diverging from Ransom’s can be found in The Political Philosophy of Michel 
Foucault (2009). Rather than insisting that readers have merely overlooked resistance in 
Foucault’s work, Kelly admits that Foucault has hardly produced any analyses of resistance (105). 
However, Kelly proceeds to present a coherent account of resistance, ‘extrapolating from and 
expanding upon Foucault’s writings’ (105). Starting from the passage in The History of Sexuality, 
he proposes a definition of resistance as ‘an adaptive response to power, which therefore varies 
according to the power it opposes’ (108). This resistance can take place on two levels: 
 
The inevitable resistance to power at the personal level is what we might call micro-
resistance. Just as the intentionality behind micro-power, the action upon our actions, 
has no regular relation to how micro-power fits into an overall strategy of power, even if 
our resistance is successful at the local level, there is no guarantee that it will therefore 
constitute resistance at the macro-level. (109) 
 
This division into two levels corresponds to Foucault’s division of tactics and strategies: whereas 
tactics, and resistance on the micro-level, are intentional actions taken by the subject, strategies 
and macro-level resistance are played out on the level where power relations coalesce into 
something like discipline. Kelly subsequently dedicates one chapter to resistance, taking the form 
of critique on the macro-level, and one chapter to ethics as a form of micro-level resistance. It is 
beyond the scope of this section to evaluate Kelly’s ambitious extrapolation. It rather serves as 
proof that a Foucauldian approach is not necessarily incompatible with a focus on resistance. 
Applying Kelly’s proposal to Discipline and Punish, it is not hard to imagine how the text itself is a 
critique of, and resistance to, disciplinary power. Thus, it seems fair to say that, like in the 
discussion of Foucault’s Eurocentrism, there is no insurmountable conceptual problem here.   
 
Nevertheless, whereas the problem of Eurocentrism was immediately remedied in Mitchell’s and 
Kaplan’s work, the problem of resistance appears to be more stubborn. Mitchell’s observation 
that discipline is not a coherent power bloc appears in the preface to the paperback, but not in 
the original edition. Similarly, Kaplan’s remark about Gandhi’s resistance to disciplinary power 
appears somewhere near the end of the essay, completely overshadowed by the analysis of the 
construction of European difference. One cannot help but feel that this is structurally equivalent 
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to Foucault’s practice: their work broaches the topic of resistance, but it is nowhere to be found 
in their actual analyses. There is real irony, then, in Kaplan’s example about Gandhi turning the 
gaze of surveillance back upon the colonizer: as one learns from Michael Welch’s article 
“Counterveillance” (2011), this is exactly the same strategy Foucault and the GIP used to critique 
the penal regime. To counter disciplinary power, they watched the watchers, holding prison 
officials accountable for their practices.  
 Unfortunately, it seems then that when it comes to the question of resistance, there is 
not much of a ‘beyond Foucault’ to be found in Colonising Egypt and “Panopticon in Poona.” But 
the problem exceeds the boundaries of this chapter: Said’s harsh assessment of Foucault 
certainly appears in a different light with Orientalism in mind. For whereas Said did not hesitate 
to add Gramsci in the mix, when it comes to the question of resistance he failed to overcome the 
limitations of Foucault’s work. Thus, under the guise of a critique of Foucault, Said, Mitchell, and 
Kaplan all perpetuate the near-obfuscation of resistance. The question of how colonial subjects 
can resist disciplinary power therefore remains to be answered.  
  
 4.4. Conclusion: Beyond Monolithic Accounts of Power 
 
In a compelling appropriation of the concept of discipline, Colonising Egypt complemented 
Foucault’s microphysics of disciplinary power with a metaphysics of representation. Pinpointing 
the role of modernity as a cluster of disciplinary power relations in the process of colonisation, 
Mitchell deploys a Foucauldian approach to power to maximal effect: his non-subjective 
approach to disciplinary power cuts off the head of the king in analyses of colonialism. Moreover, 
his highly inventive coupling of microphysics and metaphysics even contains the clues to a 
successful linking of Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy. In explaining how the microphysics of 
discipline creates a metaphysical authority, Mitchell ultimately uses discipline as an ancillary 
concept to develop a notion of authority. Interestingly, this is structurally similar to the findings 
of the previous chapter, with Said using the concept of discourse as an ancillary to conceptualize 
colonial authority as well. 
 However, the ease with which a concept designed for an analysis of the penal regime in 
France suddenly seemed to encompass the complexities of the whole world has rightly raised 
suspicion. Relating Kaplan and Spivak’s claims about the ways in which Foucault reconstructs a 
version of the difference of Europe to the larger debate about the alleged Eurocentrism of 
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Foucauldian analyses, it has become apparent that Discipline and Punish contains a strong 
Eurocentric bias in the sense of constructing a self-contained history of a European disciplinary 
society. Here too the presence of Said can be felt, except this time it is Foucault himself who is 
accused of producing a self-other binary with his concept of discipline. However, reviewing 
Mitchell’s and Kaplan’s contributions, it has also become apparent that the concept of discipline 
can be, and has been, dislodged from its Eurocentrist context.  
 By contrast, the second problem Kaplan raises is more disturbing: the conceptual 
architecture of Discipline and Punish does not contain a concept of resistance to keep discipline 
as a category in check. Rather than addressing this, Kaplan and Mitchell actually perpetuate this 
problem by failing to complement the analysis of discipline with an attention to practices of 
resistance. Although proposals such as Kelly’s demonstrate that an account of resistance is not a 
priori incompatible with a Foucauldian approach to power, in the postcolonial field this issue 
stands largely unresolved. One can only guess that, more than the hollowed out conceptual 
architectures one can extrapolate from Foucault’s work, it is his actual analyses of power which 
inspire and provoke responses. The absence of pertinent analyses of resistance in Discipline and 
Punish thus left postcolonial studies with an incomplete image.  
 To close this chapter, it is perhaps instructive to take a brief look at Questions of 
Modernity, a volume edited by Mitchell and published in 2000, twelve years after the first 
publication of Colonising Egypt.  In his own contribution, “The Stage of Modernity,” Mitchell 
implicitly addresses the two problems this chapter has dealt with. Whereas Colonising Egypt, 
through its focus on disciplinary power as the root of the peculiarity of modernity, created a 
unified notion of modernity, “The Stage of Modernity” presents a more complex picture: 
 
Developments and forces external to any possible definition of the essence of capitalist 
modernity continually redirect, divert, mutate, and multiply the modernity they help 
constitute, depriving it of any essential principle, unique dynamic, or singular history. 
(2000: 12) 
 
This principle of multiple modernities provides a useful corrective against the threats of 
Eurocentrism and the obfuscation of resistance. First, in relation to Kaplan’s critique of 
interpretations that construct European or modern difference, it renders the search for an 
absolute difference pointless. Rather than setting up a binary between sovereignty and 
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discipline, Europe and its colonial other, or modernity and tradition, only to disavow it later, it 
acknowledges its strictly relational character.  
 Second, as for the issue of resistance, it presents a less monolithic image of modernity. 
The potential for resistance can be recognized in the continual reproduction of modernity. In a 
move that is reminiscent of Bhabha’s notion of resistance, discussed in the previous chapter, 
Mitchell now emphasizes the ‘displacement, deferral, and delay in the production of the 
modern,’ where ‘the non-West emerges as a place that makes possible the distance, the 
difference, and the time lag required for these forms of displacement’ (23-24). This repetition as 
difference has an immediate consequence for the operational value of discipline as a concept: to 
exclude monolithic accounts, one requires not only the idea of multiple modernities, but also of 
multiple configurations of power. It is insufficient to stress the relational nature of power, as long 
as one remains stuck in a model where the relationality of concepts like discipline themselves is 
disavowed. The introduction of new concepts such as biopolitics and necropolitics in the next 
chapter could well be a step in that direction. 
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5. Biopolitics 
 
As far as their general reception is concerned, there are striking similarities between the 
concepts of discourse and biopolitics. If the introduction to Chapter 3 claimed that ‘discourse’ has 
been a fashionable term, lacks a precise definition, and has been problematically attributed to 
Foucault, each of these three claims applies equally to ‘biopolitics.’  
 First, as Lemke states in his 2011 introduction to the subject, ‘the notion of biopolitics 
has recently become a buzzword,’ ‘used today in many different disciplines and discourses’ (1). 
This echoes Paolo Virno’s complaint that ‘it is often, and enthusiastically, invoked in every kind of 
context’ (2004: 81). To name but a few fields, the concept has appeared in cultural studies, 
international relations, political geography, critical security studies, and legal studies. Testimony 
to this frantic grappling with biopolitics, the year 2012 has seen the advent of two eponymous 
volumes: Beyond Biopolitics: Essays on the Governance of Life and Death (Clough; Willse: 2012) 
and Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, Violence, and Horror in World Politics (Debrix; Barder: 2012). In 
spite of what their titles signal, both volumes still take as their central focus the connections 
between politics and life, fuelling contemporary debates about the concept of biopolitics. 
Second, most discussions of biopolitics simply assume Foucault as a starting point.30 In 
fact, Foucault did not coin the concept of biopolitics himself. As the first two chapters of Lemke’s 
Biopolitics make clear, the concept has a long and troubled history, appearing in texts that 
advocate a politics that takes life as its model, and a politics that takes life as its object. 
Foucault’s intervention takes issue with both approaches, demonstrating instead the contingency 
of the perceived border between life and politics. 
 A final parallel to the manner in which the concept of discourse was received is to be 
found in the lack of an established definition of biopolitics, in spite of (or perhaps due to) its 
popularity. As Coleman & Grove emphasize, ‘biopolitics should be approached as a site of fervent 
definitional struggle and disagreement’ (2009: 504). Nevertheless, the literal meaning of the 
concept of biopolitics should be quite clear: ‘it denotes a politics that deals with life’ (Lemke 
2011a: 2). Still, there are at least two factors that considerably complicate attempts to stabilize 
the concept. To begin with, Foucault’s work has been taken up by a host of scholars, developing 
Foucault’s conception in various, often contradictory directions. Here one might name Agamben, 
                                                 
30
 Coleman & Grove’s otherwise excellent conceptual history is a case in point: ‘biopolitics’ is not a 
neologism ‘coined by French political theorist Foucault’ (489), but was used as early as the beginning of the 
20
th
 century by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (cf. Lemke 2011a: 9). 
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Hardt & Negri, Esposito, Rabinow and Rose. This has led Debrix & Barder to observe that 
‘biopolitics is characterized not so much by adherence to one Foucault-inspired model, but rather 
by a plurality of perspectives (...) that radiate, sometimes in very different directions, from an 
initial Foucaultian moment of analysis’ (Debrix & Barder 2012: 15). Moreover, this ‘initial 
Foucaultian moment’ is not exactly stable either. Foucault’s own approach has been 
characterized as ‘an incitement to experiment rather than as a definition to be abided by’ 
(Coleman & Grove: 490). Given that Foucault explicitly named the phenomena he wished to 
tackle, this point should not be overstated. Still, there are considerable differences between his 
treatment of biopolitics in The History of Sexuality, and the lectures at the Collège de France 
published as Society Must Be Defended; Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of 
Biopolitics.31  
 The prominence of these lectures in contemporary debates around biopolitics can hardly 
be overstated: Foucault’s interest in security and the defense of society has found great 
resonance in our post 9/11 world.32 Importantly, these lectures have only been translated and 
published in English as late as 2003, 2007, and 2008 respectively, almost twenty years after 
Foucault delivered them  (in 1976, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979 respectively).  In combination with 
the piecemeal translation of the work of Agamben and Esposito, one can not only understand 
why ‘biopolitics’ may have become a buzzword, but also why it should have taken so long to 
acquire currency. 
  
In the postcolonial context, the concept of biopolitics was taken up by Ann Laura Stoler in 1995, 
with the publication of Race and the Education of Desire, long before anyone would have thought 
of ‘biopolitics’ as a buzzword. Her discussion of the Society Must Be Defended lectures, based on 
the original recordings,33 may well have been the first serious engagement with this rediscovered 
material in the Anglophone world.  In her analysis of the production of European colonial 
bourgeois order in the Dutch East Indies of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, she 
explores the potential and limitations of the notion of biopolitics. Combining and developing 
                                                 
31
 The following sections will illuminate some of these differences. 
32
 e.g. The Biopolitics of the War on Terror (Julian Reid, 2006), The Logics of Biopower and the War on 
Terror (Elizabeth Dauphinee; Cristina Masters, 2007), and Foucault in an Age of Terror (Stephen Morton; 
Stephen Bygrave, 2008)  
33
 Stoler 1995: viii. 
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elements from both The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended, Stoler explores the 
connections between sexuality and race in the functioning of colonial power.  
 Innovative though this focus on biopolitics may be in some respects, Stoler’s notion of 
power is highly reminiscent of earlier conceptions of power. A contrastive reading of Stoler’s 
work against Mbembe’s enables us to confront head-on an issue that had been looming over the 
past two chapters: the relationship between a Foucauldian notion of power and an 
understanding of power as authority. An exploration of the friction in Mbembe’s “Necropolitics” 
between Agamben’s and Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, manifested in the tension between the 
law and the norm, provides us with the key to articulate a problem that remained implicit in the 
earlier discussions of Said, Bhabha, and Mitchell.  
 
5.1. Foucault and Biopolitics: The Management of the Population 
5.1.1. Context: The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended 
 
For the concept of biopolitics, the year 1976 was a crucial one. With both the publication of The 
History of Sexuality, vol. I, and the delivery of the Society Must Be Defended lectures, it witnessed 
Foucault’s first attempts to diagnose contemporary configurations of power through the lens of 
biopolitics. Given that Foucault held his lectures at the same time as he was finalizing The History 
of Sexuality, it is not surprising that its last chapter, which introduces the concept, is virtually 
identical to the final lecture in the series.   
 And yet, the roads that lead up to these final observations are highly divergent. The 
History of Sexuality, vol. I34 was originally conceived as the first volume in a series of six, outlining 
the plan for his future studies of the links between sexuality, knowledge, power, and 
subjectivity35 - a project Foucault abandoned after 1976. This accounts perhaps for the suggestive 
nature of The History of Sexuality: each of the “four great strategic unities” it describes (103), viz. 
the hysterization of women’s bodies, the pedagogization of children’s sex, the socialization of 
procreative behaviour, and the psychiatrization of perverse pleasure (104-105) was to form the 
subject of a separate volume, to be written later on in his career. 
 Nevertheless, the main thesis of The History of Sexuality is relatively straightforward: the 
explosion of discourses on sexuality does not point to an increasing liberation from a repressive 
                                                 
34
 Although the 1978 translation into English was called The History of Sexuality, vol I: An Introduction, the 
original French subtitle is La volonté de savoir.  
35
 See Stoler 1995: 21. 
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form of power, but rather to the increasing hold of power over life. Because this power is 
concerned with the continued optimization of life and the population, the apparatus of sexuality 
has a key role in its operations. In its investment in sexuality, power can be traced as productive 
rather than repressive. 
 The lectures at the Collège de France follow a different trajectory. Their starting point is 
not sexuality, but 17th century race war discourse: a historiographical discourse that posited a 
struggle in society between ruler and ruled. The prime example would be that of the Levellers, 
who described Norman monarchy in England as an act of war against the Saxon race. In what 
follows, Foucault outlines how what had initially functioned as a challenge to the legitimacy of 
the state was gradually adopted in its defense: the idea of a binary race war was transcribed into 
a statist discourse. Focusing on the theme of race war, it becomes the task of the state to protect 
its population. In the context of Darwinian discourse, this threat appears first and foremost as 
the backward, the degenerate, and the abnormal elements in society – the binary idea of race 
war turned inwards. The purification of society from these threats is what Foucault refers to as 
state racism. Biopolitics, then, is about the defense of the population against these threats.  
 In spite of their different trajectories, it is easy to see how both accounts might converge: 
the optimization of life can proceed through the elimination of biological threats. Thus, 
Foucault’s analyses of the biopolitical in relation to sexuality and race war discourse are perfectly 
compatible. And how could they not be? Both The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be 
Defended continue to operate in the genealogical context created in Discipline and Punish (see 
4.1.1). In other words, Foucault continues to produce anti-subjectivist histories of the present, 
focusing on specific technologies of power. Moreover, this notion of power has largely remained 
the same. As Kelly puts it: 
 
The difference in Discipline and Punish is that power is not spoken of in general, but 
rather only in relation to the disciplinary power that affects bodies. Nevertheless, almost 
without exception, the features Foucault discerns in that specific case, he later adopts as 
general “propositions” about power. (2009: 35) 
 
These propositions about power in general are not to be misunderstood as a general theory of 
power. Rather, Foucault locates the analytics of biopower within the context of his earlier 
observations about disciplinary power. 
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 Still, throughout The History of Sexuality and the lecture series, the contours of this 
context become much more well-defined than it had been in Discipline and Punish. His critique of 
hermeneutics is a case in point: if Discipline and Punish was already critical of the concept of 
interpretation, understood as the uncovering of a hidden truth, The History of Sexuality sharpens 
this critique by focusing on the power relations in the technique of the confession (66-67). The 
confession, where the subject is incited to speak in front of an expert who subsequently reveals 
the truth about that subject, is structurally similar to psychoanalysis in particular, and all 
interpretive sciences in general: ‘part of the power of these interpretive sciences is that they 
claim to be able to reveal the truth about our psyches, our culture, our society – truths that can 
only be understood by expert interpreters’ (Rabinow & Dreyfus: 180). In the process, the 
interpretive sciences are not external to power, but rather work as active agents in its 
deployment. 
 Obviously, hermeneutics is not the only antagonist of The History of Sexuality. In fact, 
Foucault dedicated the entire first part of the book to a description of a much larger problem: the 
repressive hypothesis, understood as the basic idea that power is primarily repressive. In the 
context of sexuality, Foucault’s critique constitutes another frontal attack on psychoanalysis. As 
Stoler argues, ‘it targeted Wilhelm Reich’s and Herbert Marcuse’s Freudian-Marxist celebration 
of sex as liberation from the repressive power of capitalism and its restrictive institutions’ (1995: 
22). This is no doubt true, but Foucault is also aiming at something much larger: the whole 
tradition of thinking about power in terms of negativity, a tradition Foucault exposes as ‘deeply 
rooted in the history of the West’ (83). He thus targets any discourse that conceives of power as 
‘reducible to lawmaking and enforcement,’ which includes both classical liberal theories and 
Marxism (cf. McWhorter 2011: 78). In sum, the notion of biopolitics aims to wrest the study of 
power out of the juridico-discursive approach that focuses on the law, restrictions, taboos, and 
prohibitions.  
 
Given that both The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended discuss race and state 
racism at some point, the racial context in which Foucault was working seems absolutely crucial. 
Stoler points out that in the intellectual climate Foucault was working in, ‘the concept of class 
and the sort of social transformations to which capitalism gave rise remained foundational in 
critical social and political theory; race and racial theory was not’ (1995: 23). If occasional 
analyses of racism took place in this European context, they mainly focused on Nazism and its 
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legacy. Foucault is no exception here: in both The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be 
Defended, the prime example of state racism remains Nazism. The role of colonialism remains 
largely unexplored. 
 
5.1.2. Cotext: Sovereign and Disciplinary Power 
 
In order to understand the conceptual architectures of The History of Sexuality and Society Must 
Be Defended, it is instructive to look back at the architecture of Discipline and Punish: it defined 
the concept of discipline primarily through its antagonist, viz. sovereign power. A similar 
operation underpins Foucault’s work from 1976, where the concept of biopolitics can only be 
understood in relation to sovereignty and discipline. Throughout this section and the next one, 
sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics will be differentiated along four axes, implicit in Foucault’s 
work: the chronology of these forms of power, their modes of operation, what they hinge upon, 
and their strategic goals.36  
 
As far as chronology is concerned, the idea of sovereign power as Foucault understands it dates 
back as far as ancient Rome (HoS 135). It refers to the right of the sovereign to kill anyone who 
transgresses against his laws. Thus, the right to decide on life and death is actually the ‘right to 
take life or let live’ (italics in HoS 136, no italics in SMBD 241). Stoler has argued that this 
definition of sovereignty is ‘idiosyncratic and only used to refer to its French absolutist form’ 
(1995: 62). While it is no doubt idiosyncratic, this seems to me to have less to do with its French 
context as with the fact that Foucault largely ignores its uses in political science.37 Brushing aside 
the likes of Bodin, Hobbes, Althusius, and Schmitt, Foucault argues that he ‘would like to trace 
the transformation not at the level of political theory, but rather at the level of the mechanisms, 
techniques, and technologies of power’ (SMBD 241).  
 This brings us to the second axis: in terms of these mechanisms, sovereign power’s 
primary mode of operation was ‘deduction (prélèvement)’: 
                                                 
36
 For the idea of these axes providing a schematic outline of the relations between sovereignty, discipline, 
and biopower, this study is indebted to Jeffrey Nealon (2008: 45). Nevertheless, there are important 
differences between the table he draws and this section. Whereas Nealon attempts to grasp the whole of 
Foucault’s work on power, the task here is to understand The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be 
Defended. As the next section will show, Nealon’s interpretation of biopolitics as the production of 
‘autocontrol’ only makes sense in the light of Foucault’s work after 1976. 
37
 For a discussion of the context Foucault ignores, see de Benoist, A. 1999. “What is Sovereignty?” Telos, 
vol. 116, pp. 99-118. 
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a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of 
products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. Power in this 
instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life 
itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it. (HoS 136) 
 
Clearly, the concept of sovereignty does not serve as a cornerstone in a political theory of the 
state here, but as a name for an actual mechanism operating throughout the whole of society. In 
spite of this omnipresence, this power emanates from the sovereign as a clearly identifiable 
centre of power.  
 This form of power hinges upon the legal subject. The subjects of the sovereign matter 
only insofar as they are subjected, in the most absolutist scenario; or, in the contract model of 
sovereignty, as those who constitute the sovereign and delegate the power to him (SMBD 241). 
In both cases, the subject is a legal subject only, and presents the apparently given starting point 
for theories of sovereignty rather than a category political theory sets out to explain.  
 Finally, the strategic objective of sovereign power as described by Foucault is to maintain 
the power relation. What the sovereign requires from his subjects is obedience. The threat of 
death is the warning that the law, issued by the sovereign, needs to be abided.  Death can take 
the form of a public execution, as in the opening pages of Discipline and Punish, where the 
spectacular destruction of the body of the offender instils the public with awe. Alternatively, as 
The History of Sexuality points out, the sovereign also has the right to wage war against those 
who challenge his power (135). For Foucault, sovereign power is therefore the power of a status 
quo. 
 
Compared to sovereign power, disciplinary power is reportedly relatively young. Foucault traces 
its earliest manifestations back to the end of the 17th century, from which time it has gradually 
developed (SMBD 242). However, it would be wrong to present discipline as the successor or 
replacement of sovereignty; rather, the spread of disciplinary power turns sovereign power into 
one strategy of power among others (HoS 136). Thus, although Foucault describes a historical 
transformation, it is not necessarily entirely linear.  
 The mode of operation of this emerging disciplinary power was not deduction, but 
objectification. As the previous chapter has shown, discipline derives from the epistemological 
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discovery of Man as object of knowledge: Man can be watched, measured, ordered, and 
controlled. This process of objectification is what connects the penal regime to the scientific 
study of Man. As a result, power is no longer centralized in the sovereign, but spreads through an 
increasingly porous state apparatus, which Foucault refers to as the scientifico-legal complex 
(D&P 21). 
 Third, the formation of disciplinary power hinges upon the body. On top of its 
heterogeneous drives, forces, and energies, the idea of the individual is constructed. What is at 
stake in discipline is an anatomo-politics of the human body (HoS 139): an encroachment of 
politics on the body of the individual. The body as object can be monitored, measured, broken 
down, and rearranged for strategic purposes. In the process, it is thoroughly individualized. 
 Finally, the objective of disciplinary power is not to protect the status quo, but to 
increase the efficiency of bodies. This includes ‘the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion 
of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility,’ and ‘its integration into 
systems of efficient and economic controls’ (HoS 139). In the context of sexuality, discipline 
appears as an instrument to intensify the production and control of the individual. One can think 
for instance of the intensive observation of sexual behaviour, or the construction of dormitories 
in schools with maximum visibility in the war against masturbation. Thus, the apparatus of 
sexuality betrays the same will to knowledge and power as Discipline and Punish had uncovered 
in the penal regime. Discipline is not something Foucault leaves behind in The History of 
Sexuality, it is a fundamental part of his analysis of the apparatus of sexuality. 
 
5.1.3. Concept: Biopolitics and its Racism 
 
Before we start with the comparison of biopolitics to sovereignty and discipline, one potential 
source of confusion ought to be cleared up. In The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be 
Defended, Foucault seems to use the concepts of biopower and biopolitics at times as 
interchangeable.38 One might suspect that he uses ‘biopolitics’ to refer to the entanglement of 
life and politics, and ‘biopower’ to the whole of the relations that emerge from this 
entanglement. Although this seems plausible in many cases, this hypothesis does not hold: The 
                                                 
38
 Lemke observes that ‘Foucault not only employs the term “biopolitics”; he also sometimes uses the word 
“biopower”, without neatly distinguishing the two notions.’ (2011a: 34). In the publication of the lectures, 
one finds Foucault asking ‘what does this new technology of power, this biopolitics, this biopower that is 
beginning to establish itself, involve?’ (SMBD 243) 
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History of Sexuality refers to this ‘political power’ which ‘had assigned itself the task of 
administering life’ as consisting of ‘two poles’: anatomo-politics and biopolitics (139). Thus, one 
could argue that biopolitics is one of the two poles of biopower. For reasons of clarity, the rest of 
the chapter will therefore reserve the term ‘biopower’ for the ensemble of power relations 
developed in the two interlinked poles of anatomo-politics and biopolitics. Given that Foucault 
uses ‘anatomo-politics’ as a synonym for the notion of discipline outlined above, the task at hand 
here is to focus on the second pole, biopolitics. As with sovereignty and discipline, the concept 
will be analyzed in terms of chronology, mode of operation, what it hinges upon, and strategic 
objective. 
 
After the emergence of discipline at the end of the 17th century, biopolitical technology would 
gradually spread into the second half of the 18th century (SMBD 242). Here again the new mode 
of power did not simply replace the former: ‘it exists at a different level, on a different scale, (...) 
has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments’ (SMBD 242). Rather, 
Foucault understands biopolitics as complementary to discipline: both forms of power need to be 
situated in the context of industrialization and a demographic explosion, the challenges of which 
sovereign power was not equipped for (SMBD 249-250). Like discipline, biopolitics came into 
being as a strategic response to the historical changes of the 17th and 18th century.  
 This complementarity is obvious in the mode of operation of biopolitics: whereas 
discipline focused on Man as object, biopolitics expands on the notion of Man as subject. In the 
ritual of confession, where the speaking subject coincides with the subject of the statement, the 
subject is modified in the sense that it has spoken and learned the truth about itself (HoS 61-62). 
It is this mechanism that has been picked up in scientific discourse about sexuality: in what 
Foucault understands as an ‘inducement to speak’ (65), the subject is encouraged to produce the 
truth about its sexuality and itself in interrogations, questionnaires, reconstructions of memories 
and sessions of free association. Rather than the given legal subject of theories of sovereignty, 
we thus get a subject that is manufactured and enacted in the process of telling its truth.  
 Third, biopolitical technologies of power hinge neither upon the legal subject, nor upon 
the individual body, but rather upon what The History of Sexuality refers to as the ‘species body’ 
(139). Similarly, Society Must Be Defended speaks of ‘man-as-species’ (242):  
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the new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to 
the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that 
they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes 
characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on. (242-243) 
 
To be entirely accurate, in disciplinary settings such as the army, multiplicities were already more 
than the sum of individual bodies. The difference is that in a biopolitical setup the multiplicity of 
bodies does not function as machine, but as living being. 
 Finally, the strategic objective of biopolitics is neither the protection of the status quo, 
nor an increase in the efficiency of the individual body. Rather, it aims at a regularization and 
optimization of the species. At the crossroads of biology and politics, it becomes the task of 
power to invest life and to foster the health and vitality of the population. As both The History of 
Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended emphasize, the sovereign power to ‘take life or let live’ 
has become the power to ‘make live or let die’ (HoS 138, SMBD 247).  Foucault identifies this 
tendency as playing out in three domains: the ratio of births to deaths, biological disabilities, and 
the effects of the environment (SMBD 243-245). More specifically, this means that biopolitics 
includes issues and techniques as different as health insurance, personal hygiene, urban 
planning, birth control, car accidents, and the security of the population versus its enemies. 
 This biopolitics, however, hardly exists in isolation. The fact that it does not simply 
replace older technologies of power also implies that it can integrate, appropriate, or link up with 
sovereign and disciplinary elements. The rest of this section will discuss both its intersection with 
discipline and its recuperation of sovereign power. 
 
As the discussion of biopolitics above has indicated, discipline and biopolitics are compatible 
strategies of power: the objectification of discipline dovetails with the subjectification of 
biopolitics, and the anatomo-politics of the body links up with a biopolitics of the species. Hence, 
for Foucault, the importance of the apparatus of sexuality: it provides the link between the 
discipline of the individual and the regulation of the population (HoS 145, SMBD 251-252). But 
there is a second way in which discipline and biopolitics interact: both strategies are essentially 
normalizing. Lemke’s discussion of the role of the norm in Foucault’s work is worth quoting here: 
 
In this context, the concept of the norm plays a key role. The ancient “power over life 
and death” operated on the basis of the binary legal code, whereas biopolitics marks a 
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movement in which the “right” is more and more displaced by the “norm”. The absolute 
right of the sovereign tends to be replaced by a relative logic of calculating, measuring, 
and comparing. (2011a: 38-39) 
 
Two elements here will turn out to be crucial in the discussion of Stoler and Mbembe: one, that 
the norm has replaced the law; two, that the norm does not work as a binary. Both assertions 
require some qualification. First of all, the norm has only displaced the law in the sense that, as 
The History of Sexuality puts it, ‘the law operates more and more as a norm’ (144). This refers to 
nothing other than the evolution Discipline and Punish had already sketched in relation to the 
penal system. The second claim is less evident: is a concern with the normal and the abnormal 
not automatically binary? In Foucault’s work, it certainly is not. The task of biopolitics is not to 
draw a line, but to effect ‘distributions around the norm’ (HoS 144). Indeed, this power ‘has to 
qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize’ (144), all of which are non-binary operations. 
 
Biopolitics as a mode of power can also intersect with the old sovereign right to kill. As we recall, 
to put someone to death was the supreme manifestation of the power of the sovereign. In a 
biopolitical society, however, the state has set itself the task of protecting and optimizing the 
vitality of the population. Rather than function as the sign of power, ‘death is outside the power 
relationship’ (SMBD 248). And yet, Foucault argues, ‘wars were never as bloody as they have 
been since the nineteenth century’ (HoS 136). Clearly, the biopolitical focus on life has not done 
away with death. How, he wonders, ‘can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised 
in a political system centered upon biopower?’ (SMBD 254). It is this question that brings us to 
the notion of racism: 
 
What is in fact racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life 
that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die. The 
appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction 
among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good 
and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the 
field of the biological that power controls. (SMBD 254-5) 
 
In short, racism is that which enables the death-function in a biopolitical society through a 
division of the species.  
120 
 
 It is easy to see how Foucault’s conceptualization of racism can be reread in terms of the 
binary legal code he set out to critique: to say the least, the formulation ‘the break between what 
must live and what must die’ strongly suggests a binary distinction. And yet, Foucault quickly 
proceeds to argue that ‘the first function of racism’ is ‘to fragment, to create caesuras’ (255) – a 
plurality that follows from the operations of hierarchizing, measuring, and appraising. In these 
non-binary operations, race functions as a norm, not a law. 
 Importantly, this concept of race as norm has a historical meaning in Society Must Be 
Defended that differs considerably from its contemporary association with skin colour. Mary Beth 
Mader has argued that ‘Foucault uses the terms ‘race’ and ‘races’ in multiple senses and in ways 
that are not always clear’ (2011: 99). However, this seems to have less to do with Foucault’s use 
of the term than with its own shiftiness. As McWhorter observes, ‘application of the term race, 
much like application of the term racism, is frequently disputed and always has been’ (2009: 42). 
Foucault’s use of the concept ‘is grounded in centuries of discourse where race had little to do 
with physical appearance’ (Kelly 2004: 62). In the conflict between the Normans and Saxons, 
which, as section 5.1.1 pointed out, presented a starting point for the lectures, ‘race is a matter 
of language, tradition, and custom’ (McWhorter 2009: 59). Foucault subsequently outlines how 
this discourse has been transcribed into a biological notion of race and racism, with a key role for 
Darwinism: certain races can then be understood as more ‘advanced’ than others. But even in his 
description of biological racism, Foucault retains the older, more inclusive concept of race, in 
order to denounce racism as a racism against the abnormal, the degenerate, the sick, and the 
pathological – categories much broader than any contemporary understanding of racism. The 
biopolitical society must protect the vitality of its population against the debilitating influence of 
the abnormal, in order for evolution not to become degeneracy. From the very term itself, it is 
obvious that evolution-ism, and by extension biopower, does not operate in a binary mode. 
Again, it takes as its model not the law, but the norm.  
 Before we can finally come to the relevance of this distinction for Stoler’s postcolonial 
work, there is one last question that needs to be answered. If the notion of state racism has 
answered the question of how the death-function can operate in a biopolitical society, one may 
still wonder why this biopolitics, intent on the optimization of life, would actually want to 
distribute death. The solution can again be found in Darwinian logic: ‘the death of the other, the 
death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that 
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will make life in general healthier’ (SMBD 255). Through this logic, biopolitical societies establish 
an immediate link between their focus on life and the sovereign right to kill. 
 Needless to say, Foucault’s genealogy of racism differs greatly from other theories of 
racism. As Lemke summarizes, 
 
he conceives of racism neither as an ideological construct nor as an exceptional situation 
nor as a response to social crises. According to Foucault, racism is an expression of a 
schism within society that is provoked by the biopolitical idea of an ongoing and always 
incomplete cleansing of the social body. (2011a: 43-44) 
 
Briefly put, state racism is a structural problem. As soon as a biopolitical state adopts an 
evolutionary logic, it becomes imperative to kill the threats to the population. The power of life 
and death coincide in the exercise of state racism.  
 
5.2. Stoler and Biopolitics: Back to the Concept of Authority 
5.2.1. Context: Foucault Meets Freud in Postcolonial Studies 
 
Ann Laura Stoler’s Race and the Education of Desire (1995) is a study of the creation of a 
European colonial bourgeois order in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in the Dutch 
East Indies. It focuses primarily on the question of ‘how a cultivation of the European self (and 
specifically a Dutch bourgeois identity) was affirmed in the proliferating discourses around 
pedagogy, parenting, children’s sexuality, servants, and tropical hygiene’ (11). The links to 
Foucault’s work of 1976 should be clear by now: the discourses Stoler lists all revolve around the 
optimization of life and the population, issues Foucault discussed under the rubric of biopolitics.  
 Given that Stoler devotes two large chapters to The History of Sexuality and Society Must 
Be Defended, these parallels are hardly surprising. Stoler’s discussion probably constitutes the 
most thorough and sustained engagement with Foucault’s work available in postcolonial studies 
to date. Not only does it draw on the conceptual apparatus of Foucault’s work, it also takes up 
the historical content of his writings in a much more systematic way then either Said, Bhabha, 
Mitchell, or Kaplan had done. 
 And yet, Race and the Education of Desire also has a lot in common with the work of 
these scholars. Not only does Stoler acknowledge their work, she also firmly positions herself 
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within the intertextual web created in the interplay between Foucault and postcolonial studies. 
Thus, she makes references to Said (1, 126, 169, 174, 175), Bhabha (169), Mitchell (15), and 
Spivak (14, 98). The most conspicuous connection to this earlier work is probably the shared 
suspicion that Foucault’s work propagates fundamentally Eurocentrist assumptions. For Stoler, 
this tendency is most visible in The History of Sexuality:  
 
(...) Europe’s eighteenth- and nineteenth-century discourses on sexuality, like other 
cultural, political, or economic assertions, cannot be charted in Europe alone. In short-
circuiting empire, Foucault’s history of European sexuality misses key sites in the 
production of that discourse, discounts the practices that racialized bodies, and thus 
elides a field of knowledge that provided the contrasts for what a “healthy, vigorous, 
bourgeois body” was all about. (7) 
 
This argument confirms what Mitchell and Kaplan had already claimed in relation to Discipline 
and Punish: Foucault’s histories of certain technologies of power produce a self-contained 
version of Europe and overlook the extent to which these technologies have developed outside 
of Europe, and have even served to buttress this idea of Europe as a self-sufficient unity. Given 
that the previous chapter has dealt with this problem at length, it suffices to say that Stoler strips 
the concept of biopolitics of its Eurocentrist assumptions by rerouting the history of its 
technologies through the history of empire, in a way that is highly reminiscent of what Mitchell 
had done with the concept of discipline.  
 But Stoler’s work does not only link up with the texts by Mitchell and Kaplan, it also 
reconsiders the work of Said and Bhabha in its efforts to shed light on the role of psychoanalytical 
concepts in postcolonial studies. Starting from the observation that Foucault’s and Freud’s 
positions on the relation between desire and the law are antithetical, she finds that postcolonial 
studies ‘have had contradictory allegiances on the one hand, to a Foucauldian perspective on 
power, and on the other, to implicit Freudian assumptions about the psychodynamics of empire’ 
(13). Indeed, many histories of colonialism have analyzed the colonial project as the release of 
the colonizer’s sexual desire, sublimated in the colonies after its repression at home (173). The 
problem, for Stoler, is not so much that this runs directly counter to Foucault’s rejection of the 
repressive hypothesis, but rather that it leaves this desire unexplained. In these Freudian 
accounts, desire is simply taken for granted as a biological and ahistorical given. 
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 However, Stoler’s misgivings about the role of Freud do not entail a straightforward 
rejection of every analysis of colonialism that somehow draws on Freud – rather, it is the lack of 
‘historical depth’ with which she takes issue (170). Through the concept of desire, Foucault and 
Freud can even be brought together, Stoler argues: ‘for Freud, sexual desire is a cause; for 
Foucault, an effect’ (169). Clearly, as the approving references to Orientalism demonstrate, Stoler 
considers the work of Edward Said to be a fruitful combination of Foucauldian and Freudian 
elements. According to Stoler, ‘Freud’s notion of projection, of the Orient as the West’s 
“surrogate self” is a crucial but buried part of [Said’s] argument’ (169). Although the architectures 
presented earlier in 3.3.2 demonstrate that this idea of projection is not a necessary component 
of Said’s argument, Stoler is right to point out that the relationship between the Occident and 
the Orient as Said analyzes it can be read in terms of a construction of the Self through the Other. 
It is this dynamic of Self and Other that subsequently appears in the work of Bhabha, and 
ultimately, in Stoler’s own work. The following sections will discuss the implications of this Self 
versus Other binary, and its relation to Foucault’s and Stoler’s concepts of biopolitics.  
 
5.2.2. Cotext: Identity and Authority Revisited 
 
In terms of conceptual architecture, Race and the Education of Desire introduces two concepts 
that were entirely absent in Foucault’s work around 1976: ‘identity’ and ‘authority.’ Significantly, 
these are the same concepts that appeared in what we have referred to as the instrumentalist 
architecture of Orientalism. As we recall, both concepts were linked to Foucault’s work on 
power-knowledge: ‘power’ was reductively understood as authority, and ‘knowledge’ was 
stretched from a particular subject-object relation to the broader realm of discourse in general, 
and all statements pertaining to identity in particular. Whereas Chapter 3 has focused on the 
friction between this approach and Foucault’s archaeological method, this section aims to 
pinpoint the possible roles of the concepts of identity and authority in a genealogical approach. 
 As far as identity is concerned, one can now make sense of the earlier discussion about 
the role of Freud and psychoanalysis in postcolonial studies. Although Stoler does not make this 
explicit, she bases her work on that ‘crucial but buried part of [Said’s] argument’, viz. ‘Freud’s 
notion of the projection, of the Orient as the West’s “surrogate self”’ (169). Stripped of its 
specific Orientalist context, what remains for Stoler is a notion of identity as an unstable relation 
between Self and Other. 
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 Three features of this concept of identity are particularly relevant here. First of all, Stoler 
understands identity as relational: selves are formed through others. With this emphasis on 
relationality, Stoler claims to distance herself from ‘Foucault’s self-referential conception of 
bourgeois identity’ (11-12). Quoting Foucault as stating that the initial deployment of sexuality of 
the bourgeoisie ‘has to be seen as the self-affirmation of one class rather than the enslavement 
of another’ (110), she concludes that Foucault overlooks the role of sexuality in the development 
of class distinctions. This conclusion is surprising, for at least two reasons. Even in the paragraph 
Stoler quotes, Foucault stresses the importance of technologies of sexuality in the process of 
protecting and isolating the bourgeois body from others to retain ‘differential value’ (HoS 123). 
Clearly, Foucault’s focus on the bourgeoisie is not as self-contained as Stoler makes it out to be. 
Moreover, one may wonder how Foucault could ever propagate a ‘self-referential conception of 
bourgeois identity’ if his work does not even contain a notion of identity and consistently steers 
clear of questions of identity. His phrase ‘affirmation of the self’ should not be understood as 
referring to the affirmation of a bourgeois identity, but rather to the epistemological discovery of 
the self as a subject position. Here the earlier discussion of the technology of the confession finds 
it full relevance: the self is discovered as a source of truths and pleasures. Thus, whenever 
Foucault speaks of ‘selves,’ it is not identity that is at stake, but a specific form of subjectivity 
produced in local and historical technologies. Like Said and Bhabha, Stoler imposes a relational 
notion of identity upon the Foucauldian inquiry into subjectivity. 
 A second feature of Stoler’s concept of identity is equally reminiscent of Said and 
Bhabha: colonialism constantly produces and reproduces identities. The typical structure is that 
of the dichotomy: acts of colonialism manufacture a clear distinction between colonizer and 
colonized, between the Occident and the Orient, between Self and Other. Colonial discourse, 
therefore, is replete with images of ‘stereotypic Others’ (146). These Others can be construed on 
racial, sexual, and/or class axes. Thus, Stoler speaks of ‘racialized Others’ (152), the ‘sexualized 
Other’ (178), and the ‘racial and class Other’ (141), all of which are continuously ‘othered’ in the 
process of colonialism. 
 Third, identity appears as fundamentally unstable. Although the continuous reproduction 
of the dichotomy between Self and Other produces real effects, identity is always threatened by 
the complexities of the colonial situation. In Stoler’s analysis, this can be found not so much in 
the instability of the signifying system, as with Bhabha, but rather in the pressure put on this 
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divide by specific groups of subjects through problems of descent, race, or upbringing. European 
colonials are a case in point:  
 
If colonial enterprises were such secure bourgeois ventures, then why were European 
colonials so often viewed disparagingly from the metropole as parvenus, cultural 
incompetents, morally suspect, and indeed “fictive” Europeans, somehow distinct from 
the real thing? While many historians would agree that colonized European-educated 
intellectuals and those of mixed-racial origin were seen as “white but not quite,” this 
was also true of a large segment of those classified as “fully” European. (102) 
 
In other words, as soon as generations of Europeans started to live their entire lives in the 
colony, the notion of Europeanness needed to be renegotiated accordingly. European identity 
had to be adjusted continually to keep up with the complexity of the colonial situation. 
 This question of ‘what it meant to be truly European’ (8) and the discussions of identity 
were codified in the legal system: what was at at stake in these debates was the legal status of 
citizenship and nationality (107). It seems, then, that Stoler’s concept of identity revolves around 
the notion of membership: Race and the Education of Desire focuses on categories, on how they 
have been constructed, policed, and negotiated. The primary modes of operation of the system 
Stoler describes are categorization and exclusion. Indeed, Stoler ends up denouncing nationalism 
and liberalism as ‘politics of exclusion based on race’ (131). But how does this exclusion mark the 
lives of those involved?  
 It is here that the concept of authority comes in. Like identity, it is a notion largely absent 
from Foucault’s genealogies. In Said, Bhabha, Mitchell, and finally, Stoler, however, ‘authority’ is 
one of the absolutely crucial concepts. Moreover, their architectures (with the exception of 
Mitchell’s) establish a direct link between identity and authority: it is the construction of 
identities in terms of a Self superior to the Other that gives rise to colonial authority. Summarized 
in light of this parallel, what Race and the Education of Desire provides is an analysis of the role of 
sexuality in the creation of a European identity and its ensuing authority. Stoler finds that  
 
In the name of British, French, and Dutch moralizing missions, colonial authority 
supposedly rested on the rigor with which its agents distinguished between desire and 
reason, native instinct and white self-discipline, native lust and white civility, native 
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sensuality and white morality, subversive unproductive sexuality and productive 
patriotic sex. (179) 
 
In short, colonial authority is based on a Manichean distinction between the European Self and 
the racial Other, articulated and protected in the realm of sexuality.  
 While this summary at least thematically links back to Foucault’s work of 1976, it is hard 
to overlook the architectural differences. Rather than focus on identity and authority, The History 
of Sexuality attempted to outline a specific configuration of power, developed in relation to 
sovereign and disciplinary power. Neither of these appear to matter in Race and the Education of 
Desire, where ‘power’ often operates as a synonym for authority, rather than the strategical 
situations Foucault analyzed. How then, can the concept of biopower function in this economy?  
 
5.2.3. Concept: Biopolitics at the Service of Colonial Authority 
 
If colonial authority is what really constitutes the central focus of Race and the Education of 
Desire, the notion of biopolitics serves as an ancillary concept. The role of biopolitics in this new 
constellation is reduced to its contribution to the processes of identity formation and the ensuing 
production of authority. This is reflected in the quotation above: discussions of sexuality and 
reproduction in the East Indies take place as a function of European identity construction and 
authority. The surveillance of sexuality, the management of the population, and the assaying of 
life, which for Foucault coalesced in a biopolitical strategy aimed at an optimization of the 
population, appear in a new economy of identity and authority. 
 This revised function of the concept entails a corresponding change in meaning. Whereas 
for Foucault biopolitics referred to a strategic set of power relations, Stoler displaces the issue of 
power to the concept of authority. Biopolitics denotes not the power relations immanent in 
technologies of life and the population, but rather the set of practices that buttress power as 
authority. Thus, when Stoler speaks for instance of a ‘“biopolitical discourse” [that] targets 
internal dangers and excesses within the Dutch policy’ (115), what she is interested in is not so 
much a power relation with that danger, but rather the function of that danger in the economy 
of identity and authority. 
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Stoler’s concept of biopolitics reconceptualizes the Foucauldian notion in such a fashion that it 
appears better suited for an analysis of colonialism. The key advance here is that the link with 
identity presents an opportunity to determine how biopolitics creates and affects different 
subject-positions differently, a point Foucault never really developed. Whereas Foucault simply 
posited biopolitics as a subjectifying power, the extent to which these subject-positions differed 
in terms of race, gender, and class remained largely unclear. 
 As far as the first term of this triad is concerned, Foucault’s treatment of race is more 
suggestive than specific. Although the rediscovery of the Collège de France lectures dispels claims 
that Foucault disregarded race, the fact that his treatment of race was primarily informed by the 
events in Nazi Germany should raise suspicion as to its practical relevance for postcolonial 
studies. Moreover, his understanding of racism as racism against the abnormal does not tell us 
much about colonial obsessions with racial taxonomies. 
 Something similar can be argued with respect to the category of class. Although Stoler’s 
assertion that Foucault produces a self-referential version of the bourgeoisie appears 
unwarranted, there is no denying that Foucault’s oblique treatment of class in The History of 
Sexuality is problematic. Suggestive though the idea of class struggle as a transcription of race 
war discourse may be, developed in the Society Must Be Defended lectures, it leaves unexplained 
the differentiating role of Empire in the production of class distinctions. 
 Considerations of gender, finally, are entirely absent in the lectures. It has led Stoler to 
conclude that ‘the most glaring omission from Foucault’s analysis is its non-gendered quality’ 
(93). David Macey also notes that the lectures remain ‘astonishingly blind’ to gender (2008: 119). 
In The History of Sexuality, this absence is slightly less conspicuous, in part because of the 
introduction of the topic of the hysterization of women’s bodies (104), to which Foucault 
intended to dedicate an entire volume later (cf. Stoler: 21). Still, the differentiating gendered 
structure of biopolitics remains insufficiently explored.  
 By contrast, Stoler fleshes out these categories and identifies how biopolitics disperses 
subject-positions along their axes, analysed in the local and historical context of the East Indies. 
Moreover, Race and the Education of Desire does not merely deploy these categories serially, but 
focuses on how they interact. Mapping the overlap of race, class, and gender, Stoler finds that 
‘Europeanness was not only class-specific but gender coded’ (115). The practice of biopolitics 
thus appears as a particularly charged field in which the differentiating effects of race, gender, 
and class coincide in the production of European identity and colonial authority.  
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Although Stoler’s reconceptualization of biopolitics makes up for the lack of systematic attention 
in Foucault’s work to the differentiating effects of the apparatus of sexuality, one may wonder 
whether this architecture should be viewed as an advance over Foucault or rather as an entirely 
different approach, with in turn different blindspots. Looking back at our earlier discussion of 
biopolitics in The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended, it becomes apparent that 
there are some fundamental discrepancies between Foucault’s notion of biopolitics and Stoler’s 
transformation of it. After exploring three of these discrepancies, the remainder of this section 
will focus on the question of how these discrepancies have gone unnoticed, and on what is lost in 
Stoler’s appropriation of the concept.  
 The first of these discrepancies is the one that revealed itself in the discussion of Stoler’s 
conceptual architecture: when Stoler speaks of power, what she means is authority. In other 
words, Race and the Education of Desire is not a study of a set of strategic power relations, but 
an analysis of how Europe legitimized colonialism. Although Foucault’s early work was very much 
concerned with the question of how truth-effects arise, his 1976 work pays only limited attention 
to the question of authority. Certainly, the figures of the scientific expert and the pastor appear 
with the capacity to speak the truth of and to the self, but what is much more prominent than 
their authority is the power relationship established in the encounter between these figures and 
the subjects they interpret. Once these power relations coalesce, they form the strategic cluster 
Foucault refers to as biopower. It is a power aimed not at the creation of authority, but at the 
management of the individual and the population. This focus on the immanence of power 
relations in specific technologies, arguably the core of Foucault’s approach to power, is replaced 
in Stoler with a focus on the metaphysical pretensions of colonialism. 
 A second, related point of friction relates to the concepts of the norm and the law. As the 
earlier discussion of Foucault’s work has emphasized, he was writing against what he termed the 
juridico-discursive conception of power. In short, he argued that the law fails to provide a sound 
model for the operations of power, given that power is not primarily concerned with drawing the 
lines between the legitimate and the illegitimate. Stoler, however, appears to take issue with this 
approach: 
 
Colonial law was no marginal player in these constructions of difference, as Foucault’s 
account would suggest. What Verena Martinez-Alier has noted for nineteenth-century 
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Cuba holds for the Indies: legal codes and not norms alone determined a person’s racial 
status “when his physical appearance was not an unambiguous guide.” (47) 
 
In other words, Stoler deems it unsound to stress the norm at the expense of the law because 
the legal element has been crucial in the formation of identities. Yet, a caveat is called for here: 
Foucault never suggested that the law ought to disappear from focus. Rather, what he claimed 
was that ‘the law operates more and more as the norm’ (HoS 144). Thus, what Foucault wanted 
to avoid was not the law itself, but the model of the law: a negative and binary conception of 
power. Instead, he proposes the norm as the instrument of power. As Nealon puts it, ‘norms, to 
repeat the Foucaultian mantra, do no primarily “repress” anything, but rather introduce a 
heightened productivity into the disciplinary apparatus’ (2008: 49). In a biopolitical mode, the 
norm adds to this heightened productivity a heightened vitality of the population. Unlike Stoler’s 
law, the norm does not draw the line between the European and the non-European. Rather, it 
‘opens up a field of visibility that facilitates the construction of “multiple separations, 
individualizing distributions, an organization in depth of surveillance and control, and 
intensification and ramification of power”’ (Debrix & Barder 2012: 100).  
 This takes us directly to a third discrepancy. As we have seen, the primary mode of 
operation of biopolitics is normalization. By contrast, Stoler’s approach downplays the role of the 
norm and only mentions it insofar as it can provide the basis of an exclusion. Indeed, as noted in 
section 5.2.2, the processes of identity formation and the creation of authority for Stoler were 
based on criteria of racial and sexual exclusion. This focus on exclusion may well be incompatible 
with the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics. As Debrix & Barder point out, 
 
The norm thus includes as much as it excludes. It includes in an especially intensive 
fashion by focusing on non-forceful techniques of examination, discipline, and 
regularized accountability that ceaselessly intervene at the level of docile bodies. When 
Foucault turns his attention to sexuality and its capture within a modern biopolitics of 
normalization at the level of an entire population (as he explains in the History of 
Sexuality, Vol. 1), he then argues that the expansion of sexual discourse in the 
nineteenth century should not only be understood as an attempt to define the moral 
boundaries of sexual conduct in society. Rather, biopolitical normalization, in this case, 
acts as a modality of power that intensifies the visibility (and brings into focus) and 
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shapes the expert understanding of various manifestations of sexualized conduct. (100-
101) 
 
The implication for Stoler should be clear: biopolitics is not concerned with the exclusion of the 
immoral in order to save the moral highground from which to conduct its colonial civilizing 
mission. That the creation and protection of authority plays out in the realm of sexuality may be 
true, but the extent to which the concept of biopolitics as a cluster of power relations helps to 
drive home that point is highly debatable if its primary mode of operation, viz. normalization, is 
the direct opposite of the exclusion Stoler describes. 
 This problem manifests clearly in Stoler’s repeated use of the Self-Other dichotomy. 
Although there is a long tradition of reading this dichotomy into Foucault’s work, to which Said 
and Bhabha have contributed, neither The History of Sexuality nor the Society Must Be Defended 
lectures used this terminology. It is my contention that the postcolonial tendency to analyze in 
terms of constructions of Self and Other is incompatible with Foucault’s concept of biopolitics. 
Jeffrey T. Nealon is worth quoting at length here: 
 
In short, for Foucault normalization is not a binary operation of the kind familiar from 
deconstruction (normal/abnormal, included/excluded); rather, normativity names the 
functioning of a supple, sliding scale of examination or classification whose effect is to 
produce and consistently maintain the necessity of reevaluating (always testing) the 
practices of “the norm” and thereby consistently maintaining and refashioning the links 
between, for example, “life” and sexuality. (50-51, emphasis in original) 
 
This runs directly counter to Stoler’s account of a binary Self versus Other distinction. Biopower 
as Foucault understands it measures the population, calculates normal values and tries to 
manage life accordingly, all of which involves more complexity than a simple binary relation.  
 
Summing up, Stoler’s focus on identity and authority as a process of drawing a line between Self 
and Other is directly connected to the contradiction between law and norm, and between 
exclusion and normalization. But if these discrepancies are so fundamental, why did Stoler resort 
to the concept of biopolitics in the first place? And if Stoler’s discussion of Foucault’s work is so 
systematic and profound, how can this friction pass unnoticed? 
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 Two major factor factors may have played a role in creating this confusion. First, there 
are elements in Foucault’s work that can easily be read in terms of the Self-Other dichotomy. This 
mainly applies to the Society Must Be Defended lectures: Foucault’s distinction between the 
normal and the abnormal at first sight functions like a binary division. Moreover, the manner in 
which Foucault traces racism back to the split society in race war discourse seems to confirm this 
reading. Nevertheless, this interpretation is incompatible with the role of the norm in a 
biopolitical society: contemporary racism transcribes the binary race war discourse into a state 
racism that affects distributions around the norm. 
 A second reason can be found in the connection with earlier postcolonial studies that 
have drawn on Foucault. As we have seen, the confusion between a Foucauldian understanding 
of power and the concept of authority dates back as far as Orientalism. The work of Bhabha and 
Mitchell in a way perpetuated this tendency by attempting to explain colonial authority through 
the conceptual apparatus Foucault designed for genealogies of power. Moreover, the tendency 
to combine Foucault with a Freudian relationship between Self and Other is another feature of 
Stoler’s work that can be traced back to Orientalism. Thus, one can argue that the most 
significant structural similarities should not be sought between Stoler and Foucault’s work, but 
between Race and the Education of Desire and Orientalism. Although Stoler, unlike Said, does 
take non-discursive practices into account, both works focus primarily on the role of the Self-
Other dichotomy in the production of colonial authority. As one of the first interpretations of 
Foucault’s work in the Anglophone world, Orientalism may well have been so influential that we 
cannot help but read Foucault’s concept of power in relation to authority.  
 
Naturally, to turn the notion of biopolitics into an ancillary concept for a Saidian focus on 
authority is in itself an unproblematic move. However, Race and the Education of Desire itself 
brings up certain issues it cannot properly explain on the basis of this Self-Other binary. Not 
surprisingly, these are exactly the issues Foucault had set out to explain when he coined his 
concept of biopolitics. The remainder of this section will focus on two of these problems. 
 The first issue relates to the notion of difference. As we all know, postcolonial studies in 
the wake of Said have generally challenged essentialist conceptions of the ‘nature’ of both 
colonizer and colonized. In combining the psychoanalytical idea of a Self that is formed through 
the Other with the linguistic observation that meaning is the result of the relations between 
signifiers, postcolonial studies from Said to Stoler have exposed the relational rather than 
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essential character of colonial identities. The crux of their work has been to show that the 
Western or European Self has been formed through the creation of the Other. The process of 
Othering, then, is something that can be observed and critiqued in colonial discourse and 
practice. But what if essentialism and relationality are not the only possible conceptions of 
difference?  
 In Race and the Education of Desire, Stoler misses the chance to explore one such 
conception of difference: a notion of identity based on environment. This discourse, of 
paramount importance in Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics, is often hinted at in Stoler’s 
work, but its relation to the Self-Other binary remains unclear. Consider the following passage: 
 
While Ritter’s exclusion of all those born in the Indies from the category “European” was 
unusual, it belies an anxiety that was much more widely shared: that even for the 
European-born, the Indies was transformative of cultural essence, social disposition, and 
personhood itself. His Lamarckian distinction was rarely so explicitly expressed; namely, 
that “Europeanness” was not a fixed attribute, but one altered by environment, class 
contingent, and not secured by birth. (104) 
 
As soon as one begins to think of Europeanness in relation to environment, the binary breaks 
down. Even if one proceeded by drawing a legal line between the European and the non-
European subject, the discourse that informs and sustains this distinction conceives of difference 
as gradual rather than binary. Rather than see this as proof of the fact that European identity is 
unstable, as Stoler does, one can also understand this concern with environment as a central part 
of biopolitical power: it allows power to reorganize the space in which people live. In that sense, 
instability is not a threat to power, but its precondition.  
 Besides the notion of environment, at least one other notion prominent in Race and the 
Education of Desire does not fit in with the Self-Other paradigm: degeneracy. Stoler points out 
that discourses on European identity in the East Indies accord great value to the fitness of the 
population, which is continuously threatened by the natives and the environment: 
 
European children of the well-to-do were equally at risk of degeneration, of 
“metamorphosing into Javanese,” if the proper habitus was not assured and certain 
social protocols were not met; if they played in the streets with Indo-European children, 
if they attended Indies schools that could not instil a proper Dutch “spirit,” and most 
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perniciously, if they enjoyed too much indulgence from their native nursemaids, and in 
general had too much intimacy with and knowledge of things Javanese. (112) 
 
This notion of degeneracy establishes a biological continuum rather than a dichotomy, in which 
the line between the European and the Javanese is understood as blurred. To reduce discussions 
of degeneracy to matters of identity and authority obfuscates the way in which this discourse 
was enmeshed in a real biopolitical concern with the management of the population in biological 
terms. Rather than a ruse to create and maintain colonial authority, biopolitical practice worked 
to measure the population, to establish normal values, to distribute (in)security, to introduce 
hygiene, to monitor the circulation of subjects, and to increase the vitality of the population, or, 
in negative terms, to prevent its degeneration.  
 This brings us to a second problem of Race and the Education of Desire: if one focuses on 
power as authority, what happens to the technologies of power Foucault analyzed? Although 
Stoler explains how biopolitical discussions provided Europe with the authority to colonize, there 
is comparatively little to be found in Race and the Education of Desire about actual strategies of 
subjection in the East Indies. Foucault’s focus on power relations immanent in biopolitical 
strategies attempted to analyze how the notion of the population came into being, how a 
normalizing power was established, and how the state and the scientifico-legal complex 
managed the population. For Foucault, these questions led to very specific phenomena: to name 
but a few, biopolitics incorporated health insurance, urban planning, public hygiene, 
demographics, birth control, mortality rates, and epidemiology. The questions Stoler’s 
transformation of the concept of biopolitics raises, but leaves unanswered, relate to the role of 
these biopolitical technologies in the colonies. How does the management of the population in 
the colonies differ from that in Europe? How do colonial regimes attempt to keep populations in 
check? Was Vaughan right to argue contra Foucault that power in the colonies was primarily 
repressive after all (cf. 1991: 10)? In short, how do the technologies aimed at the optimization of 
the population play out in the colonial management of the population? It is to this question that 
Achille Mbembe’s “Necropolitics” turns.  
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5.3. Mbembe and Necropolitics: Biopolitics and the Colonial Distribution of Death 
5.3.1. Context: Thinking Foucault and Agamben in Tandem 
 
In the corpus of postcolonial appropriations of Foucault, Achille Mbembe’s essay “Necropolitics” 
might be considered the odd one out. Whereas Said, Bhabha, Mitchell, Kaplan and Stoler had 
their eyes on the colonial past, Mbembe takes us from the scrutiny of colonial history into 
contemporary configurations of power. Although the first publication of the essay in 2003 came 
too early to discuss the implications of the war on terror following 9/11, a reprint in the 2008 
volume Foucault in an Age of Terror has framed “Necropolitics” as a contribution to ‘an 
understanding of modern terror’ (169). Testifying to its topicality, commentators like Puar (2007: 
35), Dillon (2008: 169), and Debrix & Barder (2012: 11) have drawn on Mbembe’s concept of 
necropolitics in order to describe the violence inherent in the contemporary apparatus of 
security and the war on terror.  
 However, Mbembe’s essay also has important implications for our understanding of 
colonial power. Indeed, although Mbembe ends with observations about suicide bombers in 
contemporary Palestine (35), the essay works towards a historicization of technologies of death, 
an endeavour that reaches from the plantation system (21) to late modern colonial occupation 
(25) and the apartheid regime (26). What ties these disparate historical conditions together is a 
particular deployment of power aimed at the creation of the ‘living dead’ (40): people who can 
be killed without consequence because they are not considered to be fully human. 
 Mbembe develops his argument in relation to the concepts of sovereignty and 
biopolitics, combining Foucauldian elements with notions from Giorgio Agamben. Without 
thematizing the differences between these two thinkers, Mbembe simply contends that his 
approach ‘builds on Michel Foucault’s critique of the notion of sovereignty and its relation to war 
and biopower’ as developed in Society Must Be Defended, while referring in the same footnote to 
Agamben’s Homo Sacer (1998). In spite of the fact that Homo Sacer deals extensively with 
Foucault’s work and also analyses the workings of biopolitics, the effort to think Foucault and 
Agamben in tandem may be more complicated than Mbembe makes it appear. Although 
‘biopolitics’ can be understood as the conceptual link bridging their approaches, the differences 
in their conceptualizations are such that it remains to be seen whether the link is more 
substantial than the shared use of a signifier. The discrepancies between Foucault and Agamben 
have led Mika Ojakangas to speak of an ‘impossible dialogue’ (2005: 5). While it is outside the 
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scope and ambition of this chapter to fuel the ‘heated controversy surrounding Agamben’s 
appropriation of concepts from Foucault’ (Bussolini 2010: 3),39 the tensions that manifest within 
Mbembe’s work certainly deserve our attention. In order to introduce Agamben’s work on 
biopolitics as concisely as possible, this section will repeat the three-tiered contextual, cotextual, 
and conceptual approach in a minimal analysis of Homo Sacer. 
 On the contextual level, the introduction to Homo Sacer leaves little doubt as to its 
principle antagonist: references to Foucault, and The History of Sexuality in particular, abound. 
However, in spite of Agamben’s bold assertion that Foucault’s work on biopower will ‘have to be 
corrected, or at least, completed’ (9), Homo Sacer seems to operate in a different discursive field 
altogether. Whereas Foucault claimed that he sought to ‘trace the transformation [of power 
relations] not at the level of political theory, but rather at the level of the mechanisms, 
techniques, and technologies of power’ (SMBD 241), Agamben seems to be doing the exact 
opposite. Indeed, Homo Sacer is an intervention into the understanding of politics in a Western 
metaphysical tradition: Western politics is not the result of a friend/enemy opposition, but of 
man as a living being who, ‘in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, 
at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion’ (8). This 
political tradition, which runs from Ancient Greece to the Third Reich and intensifies in the 
present, builds on Homo Sacer, the figure in archaic Roman law that could be killed without legal 
consequences, and is thus included in the legal system through exclusion. Agamben’s provocative 
thesis is that ‘in our age all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear 
virtually as homines sacri’ (111). 
 In order to understand this thesis, Agamben’s reconfiguration of the relationship 
between sovereignty and biopolitics is of paramount importance. As we have seen in the 
cotextual analysis of The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended, Foucault defined 
biopolitics through the antagonist concept of sovereignty. What separated these concepts was 
not only a fundamentally different objective and strategy, but also a historical transition: 
sovereignty was the power of the sovereign to ‘make die or let live,’ whereas biopower was the 
modern decision to ‘make live or let die.’ In Homo Sacer, however, sovereignty is not just the 
backdrop against which biopower can be outlined. To the contrary, the sovereign right to kill is 
inextricably interwoven with the politics of life: the foundational gesture of sovereign power is 
the creation of a biopolitical body that can be killed. The sovereign thus appears as the mirrored 
                                                 
39
 For a sustained discussion, see a dedicated issue of Foucault Studies, No. 10, November 2010. 
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image of Homo Sacer: the sovereign can kill with impunity, Homo Sacer can be killed with 
impunity. The historical transformation Agamben describes is therefore not that from sovereign 
power to biopower, since ‘the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign 
power’ (6, emphasis in original). Instead, the transformation consists of the fact that whereas the 
exclusion of life that can be killed (bare life) used to operate as the foundational outside, bare life 
is now generalized: ‘“bare life,” formerly on the margins of political existence, now increasingly 
shifts into the center of the political domain’ (Lemke 2011: 56). The shift is such that Agamben 
understands the concentration camp as the ‘biopolitical paradigm of the modern’ (117), because 
of its intensified production of life that can be killed. Thus, the camp presents a concatenation of 
the sovereign power to kill and the biopolitical production of bare life. 
 These contextual and cotextual transformations have a profound impact on the meanings 
and functions of the concept of biopolitics. Two main discrepancies between Foucault’s and 
Agamben’s conceptualization will prove crucial in the discussion of Mbembe’s “Necropolitics.” 
First of all, Agamben’s notion of biopower paradoxically focuses mainly on death. As Coleman & 
Grove sum up, ‘when speaking of the generalization of the camp as the new biopolitical nomos of 
20th-century modernity, Agamben suggests that biopolitics should be read in his work as 
thanatopolitics, which he says is when biopolitics plays out in an extreme form as a 
determination on the unworthiness or valuelessness of a particular life’ (497). Needless to say, 
this focus on the value or non-value of life is highly reminiscent of the biopolitical assaying of life 
Foucault describes, and the concept of state racism as a split in a biological continuum clearly 
indicates that Foucault did not ignore the question of death in biopolitical regimes. However, 
there is a crucial difference in his conceptualization of the strategic objective of biopower: 
whereas Agamben focuses on bare life and its destruction as the foundation of politics, Foucault 
focused on biopower as a power intent on managing the population and supporting certain lives. 
This dimension completely disappears in Homo Sacer: biopolitics is now solely aimed at the 
production of bare life. 
 A second and related issue is that Foucault’s focus on specific technologies of power 
brought together a number of particular historical phenomena in a biopolitical apparatus, 
ranging from demographics to birth control, hygiene and urban planning. In drawing on the 
model of the law, Agamben strips the concept of biopolitics of its explanatory value in the realm 
of technologies of normalization, focusing instead on the underpinnings of a Western 
metaphysical tradition.  
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 Thomas Lemke’s otherwise excellent discussion of biopolitics concludes from this second 
point that ‘Agamben fails to recognize that biopolitics is essentially a political economy of life’ 
(2011a: 60). In this ‘impossible dialogue’ (Ojakangas 2005), as well as in the reading of 
“Necropolitics,” however, it is vital to remember the obvious fact that signifiers lack an essence: 
in the light of the above, it seems more appropriate to conclude that Foucault and Agamben, in 
spite of their use of the same signifier, set out to explain divergent issues with divergent 
approaches. 
 Much more than Agamben’s failure to live up to Foucauldian orthodoxy, what is 
problematic is Homo Sacer’s way of dealing with difference. In the discussion of Ann Laura 
Stoler’s work above, we have seen how an understanding of power as the production of a binary 
may well be incompatible with Foucault’s emphasis on normalization. In working along the model 
of the law, Agamben proposes a similar binary. Lemke’s description of this process is worth 
quoting at some length:  
 
(...) one notices that Agamben conceives of the “camp” not as a differentiated and 
differentiating continuum but simply as a “line” (1998, 122) that more or less 
unambiguously divides bare life and political existence. His attention is directed solely 
toward the establishment of a border – a border that he comprehends not as a tiered or 
graded zone but as a line without extension or dimension that reduces the question to 
an either-or. Within these parameters, he can no longer analyze how gradations and 
valuations within “bare life” emerge, how life can be qualified as “higher” or “lower,” as 
“descending” or “ascending.” These processes of differentiation evade him, for he is 
interested not so much in “life” as in its “bareness.” (2011a: 59) 
 
From a postcolonial point of view, such a rigid perspective seems especially worrisome. How can 
the dichotomy of politicized life versus bare life account for the complexity of the colonial 
situation? How can a model that uses the border as an analytical tool avoid reproducing those 
borders, in a less innocent geographical sense? 
 
Before we proceed to the manner in which Mbembe grapples with these tensions, two caveats 
ought to be made. First of all, Agamben and Foucault are certainly not the only points of 
reference for “Necropolitics.” Stephen Morton rightly emphasizes that ‘Mbembe develops 
Fanon’s observation about the constitutive role of violence in the political formation of the 
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European colony’ (185). In light of the discussion of difference as the dialectic of Self and Other, it 
is crucial that Mbembe’s invocation of Fanon differs markedly from Bhabha’s: rather than the 
psychoanalytical aspect, what Mbembe values is Fanon’s description of ‘the spatialization of 
colonial occupation’ (26). His discussion of the compartmentalization of space, the setting of 
internal frontiers, and the role of police stations and barracks is highly compatible with Foucault’s 
focus on techniques and technologies of disciplining individuals and managing populations. 
 Second, Morton’s observations about Fanon serve as a reminder that the discrepancies 
between Foucault and Agamben should also not be overstated: if Fanon wrote about the 
constitutive role of violence in the political formation of the colony, Foucault and Agamben 
discuss politics as inherently violent. What binds Fanon, Foucault, Agamben, and Mbembe 
together is that they all oppose the model of politics as the exercise of reason in the public 
sphere. The task at hand will be to see how Mbembe negotiates the tension between the various 
manifestations of this critique of the rational and autonomous sovereign subject.  
 
5.3.2 Cotext: ‘Sovereignty’ and its Layers of Meaning 
 
As hinted at in the contextual analysis, an attempt to reconstruct the conceptual architecture of 
“Necropolitics” will have to confront the multiple configurations of the relationship between two 
central concepts: sovereignty and biopower. Exactly how disorienting Mbembe’s merging of 
Foucault and Agamben can be becomes painstakingly clear in the very first lines of the essay: 
 
This essay assumes that the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large 
degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die. Hence, 
to kill or to allow to live constitute the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental attributes. 
To exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the 
deployment and manifestation of power. One could summarize in the above terms what 
Michel Foucault meant by biopower: that domain of life over which power has taken 
control. (11-12, emphasis in original) 
 
In this short passage, Mbembe superimposes at least three disparate conceptualizations of 
sovereignty: the traditional notion of sovereignty, Foucault’s refusal of it, and Agamben’s 
reconfiguration of Foucault. In the remainder of the essay, Mbembe adds a fourth layer and 
combines them all into a palimpsestic concept of sovereignty. 
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 The first layer of meaning in Mbembe’s discussion of sovereignty is invoked through its 
rejection: his claim that sovereignty is the capacity to decide who may live and who must die is 
fundamentally at odds with what the essay frames as ‘privileged normative theories’ of 
sovereignty (13). According to Mbembe, late-modern political criticism has propagated an 
understanding of sovereignty as ‘the production of general norms by a body (the demos) made 
up of free and equal men and women’ (13). This perspective thus presupposes full subjects who 
enter into a contract to constitute sovereignty. In this way, the sovereign subject is the 
foundation of the sovereign, given that this system ‘rests on the belief that the subject is the 
master and the controlling author of his or her own meaning’ (13). Politics, correspondingly, is 
the exercise of reason through these subjects. This traditional notion of the sovereign subject has 
a counterpart on the level of states. The sovereign state is a state that ‘could recognize no 
authority above it within its own borders’ (23). In this context, Mbembe mentions the ‘Jus 
publicum Europaeum,’ a European juridical order that postulated the juridical equality of all 
states. The equality of subjects thus finds it counterpart in the equality of sovereign states.  
 Such a conception of sovereignty has been criticized extensively, amongst others by 
Foucault: Mbembe’s picking up on Foucault’s understanding of sovereignty as the capacity to 
take life or let live shifts the focus away from sovereignty as the exercise of reason to the 
question of violence. Sovereignty comes to signify the power of the negative and the destructive, 
as exemplified in the gory introduction to Discipline and Punish. This approach to sovereignty as 
violence rather than reason serves Mbembe’s purpose of exposing colonial violence against its 
legitimizing narrative of civilization.  
 However, for Foucault the concept of sovereignty is only a foil for developing his notion 
of biopower. As should be clear by now, Foucault sketches a historical development from 
sovereignty to biopower, with the nuance that biopower can incorporate sovereign elements. 
But if his critique of the sovereign subject revolves around the fact that a contract model of 
sovereignty presupposes the subject and is therefore incapable of accounting for its production, 
the Foucauldian emphasis on the subjectifying techniques of biopower leaves unanswered the 
question of the subject under sovereign power. In short, if sovereignty is the power of the 
negative, how could it possibly produce the subjects on which it works?  
 This is where the third layer comes in: Agamben’s reconfiguration of Foucault. In Society 
Must Be Defended, Foucault had briefly raised the question of the contract, discussing the 
relationship between life and sovereignty. If, Foucault asks, individuals appoint a sovereign to 
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protect their lives, ‘mustn’t life remain outside the contract to the extent that it was the first, 
initial, and foundational reason for the contract itself’ (241)? However, he is quick to dismiss this 
issue as ‘a debate within political philosophy that we can leave on one side’ (241). With 
Agamben, by contrast, the debate on life in political philosophy is absolutely central to an 
understanding of sovereignty. Political life only comes into being as the negation of unpolitical 
existence, or, in Agamben’s formulation, bare life. As Oksala aptly summarizes, ‘sovereignty, 
understood in this way, thus corresponds crucially to bare life. Bare life is the exception within 
the political order because it forms the zone outside the law and of political rights’ (2010: 31). 
Although Mbembe does not use the term bare life, his comparable notion of ‘animal life’ fulfils 
the same role as a designation of life excepted from the political realm: ‘in the eyes of the 
conqueror, savage life is just another form of animal life’ (24, emphasis in original). Mbembe 
thus relocates Agamben’s split between bare life and political existence to the boundary 
between colonized and colonizer.  
 Agamben’s very spatial conceptualization of the state of exception plays a major role in 
this process. Following up on Carl Schmitt, Agamben and Mbembe refer to the sovereign as the 
one who decides on the state of exception, ‘a temporal suspension of the law’ (Mbembe 12). But 
whereas for Agamben the state of exception has ceased to be temporal and has increasingly 
become the norm, constituting the nomos of our contemporary situation, Mbembe does not 
conflate the state of exception and the normal juridical order. To the contrary, ‘the colonies are 
the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of juridical order can be 
suspended – the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the 
service of “civilization”’ (24). In this way, he maintains a ‘distinction between, on the one hand, 
those parts of the globe available for colonial appropriation, and, on the other, Europe itself 
(where the Jus Publicum was to hold sway)’ (23-24). The colony thus emerges as the locus where 
the sovereign capacity to take lives is not subject to any legal limitation. There is no sovereign 
subject establishing the contract, and there is no sovereign state protecting the lives of its 
subjects in the colony Mbembe depicts.  
 Mbembe’s combination of Foucault’s and Agamben’s conceptualizations of sovereignty 
in this way effectively dismantles the traditional notion of sovereignty as the exercise of reason 
through autonomous subjects. However, Mbembe’s approach also goes beyond the work of 
these two thinkers, adding in a sense a fourth and final layer of meaning: sovereignty as a figure 
of power that dissolves the distinction between state and non-state power. One could object that 
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positing such a dissolution is far from a novel gesture, and that it is exactly what Foucault 
attempted to achieve with the concept of governmentality. And yet, Society Must Be Defended 
discusses sovereignty primarily in relation to state racism and the figure of the king, thereby 
positing sovereignty as a centralized form of power. This is even more prominent in Agamben’s 
work, with ‘its concentration on state apparatuses and centralized forms of regulation’ (Lemke 
2011a: 61). The sovereign power operating in the colony as state of exception, however, is ‘not 
necessarily state power’ (Mbembe 16). In the colony, ‘war is no longer waged between armies of 
two sovereign states. It is waged by armed groups acting behind the mask of the state against 
armed groups that have no state but control very distinct territories’ (35). However, if Mbembe 
proposes a notion of sovereign power as decentralized, and thus defines it as the opposite of 
what Foucault had in mind, we may be approaching the limits of conceptual work. The next 
section will therefore check whether such contradictions are simply the result of a productive 
superimposition of various conceptualizations, or whether they might stem from a deeper 
conflict between analytically disparate rationales of power.  
 
5.3.3. Concept: Is Biopolitics Necropolitics? 
 
Necropolitics, the concept Mbembe coined to refer to ‘the generalized instrumentalization of 
human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations’ (14), is a clear 
appropriation of the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics. Unlike the postcolonial transformations of 
‘discourse’ and ‘discipline,’ discussed in the previous chapters, this transformation is reflected in 
the signifier itself. Even though the general thrust of this appropriation is quite obvious, with a 
shift from politics as the fostering of life towards politics as the distribution of death, the actual 
relation between the concepts of necropolitics and biopolitics can still be read in two different 
ways, depending to a large extent on the role one assigns to either Agamben or Foucault in 
Mbembe’s text, and their respective conceptualizations of sovereignty.  
 A possible first interpretation would be to maintain a strict separation, conceptually as 
well as analytically, between the politics of life and the politics of death. This is the path Mika 
Ojakangas has chosen in his reading of Foucault. Focusing on the inclusive nature of biopower, 
Ojakangas argues that ‘the care of “all living” is the foundation of biopower,’ rather than ‘bare 
life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death’ (6, emphasis in original). Biopower in this 
interpretation is a form of pastoral power that aims to take care of each and every member of 
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the flock. The result is an opposition between biopolitics and a politics of death. A similar 
separation informs the work of Rabinow and Rose, and their essay “Biopower Today” in 
particular. In a summary that sounds quite ironic in contemporary debates, they 
 
argue that, while exceptional forms of biopower, especially in conditions of absolutist 
dictatorship, and when combined with certain technical resources, can lead to a 
murderous ‘thanatopolitics’ – a politics of death – biopower in contemporary states 
takes a different form. (2006: 195) 
 
While this wholesale claim about ‘contemporary states’ is in itself problematic enough in its 
generalization, the implicit opposition to ‘absolutist dictatorship’ as a thing of the distant past 
seems particularly worrisome. Their claim that such a politics of death is exceptional – an 
interesting choice of words – if anything seems to confirm Agamben’s suspicion towards the 
myth of a temporal state of exception rather than to undercut it: Rabinow and Rose’s wording 
sweeps under the carpet the fundamental violence in certain parts of the globe inflicted upon 
certain members of the population.  
 However, these interpretations of Foucault’s work are not entirely unfounded. Although 
Society Must Be Defended does not present a picture of biopower as a politics of life that 
operates at great remove from the politics of death, Foucault does attribute genocidal violence 
to a combination of the sovereign right to kill and the biopolitical management of the population, 
rather than biopolitics as such (e.g. SMBD 260). Moreover, to his own question of whether the 
death function is inscribed in the workings of all states, Foucault answers somewhat hesitantly 
‘perhaps not’ (261). This hesitation leaves the door open for an interpretation of the politics of 
life and the politics of death as two separate rationales of power. Applied to Mbembe, this 
interpretation would yield an analysis of Europe as the site of biopower, and the colony where 
necropower is operative – without any necessary or foundational connection between them. 
Such a reading, however, is not very plausible, as it does not seem to correspond with 
Mbembe’s Agamben-inflected reading of Foucault. Ignoring Foucault’s hesitation, Mbembe 
contends that ‘Foucault states clearly that the sovereign right to kill (droit de glaive) and the 
mechanisms of biopower are inscribed in the way all modern states function’ (17). Although such 
a reading makes a stronger claim than the lectures seem to warrant, this interpretation seems to 
have become more current than Ojakangas’s reading. And for good reason: against the claim that 
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biopower aims to take care of ‘all living,’ Dillon succinctly objects that ‘life cannot be made, 
encouraged, or otherwise seduced, into living biopolitically unless other ways of living and other 
forms of life are extinguished’ (2008: 168-9). The question Ojakangas precludes is the question of 
‘what it is to be a living thing’ (Dillon 2005: 41). As soon as biopower includes ‘all living,’ a 
decision is made about what counts as life and what does not. Thus, the ‘animal life’ Mbembe 
speaks of is exposed to death even in a biopolitical system. ‘Necropolitics,’ Dillon concludes, ‘is 
the ‘letting die’ required by the biopolitical injunction to ‘make life’’ (2008: 169). Biopolitics 
always already carries necropolitics with it.  
Paradoxically, the realization that biopolitics and necropolitics are two sides of the same 
coin has often led to a focus on the lethal side only. As Dan Stone complains, 
 
the thrust of the literature on biopolitics – which focuses on identifying the “dark side” 
of modernity – overlooks the fact that biopolitics led not only to genocide, but also to 
advances in social welfare, public health, and family policy, even as the aims and 
vocabulary of welfare advocates and eugenicists were often indistinguishable. (2010: 
168-9).  
 
Debrix & Barder’s statement that ‘the object of biopower is death itself’ (11) is a case in point: it 
completely ignores the biopolitical strategy of fostering life Foucault described. The same thing 
could be argued about the work of Agamben and Mbembe: focusing on the politics of death only, 
they do not expose the fundamental connections between necropolitics, biopolitics, and 
sovereignty, but rather conflate them until the three concepts become analytically 
indistinguishable. This allows Mbembe to speak of ‘biopower, “that old sovereign right of death”’ 
(17): the politics of life, the politics of death, and sovereignty have become interchangeable. 
 
It is my contention that both the strict separation of sovereignty, biopolitics, and necropolitics as 
well as their conflation overlooks key aspects of the particular configuration of power hinted at 
by Mbembe. In spite of the conflation he effects, the characteristics Mbembe ascribes to 
necropolitics present sufficient ground to argue that necropolitics coincides neither with 
sovereignty nor with biopolitics.  
 First of all, as the previous sections have established, for Foucault the right of the 
sovereign to kill was centered around the figure of the king. In a necropolitical society, there is no 
such centre. As Mbembe puts it in relation to Africa: ‘Urban militias, private armies, armies of 
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regional lords, private security firms, and state armies all claim the right to exercise violence or to 
kill’ (32). Whom to shoot and when to shoot is left to the discretion of local military commanders, 
thus rendering each of them a local sovereign. Moreover, technological advances have made it 
possible for the necropolitical agent to strike without warning and vanish immediately (31). 
Necropolitical technology can thus be characterized in terms of a ‘global mobility’ (31) rather 
than a specific center.  
Second, in a sovereign regime, the act of killing was meant to function as an example. 
The body of the person who was executed was a signifier, warning people not to transgress 
against the power of the king. But, in the necropolitical massacre, ‘lifeless bodies are quickly 
reduced to the status of simple skeletons. Their morphology henceforth inscribes them in the 
register of undifferentiated generality: simple relics of an unburied pain, empty, meaningless 
corporalities’ (35). Moreover, the power that is responsible for the killing does not want to be 
seen, hence the importance of ‘stealth capabilities, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 
cyberintelligence’ (30). This is not to say that death as example loses its function altogether, but 
rather that ‘invisible killing is added to outright executions’ (30).   
Third, as the introductory pages of Discipline and Punish bring to mind, the sovereign act 
of killing aimed at a particular kind of excess: it was not enough to kill the perpetrator, the body 
needed to display the formidable strength of sovereign power. Necropolitical violence on the 
other hand practices targeted killing with laser-guided missiles. It need not necessarily be 
excessive – death can be sufficient. Obviously, Mbembe does not imply that killing is now ‘clean’: 
a technological revolution has even ‘multiplied the capacity for destruction in unprecedented 
ways’ (30). Rather, the crux of the matter is that the excess which used to be the strategic aim of 
sovereign power is now a side effect in the economy of warfare: the main point is to shut down 
the enemy’s life-support system (31). 
 Fourth, the discontinuity of the public execution is replaced in a necropolitical regime 
with continuous surveillance, with, as Mbembe puts it, ‘the eye acting as a weapon and vice 
versa’ (28). The exercise of necropower thus has more in common with the continuous 
application of disciplinary power than with the bursts of sovereign vengeance. The result in the 
necropolitical society is that ‘daily life is militarized’ (30).  
Finally, in Foucault’s conceptualization sovereign power targeted the body, whereas 
necropolitical ‘technologies of destruction are less concerned with inscribing bodies within 
disciplinary apparatuses as inscribing them, when the time comes, within the order of the 
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maximal economy now represented by the “massacre”’ (34). Even in times of war, what is at 
stake is the ‘management of the multitudes’ (34). Like biopolitics, necropolitics thus operates at 
the level of the population. 
  If these five points demonstrate that a conceptual separation of sovereignty and 
necropolitics allows us to distinguish two strategies of power, something similar can be said 
about biopolitics and necropolitics. Although the last of these five points makes it tempting to 
equate biopolitics and necropolitics as the form of power that takes the population as its object, 
a conflation of the politics of life and death ignores the phenomenon Ojakangas focuses on: the 
biopolitical determination to optimize the population and to take care of ‘all living.’ As we have 
seen, the trouble with his approach is that it overlooks the violence inherent in deciding what 
counts as life. To read “Necropolitics” either as a transformation of Foucault’s concept that 
relocates its essence from optimization to destruction, or as a supplement that posits 
necropolitics and biopolitics as free-standing rationales of power, misses Mbembe’s (perhaps 
unwitting) solution to this debate: in exploring the colony and the colony only as the location of 
necropolitics, he acknowledges the violence inherent in the biopolitical assaying of life, without 
reducing this biopolitics to its death-function.  
 Read in this way, Mbembe effectively manages to go beyond both Foucault and 
Agamben: the concept of necropolitics explores a form of power that Foucault’s Eurocentric 
account overlooked, and it presents Agamben’s totalizing narrative with a much-needed 
differentiation and historicization. One might object to such a reading that Mbembe’s 
differentiation is schematic, and his historicization insufficient: Jasbir Puar has referred to 
“Necropolitics” as a ‘totalizing narrative’ in its own right (33). And indeed, Mbembe’s work has 
only partially freed itself from the binary divisions and generalizations Lemke found in Agamben’s 
work. It is in this issue of dealing with difference that the problematic fusion of Foucault with 
Agamben returns to the surface. This is of course not to say that Foucault was the great 
theoretician of difference, and Agamben the one who ignores difference, with Mbembe 
vacillating between the two – such a summary would be too forgiving of Foucault’s self-
contained histories of Europe, and overly harsh on Agamben’s account. After all, Agamben’s 
claim that bare life used to form the constitutive outside of sovereign power demonstrates that 
some form of differentiation and historicization, however schematic it may be, underlies his 
conceptualization of biopolitics. It is this same binary division of bare life versus politicized 
existence, or animal life versus human life, that also appears in Mbembe’s distinction between 
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necropolitics and biopolitics. “Necropolitics” thus relies to a certain extent on Agamben’s 
juridico-discursive model of power: by taking the law as its model, it draws ‘a line without 
extension or dimension that reduces the question to an either-or’ (Lemke 2011a: 59). In this 
sense, Mbembe’s notion of necropolitics inherits this binary conception of difference, as a line 
that separates animal life and political existence. This line is not the result of the analysis of 
power relations, but is dictated by an approach that takes a juridico-discursive theory as its 
starting point.  
 However, this tendency is countered by an equally present Foucauldian impetus to focus 
on technologies of power. The importance of this point can hardly be overstated: Mbembe’s 
characterization of necropolitics relies crucially on a discussion of technologies of destruction. 
The immediate effect is a historicization of power that is much more thorough than the juridico-
discursive approach achieves. In his discussion of necropower, Mbembe points to the fact that 
‘each stage of imperialism also involved certain key technologies (the gunboat, quinine, 
steamship lines, submarine telegraph cables, and colonial railroads)’ (25). In the contemporary 
stage, ‘a military-technological revolution [...] has multiplied the capacity for destruction in 
unprecedented ways’ (30). Thus, necropower has intensified into a situation where ‘smart bombs 
and bombs coated with depleted uranium (DU), high-tech stand-off weapons, electronic sensors, 
laser-guided missiles, cluster and asphyxiation bombs, stealth capabilities, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, and cyberintelligence’ ensure the death of the enemy (30). Necropolitics is not simply 
the ‘letting die’ implied in the imperative to ‘make live,’ but a whole technology of death.  
 This discrepancy between, on the one side, a politico-philosophical approach that takes a 
binary scheme as its starting point, and, on the other, a Foucauldian bottom-up approach that 
starts from a set of specific historical technologies, constitutes the key point of tension in 
contesting conceptualizations of biopolitics and necropolitics. In Mbembe’s text, this tension 
stands largely unresolved: biopolitics and necropolitics appear both as the automatic outcome of 
the ancient distinction between bare life and political existence, as well as the contingent 
coalescence of a distinct set of technologies. As the next section will stress, this split becomes yet 
more significant in the context of the earlier discussion of Race and the Education of Desire.  
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5.4. Conclusion: Enter Biopolitics, Exit Identity? 
 
Reading Foucault in light of Stoler’s and Mbembe’s transformations of the concept of biopolitics, 
the most conspicuous issue is no doubt that The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be 
Defended analyze a form of difference on an ontological rather than an identitarian plane. The 
biopolitical aim to optimize the population and to foster life entails a decision about the 
ontological question of what counts as life and of who is deserving of biopolitical care. This 
evaluation of life is made possible through the production of a set of norms, measuring ‘normal’ 
demographical statistical values, occurrences of disease, starvation, etc. A complementary set of 
technologies emerges to relate the actual values to the normal values and to bring them in line 
with the norm or to pathologize elements of the population. Importantly, we have found such a 
power of normalization to effect distributions around the norm rather than invest in a binary 
separation of the normal and the abnormal.  
 On this last point, however, Ann Laura Stoler suggests the exact opposite. Deploying 
biopolitics as an ancillary concept, she understands biopolitical practices as an effort to create 
and maintain a dichotomy of Self and Other. Moreover, this dichotomy between the colonizer 
and the colonized is not consistently framed as ontological, but rather as identitarian: the 
dialectic of self and other creates the identity of the colonizer in such a way that he has authority 
over the colonized. At bottom, what this move implies is the partial integration of Foucault’s 
concept into a Saidian economy of identity and authority.  
 As we have seen, such a framework overlooks two crucial elements. First of all, this 
binary conception of identity formation seems more akin to the model of the law than the norm: 
it draws a line rather than effect distributions around the norm. It thus not only neglects the 
process of normalization, but also fails to account for the notion of difference installed in the 
evolutionist thrust of biopolitical discourse, leaving the notion of degeneracy unexplained. A 
second and related problem is that Stoler only seems interested in biopolitical practices insofar 
as they pertain to identity formation and the creation of authority. In this way, Race and the 
Education of Desire neglects biopolitical practices as strategies of power aimed at the body of the 
individual and the population. In other words, whether biopolitical practices served the creation 
of authority or not, they constituted a direct intervention in the lives of the colonized: 
phenomena such as the introduction of systems of hygiene, the control of circulation, and 
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attempts to quarantine certain subjects cannot be characterized solely in terms of identity-as-
authority.  
 On closer inspection, it seems that the key tension here is between the Foucauldian 
approach of analyzing certain technologies as they coalesce towards a certain strategy, and 
Stoler’s effort to subsume these technologies under a Saidian scheme of Selves and Others. A 
similar source of friction has been detected in Mbembe’s “Necropolitics,” viz. between Foucault’s 
bottom-up approach and Agamben’s grappling with the binary of bare life and political existence. 
And yet, this similarity is far from absolute: whereas Stoler integrates the concept of biopolitics 
into the larger economy of identity, Mbembe’s conceptual architecture does not prioritize either 
Foucault or Agamben, but rather merges their work without much thought to their compatibility. 
The outcome is a conceptualization of biopolitics and necropolitics that reproduces only the first 
of Stoler’s problems. More specifically, Mbembe’s reliance on Agamben’s opposition between 
bare life and political existence is akin to Said and Stoler’s notion of difference as a binary 
distinction, with the same reductive notion of power as the production of a division into two 
camps.  
 However, the issue of the binary is where the similarity between Stoler and Mbembe 
ends. Whereas Stoler identified the creation of a binary on the level of identity, Mbembe focuses 
on the level of ontology: not the difference between selves and others, but between properly 
human and animal life is the difference between colonizer and colonized. Second, whereas 
Stoler’s focus on identity and authority led her to ignore the immediate impact of biopolitical 
practices on bodies and populations, Mbembe’s attention to technologies of death transforms 
the Foucauldian impetus to highlight the role of technologies of power into a forceful 
reconsideration of colonial modalities of power. With technologies of death as the main subject 
of his essay, Mbembe takes seriously the idea of a form of power which takes the individual body 
and the species body as its point of application. The result is a study in which the notion of 
identity is almost totally absent (except for one brief excursus on page 27), focusing instead on 
the strategies, tactics, and techniques of colonial power. Naturally, Mbembe’s account is 
incomplete, and an exclusive emphasis on the politics of death can only metonymically stand in 
for an analysis of colonial projects as such. Rather, the value of Mbembe’s approach can be found 
in shifting the critique of power from the stories of legitimization power produces to its rationale 
and modes of operation. As the next chapter will indicate, Mbembe is not the only one who 
deemed such a shift necessary.  
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Before moving on, however, a final word on the work of Stoler may be helpful to illustrate the 
significance of the differences between Stoler’s and Mbembe’s appropriations of ‘biopolitics.’ If 
the opening paragraphs identified ‘biopolitics’ as a buzzword in the first decade of the 21st 
century, the impact of this period can most clearly be discerned in Stoler’s second seminal 
volume, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power (2002, 2010). This is a collection of essays, mainly 
written during the nineties, and published in 2002, with a large degree of overlap with Race and 
the Education of Desire. In other words: here too one finds a focus on identitarian frames and 
their contribution to colonial authority. And yet, the new preface to the 2010 edition reframes 
these discussions in terms highly reminiscent of Mbembe’s description of colonial power: rather 
than identity, authority, and nationalism, we read about ‘regimes of living,’ and ‘sovereignty’ (xx).  
Although this preface on its own hardly constitutes sufficient proof, taken together with the 
questions Mbembe raises, it indicates that postcolonial studies may have developed an interest 
in power that is no longer confined to identity-as-authority, and that the concept of biopolitics 
has had a key role to play in this process during the first decade of the 21st century. 
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  6. Governmentality  
 
Just as with ‘discourse,’ ‘discipline,’ and ‘biopolitics,’ ‘governmentality’ is not a signifier 
originating with Foucault. Thomas Lemke traces it back to the 1950s, when Roland Barthes 
coined the neologism ‘to denote an ideological mechanism that presents the government as the 
origin of social relations’ (2011b: 3). After Foucault stripped the concept of its semiological 
context in the 1970s, the concept has been used to refer to a particular rationale of power and 
government. From the 1990s onwards, a ‘boom in studies of governmentality’ has taken place, 
with scholars drawing on the concept in order to focus on ‘transformations from welfarism to 
neo-liberal rationalities and technologies’ (Lemke 2011b: 78). As the publication in the same year 
of both Foucault, Governmentality and Critique (Lemke 2011b) and Governmentality (eds. 
Bröckling, Krassmann, Lemke 2011) indicates, the notion of governmentality continues to draw 
interest in contemporary scholarship.  
 One volume that has played a major role in starting this boom is without a doubt The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. This 1991 publication opened up Foucault’s work on 
governmentality to the Anglophone world by providing the first English translation of Foucault’s 
lecture of February 1st, 1978. The source text of the English translation is not the manuscript 
Foucault used to deliver his lecture, but a transcription and translation of the lecture into Italian, 
leading to a double translation (cf. Gordon et al. 1991: 87). Moreover, the publication of this 
single lecture completely wrenches it out of its context: Foucault’s lecture was part of a series of 
thirteen lectures he held in 1978 at the Collège de France. It was not until 2007 that the full 
series became available in English, published as Security, Territory, Population.  
 Both postcolonial appropriations on which this chapter focuses therefore rely on a 
decontextualized, transcribed, and doubly translated version of Foucault’s work. The first 
appropriation is an essay by David Scott, aptly titled “Colonial Governmentality.” It first appeared 
in a 1995 issue of Social Text, but was reprinted in Scott’s Refashioning Futures (1999: 23-52) and 
in a 2005 volume called Anthropologies of Modernity (ed. Jonathan Xavier Inda). Scott’s essay 
urges students of colonialism to analyze the rationale of modern colonial power, to spell out its 
goals, ambitions, and methods, or, in short, its project.40 In his brief analysis of colonial power in 
                                                 
40
 In using this notion of a project to study colonial governmentality, Scott develops a perspective that is 
similar to Nicholas Thomas’s in Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government (1994). 
overlap with Scott and the fact that Scott’s account is more systematic and has been reprinted a number of 
times, the present chapter will focus on Scott alone.Thomas’s fourth chapter, “Colonial Governmentality 
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Ceylon, however, it becomes apparent that Scott’s almost exclusive reliance on Foucault’s 
decontextualized lecture yields a picture of colonial power that is as problematic as it is 
promising.  
 The second postcolonial appropriation, James Duncan’s In the Shadows of the Tropics 
(2007), picks up where Scott left off, with a more substantial analysis of colonial power in 19th 
century Ceylon. A focus on the connections Duncan establishes between Foucault’s famous 
lecture of February 1st, 1978, and other concepts and scholars will demonstrate how Duncan 
negotiates many of the problems that plagued Scott’s work, as well as some of the other texts 
mentioned throughout the previous chapters. Indeed, In the Shadows of the Tropics is not only 
the last text to be subjected to analysis here, it is also the last of this intertextual web under 
study in a chronological sense. A major task of this chapter will therefore be to demonstrate how 
the intertextual web we have been discussing structures and affects Duncan’s conceptualization 
of governmentality.  
 
6.1. Foucault and Governmentality: Power as the Art of Government 
6.1.1. Context: The Security, Territory, Population Lectures 
 
By far the most effective way to contextualize Foucault’s concept of governmentality is to take a 
closer look at the lectures in which it first emerged. Unlike Scott and Duncan, who could only rely 
on the doubly translated transcripts of a single lecture, we can place this lecture in the series of 
thirteen Foucault delivered between January and April 1978 at the Collège de France. In this 
series, published as Security, Territory, Population, Foucault develops a particular perspective on 
what he calls ‘governmentality.’ Claiming that the title of the series is misleading, Foucault 
explains that ‘what [he] would really like to undertake is something that [he] would call a history 
of “governmentality”’ (108). In anticipation of a more thorough discussion later on, we can 
understand ‘governmentality’ as referring to both the ensemble of practices and projects of 
power exercized over the population, as well as the pre-eminence of a conceptualization of 
power as the government of the population.  
Whereas this aspect of the lectures has received a lot of attention in the wake of the 
publication of The Foucault Effect, what is generally less understood is that Foucault did not 
                                                                                                                                                   
and Colonial Conversion” (105-142) is an interesting postcolonial appropriation of Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality in its own right, but because of the  
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broach the topic of government until the fourth lecture. The salient concept in the first lectures is 
not ‘governmentality,’ but ‘security.’ Through the examples of disease spreading and grain 
scarcity, Foucault develops a contrast between sovereign technologies of power, disciplinary 
technologies, and technologies of security. In short, sovereign power is a power of prohibition, 
discipline is a power that prescribes a norm and attempts to bring individuals in line with it, 
whereas the apparatus of security derives the norm from what it posits as the reality of nature. 
Its task, then, is to regulate this reality, to regulate men as such an element of nature in the form 
of a population, and to manage this population in relation to its milieu. One crucial aspect of this 
notion of an effective reality is that the function of the state is limited to regulating the natural 
circulation of men and things, as opposed to prohibiting or structuring it.  
This is where the idea of liberalism comes in. As Foucault points out:  
 
The game of liberalism – not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow 
their course; laissez-faire, passer et aller – basically and fundamentally means acting so 
that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, 
principles and mechanisms of reality itself. (48) 
 
This strategy of liberalism thus installs a notion of freedom at the heart of government. In this 
way, freedom no longer appears as the absence of power, but as a crucial technique of power. 
According to Mitchell Dean, this line of thought forced Foucault to develop ‘a new conceptual 
architecture of power’ (2010: 58). Based on a later text from Foucault, “The Ethic of the Care of 
the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” Dean identifies a shift from Foucault’s earlier work that 
focused on domination to the focus on government as ‘an intermediate region which is not 
purely one of either freedom or domination’ (58). Claiming that ‘in using the language of war, 
battle and struggle, genealogy found itself uncomfortably close to a position that tended to 
identify all forms of power with domination, and thus much like that of Adorno and Horkheimer,’ 
Dean concludes that genealogy after The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended 
found itself at an ‘impasse’ (58). He thus introduces a break between Foucault’s work on 
biopower and that on governmentality.  
However, it is my contention that there is no fundamental break between his approach 
to biopower and governmentality as presented in Security, Territory, Population. Martin Saar 
rightly observes that ‘it is easy to see that Foucault does not think that the project of a history of 
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governmentality demands any major methodological innovation except a change of focus’ (37). 
Not only is it so that the series freedom – government – domination Dean insists on only appears 
after the delivery of the lectures, it can also be argued that this tension between freedom and 
domination was always already implicit in Foucault’s work and does not present a major 
innovation. This is the point Kelly makes in his discussion of Foucault’s concept of power: 
although Foucault indeed introduced a distinction between freedom as a reversible, flexible 
relation of power, and domination as an ossified, irreversible power relation, the principle of 
reversibility ‘was included in Foucault’s thinking all along’ (2009: 76). Indeed, even in Discipline 
and Punish and The History of Sexuality, where Foucault discussed seemingly stable clusters of 
power relations, he still insisted on (but never developed) the possibilities for the subject to resist 
or reverse the power relation. It seems, then, that the real difference between his work on 
biopower and his work on governmentality lies in his more balanced elaboration of both the 
structuring effects of power on the subject and the room for manoeuvering within and 
throughout that structure. An example can clarify this: if the biopolitical concern with the 
reproduction of the species developed through observation of a notion of normal (or, in the light 
of what was said about liberalism earlier, natural) sexuality, Foucault’s conceptualization of 
biopower never precluded the possibility of subjects behaving abnormally – to the contrary, the 
ongoing process of normalization implies that there always have been so-called deviant subjects.  
With the above example in mind, one can clearly see that the biopolitical management of 
the population Foucault described in 1976 is one of these ways in which technologies of security 
regulate the population as a natural given. Phenomena such as the interest in sexuality, the 
establishment of normal birth-mortality rates, and the rise of demographics are all means to 
uncover the natural principles underlying the population, and practices such as urban planning 
and hygiene campaigns are ways to regulate the population in order to optimize its prosperity 
within the parameters of the natural. This explains why Foucault started his first lecture by saying 
that in the lectures he wants to study biopower (1), but immediately abandons the term 
afterwards: the concept of security replaces or subsumes the idea of biopower. Obviously, the 
concepts of biopower and security do not overlap completely – the technologies of security 
Foucault describes include biopolitical techniques, but not all technologies of security have ‘the 
function of modifying something in the biological destiny of the species’ (10). Security is thus a 
concept that includes what Foucault had defined as biopower, but that also refers to a broader 
set of techniques to regulate the population.  
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Seen in this light, the break Dean claims to have identified certainly does not seem as 
fundamental as he makes it out to be. In fact, there appears to be a continuity between 
Foucault’s conceptualizations of biopower, security and governmentality that only got broken up 
when the lecture on governmentality was divorced from the series and presented in isolation. In 
our reading of Scott and Duncan we will see how the respective severing or re-establishing of this 
link yields highly divergent results.  
Before moving on, however, there are at least two other continuities between Foucault’s 
work on governmentality and his earlier work that should not be overlooked. Looking back at the 
contextualizations of The Archeology of Knowledge, Discipline and Punish, The History of 
Sexuality, and Society Must Be Defended in the preceding chapters, two elements consistently 
appeared: Foucault’s anti-subjectivist stance and his dissatisfaction with Marxism. One could 
argue that this new-found interest in the question of conduct implicitly rejects this anti-
subjectivism, and that his concern with the state abandons his bottom-up approach to power and 
moves towards a Marxism, ‘which was obsessed with state power, both with fighting the state as 
presently constituted and with seizing state power’ (Kelly 2009: 61). One would be wrong on 
both counts. Although ‘the concentration on government re-introduces the subject by implying 
some focus on the one who governs’ (Kelly 2009: 62), the earlier explanation of power as 
intentional but non-subjective still applies here: the schemes and tactics devised to govern 
should not be confused with the overall outcome of these tactics. As far as the second issue is 
concerned, Foucault’s turn toward the state is not a concession to Marxism that the state 
deserves the central role it has been ascribed, but rather an attempt to show that what is going 
on at the level of the state cannot be reduced to an ‘expression of the all-important domination 
by class’ (Kelly 2009: 62). What Marxism missed was a critique of projects and practices of 
government, which is exactly what the following sections will explore in more detail.  
 
Whereas the discussion above has focused on Foucault’s own work as context, there is of course 
also a world outside of his writings.41 It has now become somewhat commonplace to identify  
 
                                                 
41
 Accompanying the Picador English edition of the lectures is a text from Michel Senellart, which focuses 
on their wider context. Senellart primarily discusses the comments Foucault made on political issues 
around the time he delivered the lectures, including Soviet dissidents, the Iranian revolution, and the case 
of Klaus Croissant, a lawyer for the RAF. However, apart from the fact that these issues seem to have 
concerned Foucault, Senellart does not offer much in the way of a substantial connection between 
Foucault’s feelings about these events and the contents of the lectures. (369-401) 
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a shift in political-cum-intellectual climate in France over this time with the tail-off of 
post-1968 radicalism, and a concomitant shift in Foucault’s own interest, from looking 
at the nefarious social power effects in the prison system and the constitution of 
modern sexuality, to less insidious interpersonal and governmental relations, first in the 
development of modern governmental techniques, and then in ancient ethical practices 
(Kelly 2009: 59).  
 
Although Foucault’s rhetoric when talking about government no longer betrays the urgency with 
which he spoke about disciplinary and biopolitical relations of power, it is my contention that 
there is no fundamental difference in his conceptualization of power. For Foucault, it was always 
already the point that there is no difference between the power relation in the prison and the 
everyday interpersonal encounters in schools or hospitals. If anything, then, the move from a 
focus on privileged sites of power to a perspective on freedom as not the absence of power but 
its ultimate realization is more rather than less radical. It remains to be seen, however, how such 
a focus on freedom plays out in the analyses of colonial power.  
 
6.1.2. Cotext: Sovereignty, Once More 
 
Contrary to Dean’s earlier claim, the continuities with Foucault’s previous studies of power are 
also reflected in the conceptual architecture built around the notion of governmentality. As the 
chapters on discipline and biopower have demonstrated, Foucault developed these concepts 
through an opposition to the notion of sovereignty. In the case of governmentality, the 
mechanism is no different: the entire famous lecture of February 1st 1978 can be understood as 
the opposition between sovereignty and governmentality.42  
However, Foucault’s definition of sovereignty differs slightly from his previous 
conceptualizations. Given that Duncan will take up this opposition of sovereignty and 
government in his analysis of Ceylon, a brief glance at how Foucault constructs this opposition 
seems called for. In the lecture, Foucault does not approach the question of sovereignty head-on, 
but through Machiavelli’s treatise The Prince and the responses leveled at it from the 16th 
century onwards. The Prince, in Foucault’s reading, is a controversial embodiment of the 
medieval understanding of sovereignty. It presents a particular rationale of power that can be 
                                                 
42
 Foucault also briefly mentions disciplinary power (101), but the lecture does not spell out the difference 
between discipline and government.  
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characterized in terms of its object, its target, its goal and its instruments. The object of the type 
of rule Machiavelli propounds is a territory (93): the prince rules over a well-defined stretch of 
land. The target of rule, on the other hand, is formed by the people who happen to live on that 
land: the inhabitants. They are ruled solely in their capacity as subjects living on the prince’s 
territory. The goal of rule is connected to the claim that makes The Prince so controversial: as 
Foucault paraphrases, for Machiavelli ‘there is no fundamental, essential, natural and juridical 
connection between the prince and his principality’ (90). Given that there is no such secure 
connection, the rule of the prince will always be threatened by either other sovereigns looking to 
seize the territory, or by inhabitants who refuse to accept his rule. Thus, the goal ‘of the exercise 
of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality’ (90), or, in other words, to 
protect the link between the prince, his territory and its inhabitants. Although Foucault does not 
elaborate on the tactics deployed to this end, he mentions the law (95) and the sword (96) as two 
crucial instruments to protect the principality and to produce obedient subjects. Importantly, 
such a notion of sovereignty is circular, as Foucault notes: ‘the end of sovereignty is the exercise 
of sovereignty’ (95). In other words, if the prince is only out to protect his principality, there is no 
other strategy or purpose other than a self-referential one.  
This concept of sovereignty differs from the ones presented in Discipline and Punish, The 
History of Sexuality, and Society Must Be Defended in three subtle but significant ways, even 
though each of these three presents a change in emphasis rather than a fundamental conceptual 
change. First of all, we have seen that the concept of sovereignty used to function as a foil to 
specify a type of power that cannot be understood in a juridico-discursive, negative 
conceptualization of power. Throughout The History of Sexuality, Society Must Be Defended, and 
Security, Territory, Population, however, it becomes increasingly clear that sovereignty for 
Foucault no longer refers to a misunderstanding of power, but to a specific set of power relations 
with a rationale of their own.  
A second shift in emphasis is related to the first: sovereignty is no longer a relic from the 
past, unable to capture the dynamics of modern power, but an actual element often recuperated 
in modern strategies of power. This shift, which had already become apparent in Foucault’s 1976 
discussion of the Third Reich as a concatenation of biopower and sovereignty, is emphasized 
more consistently in the governmentality lecture: the sovereign society is not simply replaced by 
a disciplinary society, which is in turn replaced by a society of government (102). Rather, these 
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different modalities of power can interlink, cooperate, or, as Duncan will show, even obstruct 
each other.  
A third and final shift in emphasis relates to the role of violence in Foucault’s account of 
sovereignty. If sovereignty now appears as a form of power with a rationale of its own, if only a 
circular one, the contrast between a negative and a productive power disappears. This more 
consistent development of the idea of a productive power is accompanied by a change in 
rhetoric: sovereignty is no longer solely described in terms of the right to take life or let live, thus 
making the gory description of sovereign torture and execution less prominent. This is not to say 
that Foucault simply erases violence: he still mentions the sword as an important instrument of 
sovereign power. Rather, I would argue that it is the shift from sovereignty as a foil to 
sovereignty as an actual rationale of power that forces Foucault to broaden the characterization 
of sovereignty as the right of death. In its exploration of the concept of governmentality, the next 
section will come back to the place of violence in Foucault’s later work.  
 
6.1.3. Concept: Governmentality and its Problems 
 
Having related the concept of governmentality to both its wider context and the antagonistic 
concept of sovereignty, it is high time to take a closer look at the definition Foucault provides. In 
characteristic fashion, Foucault does not limit himself to one meaning, but provides three 
different meanings for ‘governmentality’:  
 
1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form 
of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led 
towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type 
of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the 
formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in 
the development of a whole complex of savoirs.  
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of 
the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes ‘governmentalized’. (102-103) 
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As Saar points out, ‘it is hard to see how something can meaningfully be said to be an “ensemble” 
of something, a temporal “tendency” and the “result of a process” at the same time’ (2011: 39). 
Yet, contra Foucault’s assertion that with the term governmentality he means ‘three things’ 
(102), I would argue that this threefold quasi-definition implies only one specific signified, 
coupled with a number of additional statements about this signified. The first meaning Foucault 
identifies is the actual definition of a particular power formation, concealed in the second is the 
statement that this particular power formation has become the dominant power formation, and 
the third points out that the predominance of this power formation has had a clear impact on the 
conceptualization of the state.  
Importantly, Foucault only speaks of governmentality as a ‘very specific’ form of power 
(102). This runs counter to Dean’s general definition of governmentality as ‘how we think about 
governing, with the different rationalities or, as it has been sometimes phrased, ‘mentalities of 
government’ (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller 1992)’ (24). The specific modality of power 
Foucault is after can be contrasted to sovereignty based on the parameters utilized earlier in this 
study: object, target, goals, and instruments. First of all, whereas sovereignty had a territory as 
its object and its inhabitants as the targets of rule, governmentality dissolves the distinction 
between territory and inhabitants with the notion of a population. Indeed, a population does not 
thrive or perish independent of its surroundings: it is the relation between human beings and 
their milieu that stands at the centre of government (100).  
Second, unlike with sovereignty, government has a purpose that is extrinsic to the 
existence of government itself. Its ultimate end is not to protect or reinforce governmentality, 
‘but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, 
longevity, health, etc.’ (100). Although such a claim makes governmentality appear identical to 
what Foucault had called biopower, the fact that he mentions not only health but also wealth 
indicates that what we have here is a formation of power that, besides biology, also incorporates 
a notion of economy. 
This takes us to the final point of comparison: whereas sovereignty had the sword and 
the law as its primary instrument, governmentality relies on a form of knowledge that would 
come to be known as political economy:  
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The new science called political economy arises out of the perception of new networks 
of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory, and wealth; and 
this is accompanied by the formation of a type of intervention characteristic of 
government, namely intervention in the field of economy and population. (101) 
 
The term ‘economy,’ which in the sixteenth century used to refer to the government of the 
family (92), returns in the eighteenth century as a designation for the knowledge of the 
population and its management. Unlike sovereignty, this idea of government as management 
does not use the law to enforce obedience, but uses what we have called the whole apparatus of 
security to arrange things in such a way that the level of reality one calls economy can realize its 
full potential.  
Having located the definitional meaning of governmentality and its relation to 
sovereignty, the time has come to outline the particularities of the concept of governmentality as 
a tool for analysis. Foucault leaves little doubt as to what he considers the central advantage: the 
concept offers a perspective on the state and its ‘governmentalisation’ (103). The state does not 
have the unity it has been endowed with, and appears instead as an ensemble of projects and 
practices that can neither be separated from the knowledge and management of the population, 
nor from the general apparatus of security.  
Indeed, practices of government cannot be located solely in the state as institution, but 
pervade the entire social fabric. Practices of rule are not the privilege of the prince, but are 
rather ‘multifarious and concern many kinds of people: the head of a family, the superior of a 
convent, the teacher or tutor of a child or pupil’ (91). Moreover, even the relation to the self can 
be understood as a relation of government, when individuals attempt to conform to proper 
standards of behaviour. Thus, Foucault traces a continuity between the management of the 
population and the management of the self, which explains his later definition in “The Subject 
and Power” of governmentality as the conduct of conduct: ‘to govern, in this sense, is to 
structure the possible field of action of others’ (221). It is this line of thought that will eventually 
lead to Foucault’s interest in ethics, understood as the relation to the self. In the lecture we are 
concerned with here, however, the emphasis lies on the state rather than the possibilities for the 
self. Still, the notion of power as the ability to structure the field of action of others will take on 
extra significance in colonial government. 
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A second feature of this perspective that will turn out to be absolutely crucial in reading 
Scott and Duncan relates again to the projects and practices of government. As Gordon puts it 
concisely, for Foucault ‘government is not just a power needing to be tamed or an authority 
needing to be legitimized. It is an activity and an art which concerns all and which touches each’ 
(Burchell & Gordon 1991: x). And: ‘Governmentality is about how to govern. Foucault continues 
here his predilection for ‘how’ questions, for the immanent conditions and constraints of 
practices’ (7). Needless to say, these how-questions imply a perspective that is completely 
different from the critique of ideologies and discourses that seek to legitimize the power of the 
state. Rather than its legitimization, it is the activities, technologies, and tactics of government 
that enter into focus. 
 
Promising though this governmentality perspective may be, it is not entirely without its 
problems. Although it renders visible the arsenal of tactics and techniques that constitute the art 
of government, it casts new shadows over other phenomena. In Foucault, Governmentality, and 
Critique (2011), Thomas Lemke devotes an entire section to the problems, limitations, and 
blindspots that plague studies of governmentality. The focus of his survey lies primarily on the 
issues arising in the work of those scholars that have picked up on Foucault’s work, rather than 
on Foucault’s work per se. The remainder of this section will therefore attempt to determine to 
what extent the issues Lemke detects can be traced back to Foucault’s 1978 lectures, before we 
move on to an analysis of how Scott and Duncan ignore, negotiate, or remedy these blindspots.  
The first of the problems Lemke discusses relates to the relationship between 
sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality. As the cotextual section has pointed out, Foucault 
insisted in his lecture of February 1st, 1978, that the power formation he calls governmentality 
does not replace the older formations of sovereignty and discipline. Still, Lemke identifies among 
many authors ‘a line of interpretation’ arguing that ‘discipline and sovereignty will sooner or later 
be replaced by governmental technologies’ (89). Foucault cannot be excused here: in spite of his 
warning mentioned earlier, he still concludes the lecture with reference to ‘a governmental state’ 
that follows the sovereign and disciplinary state (104). But there is a second reason for the 
existence of this tendency: if governmentality is a form of power that operates through freedom, 
it presents an extremely efficient mode of power that does not have to control resistance, but 
rather succeeds in eliminating the need for resistance altogether. If relations of power develop 
along the way of least resistance, governmentality is sure to outrun its more heavy-handed 
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competitors such as sovereignty and discipline. As Lemke rightly points out, however, the 
question of what counts as efficiency is the outcome of a power struggle rather than its 
structuring principle (89): the question of what counts as efficiency is itself socially determined. 
Thus, an even more careful and local, historical conceptualization of the multiple possible 
relations between different rationalities of power is absolutely crucial.  
A second, related issue concerns the role of violence in studies of governmentality. With 
the notion of government as a power of freedom that renders the violence of the sovereign 
superfluous, governmentality studies, according to Lemke ‘ignore or underestimate the role of 
violent and “irrational” forms of politics’ (89-90). In his reading, what makes this issue all the 
more pressing is that it overlooks the ways in which violence is not such a relic from the 
sovereign past, but an immediate and automatic counterpart to the freedom governmentality 
distributes. Based on Mariana Valverde’s 1996 argument that ‘the constitution of the liberal 
subject (…) makes it possible to govern “backward” or “primitive” races, classes, or sexes in order 
to bring them up to the level of autonomous liberal subjects,’ Lemke concludes that liberty and 
domination are ‘two sides of the same coin in liberal governmentality’ (90). Thus, much like the 
idea discussed in the previous chapter of the violence inherent to biopower, the violent side of 
governmentality should not be overlooked either. Here too one faces the problem of explaining 
why certain regimes are more violent than others if domination and freedom are inextricably 
connected. As Duncan’s analysis of colonial governmentality will show, there are other ways in 
which the critique of violence can be brought back into the conceptual architecture of 
governmentality without creating this problem.  
Third, studies of governmentality do not always take into account the disturbances and 
ruptures of government. Lemke observes that ‘some authors tended to treat programs as closed 
and coherent entities, as achievements and accomplishments rather than as projects and 
endeavours’ (91). Perhaps this tendency can be attributed to a misunderstanding of Foucault’s 
claims at the end of the lecture of February 1st about the rise of the state of government: 
although the coming into being of the state of government could be interpreted as the 
realization of the program of governmentality, it can more productively be understood as the 
intentional but non-subjective outcome of a multitude of coalescing projects and reflections. This 
also explains why a ‘focus on failure is not sufficient’ (Lemke 92): although useful as a corrective 
to the notion of governmentality as a fully realized program, such a focus fails to appreciate the 
extent to which failure is already a part of the dynamic of governmentality. Indeed, the crux of 
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the matter is not that programs can fail to be realized, but that governmental processes of 
calculation and management develop in certain directions on the basis of what is perceived to be 
effective and what is not.  
Still, the tendency to ignore the ruptures and disturbances of government cannot be 
attributed to a mere misreading of Foucault alone. In the lecture that has become so famous, 
there is little mention of the gaps and incoherencies of power – a problem that, as we have seen, 
already plagued Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. Ironically though, Foucault has 
never devoted as much attention to resistance as in the Security, Territory, Population lectures. 
The entire lecture of March 1st, 1978  focuses on what Foucault has called ‘counter-conduct’ 
(201). Having located pastoral power as one of the main constituents of governmentality, 
Foucault notes that both pastoral power and governmentality have developed a number of 
procedures and techniques to conduct the conduct of individuals. He then continues to analyze 
resistance, no longer as a theoretical axiom as in ‘where there is power, there is resistance,’ but 
as an equally specific set of procedures and techniques leading to movements that seek ‘to 
escape direction by others and to define the way for each to conduct himself’ (195). It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to explore the forms of counter-conduct Foucault identifies (asceticism, 
communities, mysticism, the problem of the Scripture, and eschatological beliefs). For now, what 
matters is that the tendency of studies of governmentality to overlook forms of resistance can be 
attributed to the isolated, decontextualized publication of only one lecture.  
A fourth problem relates to an issue our discussion of Mbembe has already insisted upon. 
As we have seen, the value of Mbembe’s essay resides to a large extent in its analysis of 
technologies of destruction. Although a similar emphasis on technologies would be possible in 
studies of governmentality, many authors ‘concentrate their investigation on the activity of 
humans while technological devices are regarded as inert and passive’ (Lemke 95). Similarly, 
studies of governmentality tend to focus on human rather than non-human actors. Such an 
emphasis cannot be attributed to Foucault, however: the management of the population he 
focused on should not be confused with the management of human beings, given that the notion 
of a population already implies the link between individuals and their milieu. Thus, 
governmentality for Foucault was a way of managing a set of relations between human and non-
human actors.  
Before we link these issues back to Scott and Duncan, there is one final problem Lemke 
mentions: ‘studies of governmentality were often informed by a “Eurocentrism” […] that ignored 
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non-Western as well as non-liberal contexts’ (Lemke 97). Much like the histories of discipline and 
biopower, the history of governmentality understood as a specific and historical rationale of 
power is a self-contained history of the West. However, throughout the reading of Scott and 
Duncan, the task at hand will no longer be to demonstrate that the colonies have functioned as 
laboratories of modernity, but that it makes sense in the first place to speak of governmentality 
as the power of freedom and conduct in relation to colonial domination.  
 
6.2. David Scott’s “Colonial Governmentality”: The Art of Colonial Government 
6.2.1. Context: Redefining the Problem of Colonialism 
 
David Scott’s 1995 essay “Colonial Governmentality” has a very simple thesis: studies of colonial 
power would benefit from Foucault’s concept of governmentality in historicizing strategies of 
colonial rule. Scott develops this argument in three steps: first, he demonstrates how critiques of 
colonialism have focused exclusively on the question of difference, at the expense of a broader 
understanding of colonial power. Second, he proposes the concept of governmentality as a 
remedy. A final section seeks to demonstrate the advantages of this approach through an 
analysis of modern colonial power in Sri Lanka.  
Conspicuously absent in this argument is the overt attempt to go beyond Foucault: 
although Scott clearly deploys the concept of governmentality in an area Foucault did not 
consider, unlike in the work of Said, Mitchell, Kaplan, Stoler and Mbembe, there is no explicit 
contestation of Foucault’s conceptual or historical framework to be found in his essay. The idea 
of the colonies as the laboratories of modernity, developed in amongst others Mitchell and 
Stoler, as a critique of Foucault’s self-contained histories of Europe, is not even hinted at in 
“Colonial Governmentality.” Neither does it raise the question as to whether the notion of power 
as management of the population, presupposing what Foucault calls freedom, makes analytical 
sense in a colonial context. By working through the list of problems Lemke identified in Foucault’s 
work and its reception, the following sections will sketch the consequences of Scott’s rather 
uncritical acceptance of Foucault’s framework.  
As forgiving as Scott may be of Foucault’s potential shortcomings, his criticism of the 
ensemble of texts and arguments commonly gathered under the rubric of postcolonial studies is 
fundamental. This is not to say that Scott distances himself from the academic critique of 
colonialism, but – to the contrary – that he deems the ways in which this critique has been 
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conducted to be insufficient. Scott illustrates his dissatisfaction primarily through Partha 
Chatterjee’s essay “The Colonial State,” published in The Nation and its Fragments (1993). 
Chatterjee begins his analysis of the colonial state with the following question: ‘Does it serve any 
useful analytical purpose to make a distinction between the colonial state and the forms of the 
modern state?’ (14). The answer Chatterjee offers is an unambiguous yes: if we understand 
colonial power as merely another version of modern power, colonial power would be of ‘only 
incidental, or at best episodic, interest; it would not be a necessary part of the larger, and more 
important, historical narrative of modernity’ (14). Thus, the problem Chatterjee sets out with is 
marking the specificity of colonial power as a strategy of rule distinct from modern power. For 
Chatterjee, what sets colonial power apart from modern power is the importance of what he 
calls the ‘rule of colonial difference’ (16): the implicit colonial principle that not all subjects of the 
state are entitled to the same rights and status. Underlying this principle of difference is the 
category of race.  
The example Chatterjee provides of the rule of difference is worth going into, given that 
both Scott and Duncan will provide alternative interpretations of this or similar cases. Here is 
Chatterjee’s description of the so-called Ilbert Bill Affair:  
 
In 1882 Behari Lal Gupta, an Indian member of the civil service, pointed out the 
anomaly that under the existing regulations, Indian judicial officers did not have the 
same right as their British counterparts to try cases in which Europeans were involved. 
Gupta’s note was forwarded to the Government of India with a comment from the 
Bengal government that there was “no sufficient reason why Covenanted Native 
Civilians, with the position and training of District Magistrate or Sessions Judge, should 
not exercise the same jurisdiction over Europeans as is exercised by other members of 
the service.” (…) [A]fter more or less routine consultations, Ilbert, the law member, 
introduced in 1883 a bill to straighten out the regulations. (20)  
 
Thus, a government intervention attempted to suspend the rule of difference and install a liberal 
state with free and equal subjects, regardless of race. However, a storm of protest from 
European planters and traders against the loss of their special privileges forced the government 
to reconsider: the bill was altered to such an extent that the rule of difference became even 
more manifest than before the introduction of the bill.  
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For Chatterjee, the conclusion is that this failure signals ‘the inherent impossibility of 
completing the project of the modern state without superseding the conditions of colonial rule’ 
(21). He thus not only establishes an opposition between colonial and modern power, but also 
points to the insignificance of modern liberal rule in the colony: the attempts to install a society 
of free and equal subjects were flimsy and unsuccessful in comparison to the dominance of the 
rule of difference. The implicit consequence is that critiques of colonialism should focus on the 
rule of difference rather than the insignificant attempts to install modern power.  
Scott’s essay contains three main objections to this argument. First, while Chatterjee is 
right to claim that the specificity of colonial rule should not be overlooked, there is no reason 
why one should accomplish this through offsetting up modernity and colonialism as a binary 
opposition. Not only does such an opposition render colonialism as ‘a singular reiterated 
instance’ disconnected from the logic of modernity, begging the question of whether the whole 
enterprise was entirely contingent, it also homogenizes colonial power as an unaltered and 
uncontested rule of difference. Finally, it makes a sustained historicization of Europe’s power 
impossible, given that rationalities of power can only be understood as the result of the 
interaction of Europe with its colonies. Through the concept of governmentality, Scott aims to 
avoid these problems and to historicize colonial power in relation to multiple rationalities of rule 
as opposed to exclusively focusing on the rule of difference.  
 
In order to understand the place of Scott’s essay in the intertextual web we have been analyzing 
throughout the previous chapters, it is crucial to note how Scott’s engagement with Chatterjee is 
indicative of his much broader dissatisfaction with critiques of colonialism. The exclusive focus on 
the rule of difference Scott laments is not restricted to Chatterjee alone, but rather informs two 
major strands of colonial critique. The first one Scott identifies is the body of work that, in the 
wake of Said’s Orientalism, has analyzed how colonial discourse, through the creation and 
representation of difference, denies voice and agency to the colonized. A second strand has 
emphasized the creation of difference in the institutional realm, undermining the myth that 
colonialism installed a society of law and order with free and equal subjects. Thus, for Scott, the 
bulk of what we now know as postcolonial studies is concerned with exposing the 
constructedness of colonial difference and the falsity of its civilizing myth.  
Looking back at the primary texts discussed in the previous chapters, the full extent of 
Scott’s critique becomes apparent: whether it is Said, Bhabha, Stoler or Mbembe one calls up, all 
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of the texts analyzed partially or completely belong to the two strands Scott identifies. The 
critique of discourses and practices of othering that informs a wide array of texts from Said to 
Stoler is a manifestation of the notion of a rule of difference and corresponds to the first strand; 
the second strand and its focus on exclusion from the legal state correspond to Mbembe’s 
emphasis on the state of exception.43 Consequently, Scott’s criticism is not only a criticism of a 
single text from Chatterjee, but of a major trend within the postcolonial studies under analysis 
here: it implicitly applies to Said’s Orientalism and Bhabha’s “The Other Question” (both Chapter 
3) and to Stoler’s Race and the Education of Desire and Mbembe’s “Necropolitics” (both Chapter 
5).  
The one exception is perhaps Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt, where the idea of a 
rule of difference does not dominate the argument. As chapter 5 has indicated, Mitchell is not at 
all concerned with staking out the singularity of colonial power: to the contrary, what Colonising 
Egypt discusses is exactly colonial power as modern power. The idea that colonial power is linked 
with modern power is something Scott and Mitchell clearly share, leading both scholars away 
from the common focus on the rule of difference.44 However, whereas Mitchell presented an 
understanding of modernity as a single principle, Scott aims to flesh out the multiple rationalities 
that constitute modern and colonial power.  
This idea of multiple rationalities can once again be explained through the example of the 
Ilbert case: if there was a documented government effort to introduce a liberal and egalitarian 
regime, can these efforts be dismissed as a colonial myth? Or would it make more sense 
analytically to give up the idea of colonialism as a single rationale of power? Did planters, traders, 
and government agents perhaps possess competing interests? It is these and other questions 
Scott would like to approach with the perspective of governmentality.  
 
6.2.2. Cotext: Exit Sovereignty?  
 
In order to break up Chatterjee’s monolithic conceptualization of colonial power, Scott draws on 
Foucauldian concepts to differentiate multiple rationalities of power. Like Foucault, he 
                                                 
43
 Needless to say, Scott’s essay does not actually refer to Mbembe, since the latter’s essay had not been 
published at the time Scott was writing. Still, it shows how Mbembe’s notion of animal life as the exclusion 
from the realm of the political is indebted to a tradition of critiques of colonialism as a rule of difference.  
44
 This affinity is marked by an affirmative reference in “Colonial Governmentality” to Mitchell’s Colonising 
Egypt. (216, n12).  
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distinguishes between sovereignty, discipline and governmentality. In a first section of the essay, 
Scott rehearses Foucault’s schematic outline of the relations between these concepts (202-203). 
Much more revealing than his summary, however, is the brief exploration of sovereignty and 
discipline in a colonial context. In a short overview of the history of colonial Sri Lanka, Scott sets 
off the rationale of governmentality against the older sovereign strategy of rule. Thus, much like 
in Foucault’s lecture of February 1st, the concept of discipline recedes into the background and 
the entire conceptual architecture becomes organized around the opposition between 
sovereignty and governmentality.  
Colonial sovereignty, for Scott, is a rationale of power which has as its principle object 
“the extraction of tribute for the security and aggrandizement of the State and Crown” (207). 
One recognizes here the circularity of sovereignty discussed earlier: the sole objective of power is 
to fortify power. The points of application of this sovereign power coincide with the territory that 
holds resources, and the people who can extract them. As Scott points out, ‘on this strategy of 
rule, the “lives” of the colonized population – their “local habits,” their “ancient tenures,” their 
“distinctions” and “religious observations” – were not a significant variable in the colonial 
calculus (at least so long as they did not interfere with the immediate business of extraction)’ 
(207). Or, to put it succinctly, what is absent and irrelevant in this manifestation of colonial 
power is the knowledge and management of the population.  
In Scott’s account, this rationale is displaced by governmentality rather than 
complemented by it. What Scott’s analysis of multiple rationalities boils down to is the simple 
‘displacement of one kind of political rationale – that of mercantilism or sovereignty – by another 
– that of governmentality’ (207). In this story of chronological displacement, the Colebrooke-
Cameron reforms, a set of economic and juridical measures taken by the British government of 
Ceylon in 1833, mark the break for Scott between sovereignty and governmentality. These 
reforms, which initiated the ‘unification of the administration of the island, the establishment of 
Executive and Legislative Councils, judicial reform, and the development of capitalist agriculture, 
modern means of communication, education, and the press’ (206), also signal the break between 
pre-modern and modern Ceylon in most accounts of the history of Sri Lanka.45 But whereas these 
                                                 
45
 The example Scott gives of this tendency is that of C. C. Mendis, ‘the first modern professional (and 
liberal-nationalist) Sri Lankan historian’ (206).  
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accounts heralded the reforms as an ‘advancement,’46 Scott reads the break in terms of a shift in 
the rationale of power.  
Summing up, then, the conceptual architecture of “Colonial Governmentality” consists in 
the opposition between sovereignty and governmentality and the parallel opposition between 
the pre-modern and the modern. These two pairs can be superimposed: sovereignty is the pre-
modern rationale, governmentality is the modern strategy of rule. The link between these two 
pairs can be found in Scott’s definition of modern power, borrowed from Talal Asad: ‘modern 
power is distinctive not so much for its relation to capitalism, as varieties of modernization 
theory have it,’ but for having the conditions in which people live as its point of application (198-
199). It does not command people into obedience, but structures the space in which they can 
make decisions – a similar process to that which Foucault described as the conduct of conduct. In 
this sense, Scott presents modernity and governmentality as closely connected and it becomes a 
necessity to situate colonial power in relation to modernity: pre-modern and modern 
rationalities of power lead to pre-modern and modern configurations of colonial power.  
 
Still, it remains to be seen to what extent Scott manages to avoid the homogenization he 
accuses Chatterjee of. As we have discussed in relation to Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt, 
simply opposing the pre-modern to the modern in turn has a homogenizing effect. Although 
Scott seems aware of this problem and attempts to avoid it by speaking of ‘modernities’ to stress 
the many shapes modernity can assume (198), the understanding of modernity as 
governmentality still reduces these shapes to one common rationale, viz. the conduct of conduct. 
All in all, it seems that Scott’s efforts to stress the multiple rationales of power yield a rather one-
dimensional image of modern colonial power.  
Although Scott’s distinction between pre-modern and modern power is a potentially 
useful one, it is my contention that homogenizations of colonial power cannot be avoided unless 
one makes provision for rationales of power that co-exist or struggle rather than simply replace 
one another. This relates to the first of the problems Lemke identified in governmentality 
studies: Scott too falls into the trap of assuming a straight succession of rationales of power, 
rather than a space of competition or symbiosis. The second, related problem is also present: the 
presupposition that governmentality displaces sovereignty leaves little room in his account for an 
                                                 
46
 Scott quotes Mendis, who has argued that ‘the reforms recommended by Colebrooke and Cameron have 
contributed greatly to the advancement of Ceylon’ (206). 
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exploration of how the rule aimed at the extraction of wealth never entirely gave way to the 
conduct of conduct. How can we think these rationalities in tandem? It is a question to which the 
discussion of Duncan’s work will return.  
 
6.2.3. Concept: Governmentality as Modern Colonial Power 
 
Having situated the concept of governmentality in relation to sovereignty and modernity, the 
time has come to take a closer look at the meanings, functions, and effects of Scott’s notion of 
governmentality itself. As the above section has pointed out, the conceptual architecture of 
“Colonial Governmentality” is very similar to the one constructed in Foucault’s lecture. It 
therefore should come as no surprise that Scott’s definition of governmentality does not differ 
substantially from Foucault’s: ‘governmentality’ for Scott refers to the ‘government of conduct’ 
(200). Unlike with Dean, then, Scott does not use the term to refer to the various ways of ‘how 
we think about power’ or different ‘mentalities of government,’ but to the same specific 
rationale of power Foucault discussed in the lecture. What characterizes this rationale is that it 
does not attempt to enforce obedience, but rather tries to structure the field of possible actions 
of others. In this sense, Scott too abandons the familiar anti-thesis of power and freedom. In a 
simple opposition of freedom and power, he argues, 
 
what gets elided is the emergence of a new – that is, modern – political rationality in 
which power works not in spite of but through the construction of space of free social 
exchange and through the construction of a subjectivity normatively experienced as the 
source of free will and rational, autonomous agency. It is this idea of a form of power, 
not merely traversing the domain of the social, but constructing the normative (i.e., 
enabling/constraining) regularities that positively constitute civil society, that Michel 
Foucault tries to conceptualize in his work on “governmentality.” (201, emphasis in 
original) 
 
The question we have been hinting at is of course whether colonial power really operated 
through the construction of such an autonomous subject, or whether it kept natives in a state of 
absolute objecthood. After all, as Chapter 4 has shown, part of the appeal of Discipline and 
Punish to postcolonial studies was its description of a rationality of power that worked on the 
body as an object: arranging bodies so as to discipline them into obedience may therefore sound 
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more like a description of colonial power than the construction of autonomous subjects does. 
Moreover, the entire point of Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics has been to criticize the status 
of the colonized as animal life, an intermediate stage between objecthood and subjecthood 
excepted from a political and legal society made up of free and equal subjects. How, then, can 
Scott draw on this conceptualization of governmentality in an analysis of colonial power?  
His analysis of colonial Ceylon does not deny the existence of rationalities of power 
working on colonial subjects as objects, but rather seeks to demonstrate that the Colebrooke-
Cameron reforms mark not only the break between pre-modern and modern power, but also 
between a power that needed disciplined and obedient subjects (or, rather, objects) and a 
government that created the notion of autonomous subjects. Needless to say, colonial 
governmentality never stopped to display a manifest will to power – what changed with the 
Colebrooke-Cameron reforms is the strategy of power: rather than  coerce natives into 
obedience, this new rationality of power attempted to create the conditions in which ‘following 
only their own self-interest, natives would do what they ought’ (214). In this sense colonial 
power is not the conduct of bodies, but the conduct of conduct.  
Through an analysis of Ceylon’s government, economy, and legal system after the 
Colebrooke-Cameron reforms, Scott demonstrates convincingly that the governmental 
production of liberal subjects was not an exclusively European process. First, in the realm of 
government, Scott notes the importance of the press in Colebrooke’s plan: a free press would 
contribute to the public circulation of reason and therefore enhance participation of the public in 
politics (210). Second, in the economic realm, the sovereign system based solely on the 
extraction of wealth had established a government monopoly on certain goods and employed 
natives in a system of compulsory service. Colebrooke argued that such a system prevented the 
growth of the economy and obstructed the natives from looking after their own needs. The 
alternative he proposed was free exchange between free subjects (210). Third, he advocated a 
legal system where natives could judge and be judged (211). The point here is neither that justice 
was served in the colony (as the civilizing myth would have it) nor that it was not (as Chatterjee 
rightly points out in his interpretation of the Ilbert case): like the free press and free trade, the 
installation of a legal system is a strategy of power working towards a society of free and 
reasonable subjects, who, by following their own interests, further the interest of the colony.  
In this way, Scott undermines the story of colonial progress, not through a dismissal of 
efforts to create a liberal society, but by acknowledging how these efforts are the strategy of 
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power rather than a march towards freedom. The concept of governmentality should therefore 
not be misunderstood as positing the existence of the autonomous subject, and the free 
exchange and legal system that accompany it – such a position in a colonial context would be 
quite absurd. Rather, the concept can be used to look into the efforts to create these notions and 
the strategies of power they work towards.  
 
Such a reading of colonial power, compressed as it may be, has a number of crucial 
implications for postcolonial studies in general, and the texts discussed in previous chapters in 
particular. Besides Scott’s dissatisfaction with a homogenizing study of colonial power as the rule 
of difference, there are at least three other implications of “colonial governmentality” he fails to 
spell out consistently. Each of these three can be linked back to one or more postcolonial 
appropriations of Foucault, illustrating once more what a huge mistake it would be to assume a 
continuity between Said, Bhabha, Mitchell, Kaplan, Stoler, and Mbembe, simply because they all 
draw to varying extents on Foucault. It is my contention that a reading of “Colonial 
Governmentality” as a critique of these appropriations is the more productive exercise.  
First of all, Scott’s essay clearly shows that colonial power cannot be reduced to the 
interplay between authority and identity. Although the basic Saidian scheme of constructed 
identities that lend the colonizer his authority is no doubt a valuable tool, it should not be 
confused with a systematic analysis of power as a set of discourses and practices with a specific 
rationale and strategy. Not only does the exclusive focus on identity and authority ignore the 
various tactics of governing a population, it also ignores the ways in which modern colonial 
power attempted to structure the possible field of actions of colonial subjects. In short, whereas 
postcolonial studies has devoted a great deal of attention to the stories and identitarian politics 
that created colonial authority and legitimacy, the various tactics and strategies of rule have 
been reduced to a homogeneous rule of difference. Even Stoler’s work, which draws on 
Foucault’s concept of biopower, hardly looks into the actual management of the population, but 
uses this notion to study the biopolitical component of colonial authority. By contrast, Scott’s 
deployment of governmentality turns our attention towards the art of government, the 
reflections, discourses and practices of governing the relations between men and things. 
Gordon’s earlier claim that ‘government is not just (…) an authority needing to be legitimized,’ 
but rather ‘an activity and an art which concerns all and touches each’ (x) attains its full 
significance here: colonial government and colonial authority cannot be reduced to one another.  
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Second, this distinction between government and authority considerably complicates the 
task of postcolonial critique: it no longer suffices to expose the lies on which authority has been 
built, one must also reveal the tactics and strategies of government. In the legal realm, a focus on 
governmental projects such as the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms reveals that it is insufficient to 
dismiss attempts to set up a legal system accessible to all subjects as a colonial myth, or to read 
these efforts as the legitimization of colonialism. Rather, what is at stake is a mode of subject-
constitution that is not the simple outcome of a Self-Other dichotomy, but of a strategy of power 
Foucault described as the conduct of conduct. Given that such a conceptualization of power does 
away with the old opposition between domination and freedom, the task is no longer to fight 
domination, but to understand the ways in which even the notion of freedom can be structured 
along governmental lines.  
Third, with the concept of governmentality, it becomes essential to historicize 
rationalities of power. This does not only involve steering clear of homogenizations of colonial 
rule across continents and through centuries, but also taking into account governmental 
strategies as they manifested in Europe, not because they constitute the original that has 
subsequently been copied, but because various modes of power create various modes of 
affecting the lives of the colonized (198). Consider, for instance, the case of Mbembe’s 
“Necropolitics”: to what extent does it make sense to presuppose what Foucault describes as 
biopower in Europe, and then to propose a notion of necropolitics that is somehow an inversion 
or the negative of this form of power? In part, this is the problem already hinted at in the 
previous chapter – of an implausible geographical boundary between different rationalities of 
power. But, having read Scott’s “Colonial Governmentality,” it also becomes harder to conceive 
of a rationale of power aimed solely at death and destruction. Provisional though Scott’s analysis 
may be, it clearly demonstrates that colonial governmentality in Ceylon cannot be grasped 
exclusively in terms of necropolitics.  
This is where the notion of a ‘project’ comes in: 
 
In any historical instance, what does colonial power seek to organize and reorganize? In 
other words, what does colonial power take as the target upon which to work? 
Moreover, for what project does it require that target-object? And how does it go about 
securing it in order to realize its ends? In short, what in each instance is colonial 
power’s structure and project as it inserts itself into – or more properly, as it constitutes 
– the domain of the colonial? (Scott 197, emphasis in original) 
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Although Scott’s notion of colonial power manifesting in specific projects may overstate the 
coherence of power, the notion of a project can be of use in highlighting the fact that the activity 
of government takes place in relation to expectations, calculations, imaginations, and reflections. 
Studying the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms as a project reveals a set of tactics that cannot be 
reduced to either a legitimizing story or a rule of difference and destruction.  
 
Importantly, the claim that colonial power cannot be reduced to pure violence is not concerned 
with a moral evaluation of colonialism: the fact that colonial power at least partially operated 
through attempts to construct a legal system and an economy of free exchange does not make it 
more or less reprehensible – it becomes simply another mode of Europe inserting itself into the 
lives of the colonized. Scott’s way of conducting critique then consists in demonstrating how 
modern colonial power does much more than simply install a rule of difference: it restructures 
the entire field of possible actions of all subjects.  
Still, it is easy to see how certain elements of Scott’s argument can be turned into an 
apology for colonial power: although this is quite obviously not what Scott attempts to do, his 
essay can be partially recuperated in the myth of colonialism as a civilizing mission because it fails 
to deliver on its promise to look into the heterogeneous nature of colonial power. This relates to 
the problem mentioned above of conceptualizing governmentality as a rationale of power that 
displaces all others, which in turn results in the problem of underestimating the issue of violence. 
As we have seen, this blind spot in Scott’s framework can be attributed to his simple opposing of 
sovereignty and governmentality, in which the latter simply displaces the former. But there are at 
least two other factors, previously undiscussed, which exacerbate this problem.  
First of all, while the concept of governmentality clearly has value in explaining the 
rationale behind the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms, it does not explain how a governmental 
rationale could co-exist with a rule of difference seeking to perpetuate strategies of exclusion. If 
governmentality really strives towards a liberal society with the illusion of free and equal 
subjects, how can racial difference still have the impact it does in the present day? Needless to 
say, racial difference did not all of a sudden disappear with the introduction of the reforms, 
which leads us to wonder how the category of race operated in the modern colonial power Scott 
describes. One might object that Scott’s essay could not possibly have addressed such a vexed 
question within the confines of one essay, and this indeed seems to be the case. Still, it is my 
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contention that something much more fundamental is at stake here: Scott’s conceptual 
architecture lacks the ability to explain how the field of possible actions of some subjects is 
different from that of others. In this respect, it does not differ from the work of Foucault: for 
reasons we can only try to guess, Foucault abandoned the concept of race as a split in the 
population somewhere between his lectures on biopower and the lectures on governmentality. 
The result in Scott’s work is an account of colonialism that fails to spell out the tensions and 
interactions between race and governmentality.  
A second effect of Scott’s exclusive focus on the rationale he calls governmentality is that 
he conceives of colonial governmentality as a closed program. Lemke’s earlier observation that 
studies of governmentality often overlook the ruptures and disturbances of government certainly 
applies to “Colonial Governmentality.” Although Scott introduces a concept of resistance as a 
response to the structure of the field of possible actions (198), he does not elaborate on what 
such a resistance in Ceylon could have looked like. Moreover, he only mentions this resistance in 
relation to the native population, but if governmentality presented as substantial a change in the 
social fabric as Scott makes it out to have, there is no reason to assume that only the native 
population may have resisted governmental reason. Quite to the contrary, if we return to the 
Ilbert case once more, one observes that non-state white actors explicitly opposed the Ilbert bill 
and effectively managed to alter government policy. Clearly, the governmental attempts to 
conduct the conduct of the population in such a way that the interests of the subjects coincide 
with the interests of the state failed in this particular instance: the white subjects that protested 
against the Ilbert bill did not want to relinquish their privileges and therefore opposed the 
creation of a legal system.  
Moreover, the analysis of resistance to governmentality should not be confined to 
resistance offered by human actors. This is the fourth problem Lemke had identified, in a colonial 
setting: governmentality as a form of modern power in the colonies can be seen as a rationale of 
power that must confront obstacles with which it is not familiar. One can think here in particular 
of the climate of the tropics, which caused great anxiety about degeneration, the unknown 
diseases that plagued colonial officials, and the vast geographical distances between settlements 
that complicated efforts to enforce the rule of law.  
Summing up, Scott’s “Colonial Governmentality” opens up a  problem-space that is not 
only different from the questions of authority-as-identity posed by Said, Bhabha and Stoler, but 
also raises productive questions about exclusively focusing on colonialism as violence, as found in 
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Mbembe’s “Necropolitics.” However, in focusing on governmentality only, Scott reproduces 
exactly the mistake he accuses others of: his essay reduces colonial power to one single principle. 
Moreover, although “Colonial Governmentality” and its schematic analysis of colonial Ceylon can 
be read as an invitation to scholars to adopt the concept of governmentality in the analysis of 
colonial power, Scott himself seems to have abandoned this project in subsequent years. The 
essay itself was republished a number of times, but Scott’s later work has thus far not gone any 
further with its own proposal. Is this where Duncan can step in?  
 
6.3. Duncan and Governmentality: Negotiating Scott’s issues 
6.3.1. Context: Broadening the Picture 
 
James Duncan’s In the Shadows of the Tropics (2007) constitutes a central node in the 
intertextual web we have been discussing. Not only does it develop Scott’s work to provide more 
substantial treatment of colonial governmentality, it also broadens the picture in the sense that it 
connects the concept of governmentality to many of the ideas and concepts discussed in the 
previous chapters. Indeed, in Duncan’s work, many familiar elements return: Said and Stoler’s 
focus on identity, Mitchell and Scott’s emphasis on modernity, Stoler’s concern with biopolitics, 
and Mbembe’s invocation of the work of Agamben all contribute to Duncan’s analysis of colonial 
power.  
However, this is not to say that Duncan simply lumps all of these perspectives and 
concepts together. I want to argue, rather, that his primary strategy is one of differentiation, 
which plays out on at least two levels. First, Duncan’s discussion of authority and power makes it 
clear that different scholars have been referring to different issues in discussions of colonial 
power. Second, even within these different conceptualizations of power, one still needs to 
differentiate strategies and rationales of power. The following sections aim to demonstrate how 
this process of differentiation is both one of distinguishing between scholars and concepts, and 
of bringing them together in a single conceptual architecture.  
In the Shadows of the Tropics is a study of colonial power and authority in 19th century 
Ceylon, focused on the attempts of British colonists to set up ‘modern forms of bureaucracy, 
governmentality and biopower’ (1). Given that Ceylon in the 19th century developed into a 
plantation economy that depended almost entirely on the export of coffee, Duncan is particularly 
interested in the relations of power between government officials, planters of European descent, 
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the native population, and immigrant labourers coming from India to work on the plantations. He 
investigates the tactics Europeans used to discipline labourers, as well as the techniques 
labourers developed in response. Similarly, in the biopolitical realm, he analyzes how 
government officials installed systems of surveillance to keep disease in check, and the tactics 
natives employed to avoid this medical gaze. Furthermore, special attention is dedicated to the 
tense power relations between government officials and planters of European descent, whose 
private interests did not always coincide with those of the government. In short, the overall 
picture is one of tensions, struggle, and the inability of one group of actors to concentrate power. 
Add to this a host of diseases potentially fatal to human beings (e.g. cholera), and a fungus that 
would destroy entire coffee plantations, and it becomes apparent that colonial attempts to install 
a modern regime of power were by no means a guaranteed success.  
Although such a focus on tensions and difficulties is clearly at odds with Scott’s 
characterization of colonial governmentality as a closed project, there are a number of 
similarities between In the Shadows of the Tropics and “Colonial Governmentality” that should 
not be overlooked. Both Scott and Duncan draw on the opposition between sovereignty and 
governmentality Foucault established in the lecture of February 1st, and apply it to colonial power 
in Ceylon. After acknowledging Scott’s work (29), Duncan follows him in identifying the 
aforementioned Colebrooke-Cameron reforms as the transition from sovereignty to 
governmentality. Although the next section will reveal a disparity in the way they understand this 
transition, it is safe to say that Duncan’s determination to differentiate rationalities and projects 
of colonial power can be traced back to Scott and Foucault.  
On the other hand, Duncan’s treatment of Foucault differs from that of Scott in a 
quantitative sense. Whereas Scott drew almost exclusively on the lecture of February 1st, 1978, 
Duncan casts a wider net and includes references to Foucault’s earlier work on discipline and 
biopower.47 Although Bröckling, Krasmman & Lemke’s general claim that ‘the two central 
Foucaultian notions of government and of biopolitics have generated separate lines of reception’ 
(2011: 23) may hold true in general, it certainly does not apply to In the Shadows of the Tropics. 
As the cotextual section will demonstrate, the concept of biopower holds a central place next to 
governmentality in Duncan’s conceptual architecture, with important consequences for the 
picture of colonial power it presents: an emphasis on biopower as the power over life and death 
                                                 
47
 e.g. to “The Eye of Power” (1), “Prison Talk” (20), The History of Sexuality, Vol. I, (44, 67, 169), and 
Discipline and Punish (69). 
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allows Duncan to conceptualize the violent tendency in modern colonial power – an element 
conspicuously absent in Scott’s account. It can therefore be argued that Duncan solves this 
problem by placing the governmentality lectures in the larger context of Foucault’s work. 
Still, such a claim is only partially correct: Duncan does not simply resort to Foucault’s 
work on biopolitics, but also to appropriations of this work, such as Stoler’s transformation of the 
concept of biopolitics, and Agamben’s reconceptualization of the relation between biopolitics 
and sovereignty. References to Agamben (e.g. 68) and Stoler (e.g. 45) once again bear testimony 
to the density of this intertextual web: postcolonial appropriations of Foucault do not only 
consistently refer to specific texts by Foucault, but also to each other. In this particular case, what 
is implied is that Duncan’s use of the concept of biopolitics involves phenomena and problems as 
divergent as the colonial power to kill (after Mbembe and Agamben), the biological and racial 
component of identity formation (after Stoler), and the medical surveillance of populations (after 
Foucault) – or even all three at once.  
Before the cotextual section explores these layers of meaning in more detail, there is one 
final intertext of In the Shadows of the Tropics worth pointing out: James Scott’s Weapons of the 
Weak (1985, not to be confused with the aforementioned David Scott). It focuses on ‘what we 
might call everyday forms of peasant resistance – the prosaic but constant struggle between the 
peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them’ (xvi, 
emphasis in original). This includes ‘the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot 
dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, 
sabotage, and so on’ (xvi). In order to study these tactics, James Scott spent two years in a 
Malaysian village (1978-1980), concluding that studies of resistance have focused 
disproportionally on ‘organized, large scale, protest movements,’ whereas in fact ‘subordinate 
classes throughout most of history have rarely been afforded the luxury of open, organized, 
political activity’ (xv). All too often, such activity has simply been too dangerous and would have 
defeated its purpose: to survive.  
By drawing on this specific notion of resistance, Duncan avoids the problem of presenting 
a totalizing account of power, and shifts the reader’s attention to struggles and power relations 
in everyday life on the coffee estates. This opens up a problem-space that differs considerably 
from the postcolonial studies discussed throughout the previous chapters, which, like Foucault, 
tended to account for the possibility of resistance in theory, but hardly ever explored it in detail. 
The tasks at hand are therefore not only to find out how Duncan connects the various 
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conceptualizations of biopolitics to governmentality, but also to determine how this form of 
resistance plays out in the face of biopolitical and governmental power.  
 
6.3.2. Cotext: Bringing ‘Biopolitics’ Back In 
 
In the Shadows of the Tropics presents a highly complex conceptual architecture. In stark contrast 
to both Foucault’s lecture and Scott’s appropriation of it, Duncan’s architecture cannot be 
reduced to a single opposition between governmentality and its antagonist. Even a minimalist 
abstraction would still require the following concepts besides governmentality: sovereignty, 
discipline, biopower, identity, authority, and race. This section will analyze the implicit 
connections between them, starting from the notion of biopower. Because of its layeredness, the 
concept of biopower reveals not only how Duncan brings together the many intertexts listed 
above in a single conceptual architecture, but also even in a single concept. 
 A first of three layers in Duncan’s concept of biopolitics corresponds to the definitions 
Foucault worked out in The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended. It understands 
biopolitics as the management of the population and the rationale of power aimed at the 
improvement and protection of the health of the population. This layer of meaning dominates in 
the fifth chapter of In the Shadows of the Tropics, titled “The Medical Gaze and the Spaces of 
Biopower” (101-143). It focuses on the efforts of the government to control the spread of 
diseases among the immigrant Tamil labourers, which, due to malnutrition and starvation, were 
particularly vulnerable. A word of explanation is in order here: because the native population of 
Ceylon had little interest in working on the coffee estates, planters recruited Tamil labour from 
south India. These labourers, in a pattern of seasonal migration, made the journey to Ceylon for a 
wage that barely allowed them to survive. This permanent state of famine and migration made 
epidemics a permanent threat. Biopolitical tactics were deployed to gain control over diseases by 
quarantining symptomatic labourers and improving the conditions along migration routes, by 
constructing rest sheds, hospitals, and wells with clean drinking water (113). As with the 
biopower Foucault describes, here too biopolitical tactics rely to a great extent on power-
knowledge. Whereas during the 18th century the first European colonists relied on the native 
Sinhalese medicine, the 19th century saw the rise of a new form of knowledge that required the 
colonists to intervene more directly in the colonial environment: the popular contamination 
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model of disease, which located the cause of disease in environmental conditions, necessitated ‘a 
medical topography, the mapping of diseased environments’ that needed to be sanitized (103).  
 It is easy to see how such a biopolitical rationale can link up with a disciplinary rationale: 
it displays the same concern with the legibility of space Mitchell detected in the British efforts to 
discipline Egypt. Indeed, here too the colonial effort is one of organizing space, through the 
creation of migration routes, medical checkpoints, and quarantine zones. The fact that Duncan 
establishes a strong link between Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and discipline is visible in his 
emphasis on the aspect of surveillance: much like Foucault’s focus on the panoptical qualities of 
the penal regime, what is at stake here is the ‘medical surveillance’ (120) that not only attempted 
to single out labourers showing symptoms of cholera and other diseases, but also established ‘an 
acceptable death rate’ through observation, and put pressure on those planters who exceeded it 
‘to improve food rations and sanitation on estates’ (112). Thus, rather than the displacement of 
discipline by biopower Foucault suggests, Duncan notes their coalescence in the fight against 
diseases in 19th century Ceylon. 
 Duncan’s concept of biopolitics is also closely connected to the notion of 
governmentality, to the extent that biopolitics can even be understood as a subset of 
governmental tactics specifically concerned with health. Duncan speaks of sanitation as ‘a central 
program of governmentality’ (103) and notes that ‘expanding colonial governmentality placed 
the health of labourers as a primary responsibility of the government’ (101). This confirms again, 
contra Dean, that there is no necessary discontinuity between the concepts of biopower and 
governmentality: it is perfectly possible, and as Duncan shows, in the case of Ceylon absolutely 
crucial, to underline the continuity between these rationales of power.  
 Like Foucault, Duncan connects this conceptualization of biopolitics to the notion of race. 
As we have seen, for Foucault the notion of race served as a means to introduce a split in the 
population between those who should be made to live and those that can be left to die. 
However, the fact that Duncan finds the colonial government to have built clean drinking wells, 
rest sheds, and hospitals, problematizes Foucault’s easy distinction: in 19th century Ceylon, the 
efforts to ‘make live’ were directed precisely at the colonized. There is no neat symmetry of a 
biopolitics aimed at the European planters and a necropolitics targeting the Tamil labourers. And 
yet, even this ostensible biopolitical concern with the labourers betrays the form of racism 
Foucault described. In Duncan’s words: 
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One of the central tenets of colonial governmentality was the division of a population 
into subgroups or populations as statistical entities with each having different 
characteristics, different norms, and different needs. It was believed that different 
technologies of power should be brought to bear on these groups depending upon their 
characteristics. Different calculations were used to decide what rates of sickness and 
death were unacceptable, implying that some deaths were acceptable. Tamil plantation 
workers were thought to be sickly by nature and consequently short-lived. (107) 
 
In short, this medical knowledge relieved the colonizer of his biopolitical responsibility; the Tamil 
labourers could be left to die without consequences. Although Duncan uses the concept of 
governmentality here, the idea of the division of the population is structurally identical to the 
mechanism Foucault described with the concept of biopolitical racism in The History of Sexuality, 
vol. I, and Society Must Be Defended. Duncan thus introduces a principle of difference into his 
conceptual architecture, which was strangely absent in Scott’s account of colonial 
governmentality. 
 
A second layer of meaning to be found in Duncan’s concept of biopolitics seems to have more in 
common with Agamben’s reconceptualization of Foucault than with Foucault directly. As we have 
seen in relation to the work of Mbembe, Agamben does not conceive of the relation between 
sovereignty and biopolitics as a historical one, but as a fundamental one: the creation of a 
biopolitical body over which to rule is the originary activity of sovereign power. The foundation of 
the legal realm, as well as its suspension, creates bare life as life outside of the protection of the 
law. The sovereign is then the figure who decides on this exception from the law. All of these 
elements return in In the Shadows of the Tropics. Consider the following passage:  
 
The estates were not ‘spaces of exception’ in the very strong sense that Agamben 
defines them. The state technically had authority over the estates. In effect, however, 
the estates’ economic viability was so closely tied to the viability of the colony, that the 
government granted them a fair degree of autonomy. The planters saw them as 
exceptional and tried to argue that they could most effectively and economically run 
their own affairs. (...) While planters did not have the right to take life, their decisions 
routinely created conditions that caused preventable deaths. Many of their actions 
would, in a court of law today, constitute manslaughter. However, as defacto-sovereign 
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spaces, estates were spaces where the rights of migrant labour were often informally 
suspended.  
 
The coffee plantations are spaces where planters act as local sovereigns and gain power over the 
lives and death of the labourers. They do not necessarily deploy the tactics of destruction 
Mbembe described as necropolitical, but neither do they focus on the optimization of the 
population Foucault referred to as biopolitics. Rather, what is at stake is a power over life that 
aims ‘‘to make survive,’ to use Agamben’s term’ (67): as long as labourers stay alive and perform 
work, no further energy and investment is required.  
 In this second layer of meaning, the concept of discipline is never far away. The fourth 
chapter, in which the Agamben-based notion of biopolitical sovereignty is especially dominant, 
already signals the centrality of discipline in its title, viz. “The Quest to Discipline Estate Labour” 
(67-99). The disciplinary rationale Foucault described finds a colonial counterpart in the efforts of 
planters to structure the plantation as an abstract space (84) with abstract bodies, ‘bodies that 
are made docile, useful, disciplined, rationalised, normalised, and controlled sexually’ (68-69). 
However, and this is the interesting point, Duncan claims that on the coffee estates of 19th 
century Ceylon this disciplinary rationale never acquired the importance Foucault ascribed to it in 
Europe. Observing that planters had found the strategies of producing structured, legible spaces 
ineffective in the environment of the tropics, Duncan notes that planters sought other ways to 
enforce obedience, ‘which they believed required sovereign power within the bounds of the 
estate’ (70). In other words, the planters deployed excessive force to instill fear, rather than the 
subtle and continuous tactics of discipline. This involved beating, flogging, and public humiliation 
(95), which, as biopolitical sovereigns, the planters could do with impunity. It is exactly these 
forms of violence that Scott’s account, based on the concept of governmentality, failed to 
explain. Through Agamben’s notion of a biopolitical sovereignty, Duncan highlights how even 
after the introduction of a modern colonial governmentality, violence continued to play a central 
role in the economy of power.  
 Moreover, the concept of biopolitical sovereignty is also connected to colonial 
governmentality in the sense that both rationalities of power work in tandem. Although 
governmentality might be expected, especially after the Cameron-Brooke reforms, to enforce the 
rule of law throughout the colony, it still allowed the planters to operate as quasi-sovereigns. 
Through the claim that ‘the estates’ economic viability was so closely tied to the viability of the 
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colony, that the government granted [the planters] a fair degree of autonomy,’ Duncan implicitly 
demonstrates how biopolitical sovereignty in Ceylon was not just a pre-modern relic, but a vital 
part of the governmental strategy to maintain the wealth of the part of the population deemed 
worth living.  
 In drawing on the work of Agamben to explain violence in relation to governmentality, 
Duncan not only solves the problem Scott faced, but also presents an interesting variation in his 
use of the concept of biopolitics. In his discussion of the role of violence in studies of 
governmentality, Opitz has argued the following: 
 
faced with the difficulty of explaining the exercise of direct violence in the age of 
governmentality, leading scholars in the field have hitherto resorted to the concept of 
biopolitical racism sketched out by Foucault in the last lecture of his course Society Must 
Be Defended. (2011: 93-94) 
 
By drawing on Agamben and Foucault, as opposed to Foucault alone, the explanatory potential of 
the concept of biopolitics is broadened considerably. The notion of biopolitical racism Opitz 
mentions is, as we noted in the discussion of the first layer of meaning, highly useful in explaining 
the colonial violence that stems from presumed biological knowledge of races. However, it does 
not explain how a biopolitical sovereignty can function at the service of liberal governmentality. 
This is the problem Duncan solves implicitly: the ‘laissez-faire’ strategy of governmentality allows, 
and, in the case of Ceylon, even requires, subjects to assume the role of local sovereigns to run 
the plantations as profitably as possible. The conceptual architecture thus presents not a 
displacement of sovereignty by governmentality, but their symbiosis.  
 
The third and final layer of meaning in Duncan’s concept of biopolitics corresponds to Stoler’s 
appropriation in Race and the Education of Desire. As the previous chapter has argued, for Stoler 
the concept of biopolitics functioned primarily as a means to shed light on the connected notions 
of identity and authority. Focusing on the Dutch East Indies of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, she argued that the construction of European identity and authority was 
predicated on the biopolitical concern with race, gender, and sexuality. Such a focus, I have 
argued, shifts the attention away from the technologies of power Foucault gathered under the 
rubric of biopower, towards the psyche of the colonizer.  
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 A similar operation underlies the third chapter of In the Shadows of the Tropics, titled 
“Dark Thoughts: Reproducing Whiteness in the Tropics” (43-65). Its two epigraphs reveal its 
structure: the first epigraph is a quote from Stoler’s Race and the Education of Desire, the second 
is a quote from Foucault’s governmentality lecture (43). In terms of conceptual architecture, this 
reflects Duncan’s effort to connect Stoler’s concept of biopolitics to the notion of 
governmentality. He accomplishes this through the idea of conduct: as we have seen, for 
Foucault governmentality can be understood as the conduct of conduct. This complements 
Stoler’s emphasis on self-mastery: she argues that the construction of European identity and 
authority relies on the ability of Europeans not to give in to carnal desire. Similarly, Duncan notes 
that ‘controlled self-conduct was seen as necessary for the planter not only to signal his 
authority, but also to present himself as a proper role model for the native elite and ideally for 
the native population as a whole’ (44). However, the life of British planters far away from the 
safe haven of the bourgeois family put pressure on the ability of young male colonists to control 
their passions, and consequently produced ‘anxiety about racial, class, and gendered identities 
and differences’ (44). With this focus on identity and authority, predicated on the government of 
the self, Duncan returns to the critique of difference Scott had sought to replace with the 
framework of governmentality. 
 Nevertheless, there is one crucial difference between Stoler’s approach and Duncan’s: 
the latter does not confuse identity-as-authority with power relations as such. This is worth 
quoting at some length: 
 
I wish to make it clear from the outset that the ambivalent transcultural impacts, 
insecurities, and anxieties found on the margins of the British empire should not in any 
way be conflated with a fragility in the political economy of empire. The British rule over 
this part of empire was secure during this period and consequently our understanding of 
its exploitative impact should not be diminished through attention to British psyches. 
(47) 
 
In making this distinction between psyche and political economy, Duncan introduces the 
possibility of understanding biopolitics not just as a set of technologies working on the 
population (cf. Foucault), or as a set of practices aimed at maintaining European identity and 
authority over the colonized (cf. Stoler), but as both simultaneously, connected by the notion of 
conduct. He thus shows implicitly how the production of racialized and gendered identities and 
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differences is not a phenomenon that runs counter to modern governmentality, but rather 
functions as a process that produces identities along governmental lines: the difference between 
Selves and Others can be articulated in terms of biopolitical knowledge, but also at the same in 
terms of the ability to conduct the Self, with considerable continuity between these two.  
 
Looking back at these three levels, it becomes clear that each of them opens up a different 
problem-space. Not only does each layer dominate one particular chapter of In the Shadows of 
the Tropics, but they also serve to answer different sets of questions and to highlight different 
phenomena. The first one, predominant in Chapter 5 and originating with Foucault, analyses the 
strategies and tactics used by colonial power to ‘make survive.’ The second one, dominant in 
Chapter 4 and linked to Agamben, accounts for colonial violence under modern governmentality. 
Finally, the third layer, dominant in Chapter 3 and linked to Stoler, focuses on the production of 
identity and authority. Duncan’s conceptual architecture brings all of these elements together in 
a framework built around the highly interlinked concepts of biopolitics and governmentality.  
 
6.3.3. Concept: Colonial Governmentality as a Rationale amongst Others 
 
From the conceptual architecture outlined above, it follows that governmentality for Duncan is 
not a rationale of power that displaces all others, but one that interacts with them. Colonial 
governmentality can therefore no longer be conceptualized as a closed programme, but should 
rather be understood as one project among others. This is the central difference between 
Duncan’s concept of governmentality, and Foucault’s and Scott’s. Duncan conceives of 
governmentality as a rationale and a project that encounters resistant rationales, failures, 
disturbances, and physical obstacles. The present section will focus on this reconceptualization 
and the theoretical issues it negotiates. 
 However, before we can even begin to highlight the external obstacles that confront 
governmentality, it is crucial to point out that colonial governmentality itself is not an 
unequivocally unified project. This is not to repeat the familiar (and appropriate) argument that 
colonialism operated differently in different parts of the globe, but rather that colonial 
governmentality in 19th century Ceylon at any time is the result of various tactics and actions that 
reflect the governmental process of decision making and the shifting of priorities. Keeping in 
mind Foucault’s earlier definition of governmentality as a strategy aimed at improving the health 
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and wealth of the population (cf. 1991: 100), it becomes apparent that governmentality on 
Ceylon faced a difficult balancing act between granting the plantation owners free reign and 
intervening to stop the lethal exploitation of labour.  
 This tension within governmentality is also connected to the tension between the 
universalizing ideals of modernity and a continuing rule of difference. Unlike Scott, who 
distinguishes between governmentality and the rule of difference, and fails to explain how they 
can operate together, Duncan presents the rule of difference not as an altogether different 
rationale, but as a crucial part of colonial governmentality at odds with its universalizing 
impulses. Duncan thus claims that ‘while modernity was in the throes of dismantling naturalized 
racial differences and grappling with evolving ideas of citizenship and equality, the tropics cast 
shadows of doubt over these universalizing ideals’ (2). By introducing the question of difference 
again, Duncan complicates Scott’s picture of modernity and governmentality as a way to 
structure the space of possible actions: this structure is always already profoundly racialized, and 
governmentality has its own principle of difference. Governmental knowledge of the population 
and its subgroups creates the conditions for different spaces of possible actions. As Duncan 
argues about one such piece of governmental knowledge, ‘the implication of Van Dort’s report 
was that the Tamil labourers could not be trusted to attend to their own interests. (...) They were 
thus seen as prime candidates for programmes of governmentality to be carried out in the 
estates under orders of the state’ (129). A rule of difference, an identity politics that follows from 
the logic of governmentality, thus operates in balance with the governmental ‘laissez-faire’ 
strategy.  
 As a rationale that vacillates between liberalism and interventionism, colonial 
governmentality competes with the sovereign biopolitics of the planters. Although planters 
operated as defacto sovereigns in their unofficial spaces of exception, this does not mean that 
governmentality and sovereign biopolitics always worked towards the same end. This is worth 
quoting at some length: 
 
From the beginning, planters argued that what was good for the estates was good for 
the colony more generally and this was largely accepted by the government. (...) In the 
early years planters disciplined their workforces as they saw fit. However, increasingly 
pressures were brought to bear on them, by the Government of Ceylon, the Colonial 
Office, and the Government of India to feed workers adequately, to curtail beatings and 
to challenge what the planters believed were acceptable death rates among workers. All 
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of which is to say that the state sought to limit the near sovereign powers of the planters 
over life and death on the estates. (95-96) 
 
With governmentality and sovereign biopolitics as two rationales which at times oppose each 
other, Duncan provides the means to shed light on issues such as the aforementioned Ilbert bill: 
planters can form a pressure group that resists governmental rationale. In the case of 19th 
century Ceylon, Duncan even concludes that ‘the various attempts at expanding governmentality 
had made relatively little difference throughout the coffee period’ because ‘the planters 
undermined it’ (141). These actions of the planters can be seen as acts of resistance to 
governmentality, which was deemed ‘far too bureaucratic and onerous’ (165).  
 To use the concept of resistance in this case may be highly unusual, as the term is usually 
reserved for the actions of the colonized against the colonizer. However, its use here usefully 
signals the fact that colonial power itself is fractured and dispersed. As even planters of European 
descent fought against governmental reason, the notion of governmentality and the resistance 
against it disrupt an unproblematic opposition of colonizer and colonized in terms of rationales of 
power. 
 A second obstacle governmentality encountered was the resistance put up by the native 
population and the Tamil labourers. Here too one has to carefully distinguish between different 
rationales of native resistance: Duncan’s account does not focus on resistance to colonial power 
per se, but on resistance to the different rationales outlined above, even though he does not 
make the distinctions explicit. A first set of tactics can be understood as practices of resistance 
against the planters’ rationale of sovereign biopolitics, aimed at the maximum extraction of 
wealth. This includes foot dragging or feigning illness to avoid work, or even using the legal 
system governmentality installed to collect unpaid wages from the planters (91). A second set are 
the tactics that confront governmentality itself: the practices that undermine the governmental 
attempts to set up modern legal and medical systems. Two examples can illustrate such 
resistance: although the government installed courthouses open to all members of the 
population, the legal system of producing truth and justice in court was seriously compromised 
by the attitude of the local population towards testimony. Indeed, ‘locals believed that other 
factors such as the social position or known character of the defendant and plaintiff should take 
precedence’ over objectivity and truth (163). The result was that the modern governmental 
discourse of justice and equality was continually undermined. The governmental efforts to 
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establish modern medicine shared the same fate: the aforementioned attempts to control 
epidemics by quarantining symptomatic individuals was seen by the Tamil migrants as ‘yet 
another regime of oppressive power to be evaded if possible’ (120). Thus, not only the sovereign 
biopolitics of the planters, but also the rationale of native survival resisted governmentality. 
 Although Duncan does not frame this focus on resistance as a corrective to the work of 
Scott, there is one clearly identifiable difference between Scott and Duncan that enables the 
latter to provide a much more substantial analysis of resistance. As we have seen, Scott’s essay 
posited a displacement of sovereignty by governmentality. Modern colonial governmentality for 
Scott effectively structured the space of possible actions of the population. As such, resistance 
could only be conceptualized as space for manoeuvre within governmental reason. Duncan’s 
example of Tamil labour recurring to the courthouse to collect unpaid wages from the planters is 
one example that fits into such a concept of resistance. However, the fact that natives had been 
reported to hide symptoms of disease shows how analyses of resistance should not be restricted 
to resistance through governmental means, but should also include resistance to 
governmentality. Consider the following passage from Scott’s “Colonial Governmentality”: 
 
In the colonial world the problem of modern power turned on the politico-ethical project 
of producing subjects and governing their conduct. What this required was the 
concerted attempt to alter the political and social worlds of the colonized, an attempt to 
transform and redefine the very conditions of the desiring subject. The political problem 
of modern colonial power was therefore not merely to contain resistance and encourage 
accommodation but to seek to ensure that both could only be defined in relation to the 
categories and structures of modern political rationalities. (214, emphasis in original) 
 
However, In the Shadows of the Tropics implicitly makes it clear that such a restructuring of the 
social was never achieved entirely. With respect to Ceylon, Duncan argues that ‘the attempts to 
produce rationalized bodies for the estates were continually undermined as elements of the 
workers’ networks and ways of life remained intact, serving as important bases for resistance and 
tactics of survival’ (69). Resistance thus follows from the fact that governmentality is not a 
rationale that displaces all others, but one that competes with them.  
 A third source of resistance to governmentality can be found in non-human actors. The 
most important non-human actor in Duncan’s analysis is, without a doubt, the Hemileia 
Vastatrix, a fungus that spread around the island with a devastating effect on the plantations. 
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Governmental efforts to stop the disease were unsuccessful, ultimately knocking Ceylon ‘out of 
the international network of coffee producers’ (191). But less dramatic actors also had a role to 
play: the efforts to structure space on the island were complicated by the fact that ‘most of the 
estates were hundreds of acres in extent and were surrounded by jungle, grasslands, and 
villages,’ and planters ‘could not afford to fence them’ (145). Given that the lands the planters 
had seized formerly served as grazing grounds for cattle, the issue of cattle trespassing soon 
became a major problem, and the planters asked the government to intervene. With 
governmentality resting on a knowledge of the population and its environment, government also 
had an interest in providing a legible, structured space, so it complied with this demand and 
issued legal regulations allowing planters to seize trespassing cattle. However, as Duncan points 
out, ‘the fact that villagers sometimes drove cattle onto an estate to settle a grudge with another 
villager reveals how bureaucratic rules can escape their originally intended purposes and how 
diffuse and fragmented power can be’ (152). 
 More than that, the example reveals how resistance is not necessarily constituted by 
great subversive plans, but can also manifest itself as the unplanned result of certain practices. 
Although Duncan frames his concept of resistance as indebted to the aforementioned Weapons 
of the Weak, it is my contention that it is also structurally similar to the notion of resistance 
Foucault introduced in The History of Sexuality, Vol. I, but hardly developed. As we may recall, 
Foucault understood power as ‘intentional but non-subjective’ (94), which refers to the fact that 
power relations can coalesce or oppose one another in unanticipated ways. Similarly, for 
Foucault there is no master plan behind resistance, ‘no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of 
revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary,’ but instead ‘a plurality of 
resistances’ (95-96). It is this plurality Duncan reveals: resistance of planters to governmentality, 
resistance of labourers to sovereign biopolitics, resistance of the population to governmentality, 
and resistance of non-human actors to governmentality.  
 What is especially salient in this understanding of resistance is that it sees resistance as a 
set of ‘embodied practices’ rather than the struggle against a dominant ideology. In the context 
of postcolonial studies, resistance has often been conceptualized as a matter of ‘speaking’ or 
being heard. A case in point is Ashcroft’s notion of postcolonial ‘counter-discourse’ (2001: 32) 
which challenges colonialist ideology, as is the concern with postcolonial literature as a kind of 
writing back (cf. Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin 1989). The problem with such theories, however, is 
that, as Spivak has demonstrated in the aforementioned “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” the voice of 
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the subaltern is often written out of colonial discourse, with the consequence that it has been 
extremely hard to research anti-colonial resistance. The manner in which Duncan integrates a 
focus on the weapons of the weak into the governmentality framework makes it possible to look 
at practices of resistance that do not hinge upon being heard.  
 
Looking back at the list of problems formulated by Lemke, it becomes apparent that In the 
Shadows of the Tropics negotiates every one of them by complementing Foucault’s lecture of 
February 1st, 1978, with other intertexts, scholars, and concepts, integrating all of them into the 
framework governmentality offered. The first three problems Lemke identified, viz. the notion of 
governmentality as a rationale of power that displaces all others, the obfuscation of violence in 
governmental regimes, and a lack of attention to the ruptures and disturbances of government, 
are all implicitly dealt with by looking at the interaction or confrontation of governmentality with 
other rationalities of power, such as sovereign biopolitics, or the native population’s tactics of 
survival. By counting non-human actors among these ruptures and disturbances of government, 
In the Shadows of the Tropics also sidesteps the fourth problem of focusing exclusively on human 
actors. Finally, by introducing a principle of difference into governmentality, Duncan negotiates 
the Eurocentric perspective of Foucault’s work. The point here is obviously not that Duncan 
‘solves’ all of the problems Lemke listed – Lemke’s list did not even exist at the time In the 
Shadows of the Tropics was published. Rather, juxtaposing Foucault’s lecture, Scott’s “Colonial 
Governmentality,” and Duncan’s In the Shadows of the Tropics, it becomes apparent that the 
concept of governmentality as it appeared in the isolated lecture needed to be contextualized 
and negotiated in order to take into account the fragmented nature of colonial power. 
 
6.4. Conclusion: The Heterogeneity of Colonial Power 
 
Scott’s “Colonial Governmentality” and Duncan’s In the Shadows of the Tropics are just as closely 
connected to the postcolonial texts discussed in the previous chapters as they are to Foucault’s 
work on governmentality. In the case of Scott, this connection with other postcolonial 
appropriations is primarily a negative one: he faults postcolonial studies for reducing colonial 
power to the rule of difference, in both the representational and institutional realms. By 
presenting the concept of governmentality as a means to inspect the rationale and project of 
modern colonial power, Scott manages to raise a set of questions that differs considerably from 
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the analyses of the rule of difference in its various manifestations. However, he fails to point out 
how the rationale of modern governmental power can interact with both the rule of difference 
and the rationales Foucault had described in his earlier work, including sovereignty, discipline, 
and biopolitics. The result is an account that does not draw on the work of Said, Bhabha, Stoler, 
or Mbembe, but simply sweeps it aside. Just as Scott thinks of governmentality as a rationale that 
converts the colony into a blank space, he seems to think of the concept of governmentality as 
one that can simply displace all others. Consequently, his analysis of colonial power in Ceylon 
lacks any real notion that explains difference, violence, and resistance. 
 Duncan, on the other hand, not only connects the notion of governmentality to the other 
major Foucauldian concepts, he also links the questions Scott asked to analyses of the rule of 
difference, and negotiates the problems that plagued them. Thus, his work demonstrates how 
the process of othering described by Said, Bhabha, and Stoler can operate as a function in the 
governmental rationale of power, indicating that the dichotomy between Self and Other in 19th 
century Ceylon was articulated in terms of conduct – exactly the term Foucault used to highlight 
the specificity of governmental reason. At the same time, he shares with Scott the insight that 
the project of colonial power cannot be reduced to a rule of difference, and he therefore 
continues to search for the rationality that, at least partially, sought to universalize rather than to 
produce difference. With Mbembe, he shares the interest in Agamben’s concept of biopolitical 
sovereignty, and its ability to explain how violence continued to occupy a central role even under 
governmental regimes. In the process, he negotiates the obfuscation of violence we had 
detected in Scott’s essay. Finally, through and against both the work of Foucault and all of its 
postcolonial appropriations, he develops a workable conceptualization of resistance that follows 
directly from the plurality of interacting rationales, projects, and technologies Foucault, Said, 
Bhabha, Mitchell, Stoler, Mbembe, and Scott discussed in isolation.  
191 
 
7. Conclusion: The Foucault Effect in Postcolonial Studies 
 
Adopting a phrase from Dipesh Chakrabarty, one can say that postcolonial studies has been 
‘provincializing Foucault.’48 Pointing out the Eurocentric tendencies in Foucault’s work, 
postcolonial scholars have demonstrated how his account of various rationales of power 
disregards the key role the colonies have played in the production and development of discipline, 
biopolitics, and governmentality. The argument that Foucault produces a self-contained history 
of Europe has been repeatedly articulated in the work of Mitchell, Kaplan, Spivak, Stoler, 
Mbembe, and Duncan, and it also follows from Scott’s decision to look at colonial 
governmentality as a counterpart to the governmentality Foucault describes. However, this 
argument is not present in the texts by Said and Bhabha, which draw primarily on Foucault’s 
theory of discourse, rather than his historical analyses of power formations. This should alert us 
to the fact that the postcolonial misgivings about Foucault’s work relate to the historical content 
of his work rather than his conceptual apparatus.  
 Indeed, after noting the obfuscation of the colonies as key sites in the production of 
power formations, scholars such as Mitchell, Kaplan, and Stoler have sought to work with 
Foucault’s concepts rather than against them. To varying degrees, they have incorporated one or 
more of these concepts, transformed them, and made use of them in order to better 
conceptualize colonialism. In all of the postcolonial studies analyzed above, Foucauldian concepts 
serve to buttress the main argument. The postcolonial engagement with Foucault is in this sense 
far from superficial.  
It should be abundantly clear by now that this travelling of concepts is neither the 
straightforward application of a model, nor the mere appropriation of concepts to endow them 
with a meaning that subverts Foucault’s work. Rather than a conscious choice of the writing 
subject, it is the recontextualization of concepts itself that changes their meaning in ways that 
seem to follow from the new context and cotext in which a concept finds itself. The significant 
changes in the meaning of travelling concepts discussed throughout this project are not the 
outcome of the desire to ‘provincialize Foucault,’ but the direct result of their appearance in a 
new context, within a new syntax.  
As far as the functions of these concepts is concerned, their role in postcolonial studies is 
surprisingly coherent. The notions of discourse, discipline, biopower, and governmentality all 
                                                 
48
 After Chakrabarty: 2000, Provincializing Europe.  
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serve to forge an understanding of colonial power that cannot be reduced to either economic, 
military, or physical force and domination.  
 However, exactly what this alternative conceptualization of power should look like is very 
much contested, and different interpretations and transformations of Foucault’s work have 
presented highly discrepant conceptualizations of colonial power. It is therefore of paramount 
importance to look beyond the travelling of concepts from Foucault to postcolonial studies: the 
transformations and discrepancies within these groups are at least as significant. This is hardly 
surprising, given that nine years passed between the publication of the first and the last of 
Foucault’s texts discussed above (1969-1978), and almost thirty years between the first and the 
last postcolonial transformations analyzed in this study (1978-2007). Within and between these 
periods, the concepts of discourse, discipline, biopower, and governmentality have appeared in 
various contexts and conceptual architectures, leading to various meanings, functions, and 
effects.  
 While the previous chapters present sufficient evidence of these manifold 
transformations, a question that remains open is whether some kind of order or pattern can be 
discerned in their trajectories. Robert Nichols has taken up this question in an essay called 
“Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault” (2010). He distinguishes two groups of 
postcolonial transformations: a first group that focuses on colonial power as an effect of 
representation, and a second group that thinks of power in relation to ‘modern racism, its 
connection to questions of sexuality, biopolitics and modern state formation’ (141). The first 
group draws primarily on Foucault’s work on discourse, whereas the second uses the concepts of 
discipline, biopolitics, and governmentality. Nichols identifies Said and Bhabha as the central 
figures of the first group, and Stoler as the scholar that initiated the second wave. More 
specifically, he argues that Stoler is the one who has spurred on ‘a new field of studies around 
questions of colonial governmentality’ which works ‘against the prevailing understanding of 
Foucault already established by the Said-discourse frame of reference’ (141). Nichols also claims 
that this second school ‘has remained relatively isolated from the first’ (141).  
 An attention to the disciplinary location of the postcolonial studies analyzed seems to 
back up such a narrative. The first group, with Said and Bhabha, has not only approached 
representation as a textual construct, they have also taken literature to be one of the central 
means of identity construction. The work of Stoler, Scott, and Duncan, by contrast, focuses on 
practices and techniques in a specific time and place, and could thus be said to be more 
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historical-anthropological in nature. This seems to confirm the existence of two separate groups 
in the postcolonial reception of Foucault, which, linked back to the present corpus, would include 
Said and Bhabha in the group with a focus on representation, and Kaplan, Mitchell, Stoler, Scott, 
and Duncan in the group with the historical-anthropological focus, with Mbembe as a separate 
case that fits neither of the two. 
 Tempting though such a typology may be, it completely disregards the intertextual 
dynamic sketched in the previous chapters. Contra Nichols, I would like to argue that the 
distinction he establishes between the two groups misses the extent to which the model of 
power as representation continues to inform those postcolonial transformations which 
ostensibly adhere more closely to Foucault’s historical analyses of rationales of power. The 
interesting thing here is not that the historical-anthropological group employs a different 
Foucault from the one summoned up by the representation group, but that it does not.  
 Put differently, the second group Nichols describes did not remain ‘relatively isolated 
from the first’ (141), but struggled to break free from the reading of Foucault the first group had 
established. Although Stoler and others clearly shift the focus from textual representation to 
colonial techniques and practices, their reading of Foucault is still profoundly affected by Said’s 
transformation. As Chapter 3 has indicated, what we have called Said’s instrumentalist 
architecture established two key concepts in the analysis of colonial power that hardly figure in 
Foucault’s oeuvre: identity and authority. From Orientalism onwards, the concepts of identity 
and authority have surfaced time and again in postcolonial critiques of power, including those 
acknowledging Foucault as a central source of inspiration.  
In many cases, Foucauldian concepts have served as ancillary concepts to arrive at the 
Saidian notions of identity and authority. The beginning of this process can be seen in Bhabha’s 
recurrence to psychosocial notions in the analysis of discourse, and in Mitchell’s analysis of 
colonial authority as a product of discipline, but it is most conspicuous in the work of Stoler. 
Although she draws on Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, she only seems interested in biopolitical 
techniques to the extent that they create a European identity that supports colonial authority. In 
the work of Duncan, finally, it is the concept of governmentality that assists in exposing how 
technologies of the self created European identity and colonial authority.  
 Seen in this light, Stoler can hardly be said to have initiated a second wave of postcolonial 
transformations of Foucault, or to have worked against Said’s reading of Foucault. If Race and the 
Education of Desire remains a pivotal work, this is not because it created a new postcolonial 
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Foucault, but because it transported the Saidian model of identity as authority into the historical 
and anthropological analysis of colonial power. This explains why the contextual analyses in the 
previous chapters had little to say about differences or struggles between disciplines: although 
the work of Said and Bhabha may be closely connected to the study of literature, and the work of 
Mitchell, Stoler, Scott, and Duncan could be considered more anthropological, all of these names 
are connected in an intertextual web in which disciplinary boundaries clearly have not stopped 
the spread of Said’s reading of Foucault. A distinction between a postcolonial Foucault focused 
on textual representation, dominant in literature, and a postcolonial Foucault focused on 
practices and techniques in a specific time and place, dominant in anthropology, underplays the 
extent to which the latter inherits from the former the tendency to look at these practices only 
insofar as they produce identity-as-authority.  
 
However, this tendency is not absolute, and there are also scholars who draw on Foucauldian 
concepts without subordinating them to the notions of identity and authority. This applies to 
Mbembe’s “Necropolitics,” which uses and transforms the concept of biopolitics in order to 
analyze technologies of power as they work on the body and destroy it. In doing so, Mbembe 
focuses not on the authority that legitimates colonial power, but on a rationale of power that is 
visible in the technologies it deploys. Although Mbembe’s Agamben-inflected reading of Foucault 
by no means constitutes a simple application of a Foucauldian framework, it is fair to say, in the 
light of the reconstructions above, that Mbembe’s attempt to trace a rationale of power in the 
technologies it deploys remains much closer to Foucault’s genealogical approach. Moreover, in 
its focus on the destructive impact of power upon bodies, Mbembe’s essay can even be read as 
an attack on the tendency to critique power only insofar as it produces identities. Indeed, the 
constatation that technologies of death can work directly on the bodies Agamben refers to as 
bare life makes it clear that a focus on the metaphysical pretensions of colonialism overlooks the 
extent to which colonial power was always also microphysical in its operations.  
In dealing with the concept of governmentality, the tension between the focus on 
identity-as-authority and the analysis of specific rationalities of power becomes even more 
pronounced. Foucault’s lectures on governmentality make it crystal-clear that the conceptual 
apparatus he had been developing serves to critique power as a set of practices and techniques 
that coalesce into strategies and projects. In short, all of Foucault’s work from Discipline and 
Punish onwards was concerned with the question of how power formations operate, rather than 
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with their legitimization. It is exactly this issue of power as a project, with specific goals, 
ambitions, and means to achieve them, that Scott takes up with respect to colonial power. At 
stake are no longer the narratives and identities Europe produces, but the actual strategies of 
colonial power, the subject positions it creates, and the reconfiguration of societies it effects.  
 Thus, if there are two groups in the postcolonial reception of Foucault, it is in this tension 
between power as authority and power as activity that the break can be seen. It is simply 
astounding that this tension should have remained unacknowledged or misunderstood for such a 
long time. Its significance can hardly be overstated: these two conceptualizations of colonial 
power direct the focus to different objectives of power, to different instruments of power, and to 
different forms of resistance to power. To deepen our understanding of the crucial divide 
between the notion of power as authority and power as activity, it may be helpful to look at each 
of these three differences in more detail. 
 First of all, because the notion of colonial power as authority conceptualizes power only 
as the creation of authority aimed at colonization, and directs attention to the creation of 
authority, the presupposed objective of power receives comparatively little attention. To 
illustrate with an example, Said’s Orientalism focuses on how the West positions itself as superior 
to the Orient, but it does not tell us much about the kind of colonization this authority was 
required for in the first place. In other words, it does not look into the projects of colonial power 
in the Orient or the kind of society power sought to create.  
 By contrast, the conceptualization of power as an activity sets out to answer exactly 
these questions. What are the objectives of colonial power? What are the different rationalities 
of colonial power? Are there perhaps conflicting views between individuals, countries, or 
historical periods about what these objectives should be? Colonial power is then no longer 
monolithic: it can be made up of different and potentially competing rationalities. Foucault’s 
concepts of discipline, biopower, and governmentality can be used to spell out different 
objectives and strategies of power in the colonies. At stake is no longer the disciplinary, 
biopolitical, or governmental component of colonial authority, but the way these power 
formations work directly on colonial subjects. In the case of discipline, this involves the ordering 
and structuring of colonial societies to produce obedient subjects. A biopolitical rationale aims to 
protect the vitality of the population, and a governmental rationale attempts to create a society 
in which the interests of subjects coincide with the interests of the state. Postcolonial scholars 
who understand power as activity rather than authority have tried to grasp the projects of 
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colonial power with these concepts, and have at times found it necessary to complement 
Foucault’s work with other concepts. Mbembe’s notion of necropolitics is the clearest example: 
the project of colonial power cannot be grasped in terms of biopolitics alone, given its tendency 
to kill colonial subjects rather than protect their health. Mbembe therefore coins the concept of 
necropolitics to refer to an activity of colonial power, and the rationale that guides this activity, 
rather than the authority that legitimates it.  
 The difference between a conceptualization of power as authority and power as activity 
is also reflected in the instruments with which power is believed to work. Scholars who have 
focused on colonial authority, in the wake of Said, have understood authority primarily as 
something that is produced through identity constructions. More specifically, it is identity as a 
binary relation between Self and Other that has repeatedly been pinpointed as the key 
mechanism of colonial authority. Much to the dismay of scholars who would have liked to pursue 
a more materialist critique of colonialism, including Ahmad, Dirlik, Parry, Brennan, Lazarus, and 
many others, this focus on identity arguably resulted in a focus on identity-creation as a textual 
phenomenon. The conceptualization of power as authority thus took novels, travelogues, poetry, 
and other literary genres to be central instruments of colonial power, and it has been criticized 
extensively for this reduction of colonial power to a textual affair. Aijaz Ahmad complained as 
early as 1992 that the struggle against colonial power had become ‘mainly a literary and literary-
critical affair’ (208). Writing from a position indebted to Marxism (cf. 4), Ahmad fulminates 
against the obsession with the textual at the expense of the material.  
 However, with the distinction between conceptualizations of power as authority and 
power as activity in mind, a more accurate assessment of the postcolonial focus on the textual 
becomes possible. I want to argue that what is problematic is not so much the tendency to limit 
the scrutiny of colonial power to its textual manifestations, but rather the underlying 
conceptualization of power as authority. It is this focus on authority that allows only a 
fragmentary answer to the question of how colonial power operates and restructures social 
spaces. The work of Stoler is an illustration of how accusations of textualism miss the mark: 
although Stoler does not focus on literature at all, just as with Said she neglects the material 
operations of colonial power by focusing exclusively on power as an authority that follows from 
identity constructions.  
 The conceptualization of power as activity, by contrast, can take into account the 
instruments upon which rationales of power rely to effect a restructuring of society, irrespective 
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of whether these instruments are textual or material. This includes anything from the military 
technology Mbembe focuses on, to the various techniques Foucault describes in his historical 
analyses of sovereignty, discipline, biopower, and governmentality. In a colonial context, one can 
think of the structuring of the land, the creation of new social hierarchies, the introduction of a 
juridical order, and the installation of a medical system, as well as the violent techniques of local 
sovereigns to force the native population into submission. Again, the focus on these issues 
follows from an understanding of power as an activity rather than an authority.  
 A third and final difference between the two conceptualizations of power relates to the 
notion of resistance. Throughout the previous chapters, it has become apparent that the concept 
of resistance has a problematic status in postcolonial studies. The analysis of power often 
dominates the argument, and the study of resistance remains limited to a few tentative remarks 
that function more as an excuse than as a proper consideration of the way in which power is 
undermined. The big exception in this regard is the work of Bhabha, which locates resistance in 
the instability of colonial discourse itself. But even this understanding of resistance has been 
criticized because it reduces resistance to ‘a condition produced by the dominant discourse itself’ 
rather than the anti-colonial actions of agents (Loomba 2005: 149). In fact, Duncan’s In the 
Shadows of the Tropics has been the only work analyzed in this study to provide a comprehensive 
treatment of such acts of resistance.  
 The distinction between power as authority and power as activity can shed light on the 
problematic status of the concept of resistance. Power and resistance can hardly be 
conceptualized apart from each other, and it is therefore no surprise that the two different 
notions of power entail two different understandings of resistance. In the case of Bhabha, the 
understanding of power as authority leads to a notion of resistance that at bottom refers to 
nothing more than the instability of that authority. With Duncan, by contrast, the understanding 
of power as an activity with a rationale of its own entails conceptualizing resistance as acts and 
obstacles that run counter to this rationale. As section 6.3.3 has illustrated, this second 
understanding of resistance enables us to look at competing projects of power, at material and 
technical obstacles, as well as the subversive actions of individuals – all of which remain 
undiscussed in the first approach.  
 These three points demonstrate that the two conceptualizations of power I have 
distinguished are not simply two different approaches to the same issues, but rather 
conceptualizations of two disparate phenomena: the authority that supported colonial projects 
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on the one hand, and the rationales and activities of these projects on the other. The work of 
Said, Bhabha, and Stoler presents clear examples of a focus on the first, whereas Mbembe’s 
“Necropolitics” and Scott’s “Colonial Governmentality” focus on the second. Mitchell’s Colonising 
Egypt begins with the second, but ultimately abandons this for the first. Duncan, finally, 
combines the first and the second approach, and distinguishes carefully between the two. 
 
So where is Foucault in all of this? It should be abundantly clear by now that only the second 
conceptualization of power is structurally similar to the one Foucault developed throughout his 
career. The first understanding, of power as authority, does not have any substantial connection 
to Foucault’s work whatsoever. As soon as he began to work towards a concept of power, 
Foucault left the notion of authority behind, and began to focus on activities, techniques, and 
rationales of power.  
 But if this is the case, how is it possible that Foucault’s work has been used so often to 
explain colonial authority? How is it possible that, in spite of all these crucial differences with 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power as an activity, Said, Bhabha, Mitchell, Stoler, and to a 
lesser extent, Duncan, have drawn on Foucault’s concepts to explain colonial power as a form of 
authority? 
 An initial explanation can be found in the impact of Said’s Orientalism. It is in this 
founding work of postcolonial studies that the first references to Foucault appear, and it seems 
to have established an extremely influential interpretation of Foucault. More specifically, it is 
what we have referred to in Chapter 3 as the instrumentalist architecture that has linked 
Foucault to power and authority. In spite of the fact that Foucault’s understanding of power was 
completely different, Said’s interpretation would continue to provide a point of reference for 
postcolonial readings of Foucault, across decades, and, as can be seen in Stoler’s work, across 
disciplines. The fact that Stoler’s Race and the Education of Desire provides a highly sophisticated 
analysis of Foucault’s 1976 lectures, and yet fails to register the crucial distinction between 
biopower as an activity and biopower as a source of colonial authority, illustrates the 
pervasiveness of Said’s interpretation. That Robert Nichols subsequently identifies Stoler’s work 
as a turning point in the reception of Foucault (cf. 2010: 141), in spite of its fundamental 
similarity to Said’s framework, illustrates how easily the two conceptualizations of power 
outlined above can be confused.  
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 A second reason can be sought in Foucault’s work itself. All of the contextual sections 
above have noted that Foucault’s writing is void of explicit references to specific scholars. He 
rarely outlines his position within a specific discipline, field, or tradition, and hardly acknowledges 
his predecessors. Neither does he specify his opponents, leaving it to the reader to puzzle out 
who the antagonists are. Moreover, these opponents do not seem to be specific scholars, but 
rather large systems of thought and ideologies, such as Marxism, liberalism, and psychoanalysis. 
The result is that it is nearly impossible to contextualize the work of Foucault today. It has been 
one of the central premises of this study of travelling concepts that the meanings and functions 
of concepts are context-dependent. Consequently, the absence of such a clear context leaves 
concepts open to considerable transformations.  
 Third and finally, the distribution process of Foucault’s work may also have been a major 
factor in the confusion surrounding his conceptualization of power. The previous chapters have 
analyzed Foucault’s work in chronological order, with the result that the corresponding 
postcolonial appropriations appeared in a parallel, near-chronological order: the work of Said and 
Bhabha, drawing on the concept of discourse, stems from the late seventies and early eighties, 
the texts from Mitchell and Kaplan, drawing on the notion of discipline, were published in the 
early to mid-nineties, followed by Stoler’s and Mbembe’s appropriations of ‘biopolitics’ in the 
second half of the nineties and at the beginning of the new millennium. The concept of 
governmentality, lastly, was picked up in 1995 by Scott and in 2007 by Duncan. Only the three 
most recent publications we have considered, viz. Scott’s, Mbembe’s, and Duncan’s, include a 
focus on colonial power as an activity, as a particular rationale and a project with specific 
ambitions and technologies to achieve them. 
To that extent, it is the three most recent publications that stick most closely to 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power. At first sight, it may seem surprising that those texts that 
are chronologically speaking the most removed from Foucault are actually closest in terms of 
their conceptual apparati. Yet, in light of the publication and translation history of Foucault’s 
work, this process becomes perfectly logical. I have argued above that it is in Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality that his focus on power as an activity becomes the most pronounced. Unlike 
with the concepts of discourse, discipline, and biopower, Foucault did not introduce this concept 
in a monograph, but in a series of lectures at the Collège de France. Thirteen years passed before 
an English translation of the governmentality lecture was first published in The Foucault Effect 
(1991) – long after Said’s Orientalism had created the problem-space that would become known 
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as postcolonial studies. Moreover, The Foucault Effect had selected only one of Foucault’s 
lectures out of a series of thirteen, with a further decontextualization of his work as a result. As 
we have seen, when Scott’s 1995 “Colonial Governmentality” deployed the notion of 
governmentality in postcolonial studies, he produced an analysis of colonial power which 
contained serious flaws, all of which can be attributed to reading Foucault’s lecture out of 
context.  
 Since then, we have seen the systematic posthumous publication of Foucault’s lectures, 
rendering the task of understanding the trajectory of Foucault’s thought considerably easier. The 
2003 publication of the Society Must Be Defended lectures can be considered a milestone in this 
regard: because they deploy the same notion of biopolitics as The History of Sexuality, but 
without linking the notion to the creation of a bourgeois self, the lectures illustrates quite clearly 
that Foucault did not seek to explain a process of identity formation, but a strategy of rule based 
on state racism. Moreover, with its emphasis on the discourse of war, the lecture series 
demonstrated that a focus on the productivity of biopower does not necessarily involve a 
blindness to its potentially violent character.  
 In Duncan’s book, we see how the concept of governmentality as Scott used it can and 
must be understood in the context of Foucault’s work on the violence of biopolitics. By re-
establishing the links that had been severed in the decontextualized publication of the 
governmentality lectures, Duncan addresses the flaws plaguing Scott’s essay and provides a 
convincing and long overdue account of colonial power as an interplay of conflicting rationales 
and projects. 
 To avoid misunderstanding, it is worth stressing that the point of this chronological 
overview is not to create a story of the progress of postcolonial studies up to the point where it 
finally managed to adopt a truly Foucauldian conceptualization of power. Rather, the goal has 
been to highlight the trajectories of Foucault’s work and postcolonial studies alike: the 
posthumous publications of Foucault’s work continue to generate new interpretations and to 
raise new questions about power. Although I have argued that the more recent interpretations 
provide a more coherent understanding of Foucault’s conceptualization of power, this is not to 
deny the value of the postcolonial critiques of power as authority. Indeed, the point has been all 
along that these two conceptualizations of power in reality study two different phenomena, viz. 
the projects of colonial power, and the authority that legitimates them. The real problem is not 
that postcolonial scholars have used Foucauldian concepts for a different purpose than Foucault 
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intended, but that for a long time they ignored exactly those issues Foucault had wanted to raise, 
and which are central to colonialism: the different rationales, strategies, and instruments of 
power. By dressing their critiques of authority in Foucauldian terminology, the postcolonial 
scholars working along the lines of Said’s interpretation effectively substituted the critique of 
colonial authority for the study of colonial power as an activity. 
 
To return to the question we set out with: has there been a Foucault effect in postcolonial 
studies? Looking at the work of Mbembe, Scott, and Duncan, the answer has to be a careful yes: 
these scholars have drawn on Foucauldian concepts in order to analyze different rationalities of 
colonial power. But if we look at Said, Bhabha, Mitchell, and Stoler, it also becomes apparent that 
among those who ostensibly draw on Foucault’s work, there has been an even stronger ‘Said 
effect’: the tendency to focus on colonial power only insofar as it is a form of authority. This 
concern with authority has been extremely influential: it has not only determined interpretations 
of Foucault, but also limited the problem-space within which postcolonial studies has been 
working to the interconnection between identity and authority. However, with new publications 
and translations of Foucault’s lectures becoming available to facilitate the interpretation and 
contextualization of Foucault’s work, postcolonial scholars seem to be gradually venturing 
beyond the familiar questions of identity-as-authority again.  
 The result is that new questions – or old, forgotten ones – are being posed again: what 
were and are the different projects of colonial power? How do we think of the conflicts between 
different colonial projects and strategies? How have these projects been carried out? What 
resistant rationalities can they meet with? Or, to put it differently: in which way do colonial 
powers seek to shape colonial societies, and how do they (fail to) achieve these goals? If 
postcolonial studies seems to have lost some of the momentum it had gained in the nineties, this 
is perhaps not so much because it has exhausted all of its questions, but because it never really 
engaged the most important ones. 
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German Abstract 
 
Postcolonial Studies nach Foucault: 
Diskurs, Disziplin, Biomacht und Gouvernementalität als Travelling Concepts 
 
1. Einleitung 
 
Nach einer Erhebung des ISI Web of Science von 2007 ist Michel Foucault der meistzitierte Autor 
in den Geisteswissenschaften. Der Bereich der postcolonial studies scheint dabei keine 
Ausnahme zu bilden: Anhänger_innen und Kritiker_innen Foucaults haben gleichermaßen auf die 
wegweisende Rolle verwiesen, die sein Werk in der Erforschung der (De-)Kolonisierung spielt.49 
Seit dem Erscheinen von Edward Saids Orientalismus im Jahr 197850 taucht der Name Foucaults 
immer wieder in den verschiedensten Richtungen der Kolonialismuskritik auf. Die Bedeutung 
Foucaults für die postcolonial studies ist Gegenstand dieser Arbeit. 
 
Orientalismus hat als eine der frühesten Publikationen das Werk Foucaults in der 
englischsprachigen Welt sichtbar gemacht. Es wäre deswegen unzureichend, die postcolonial 
studies nur als passiven Rezipienten Foucaultscher Einflüsse zu betrachten: Postkoloniale 
Forscher_innen haben eigenständige Interpretationen seines Werks formuliert und es 
weiterentwickelt, um seine Theorien und Konzepte auf die Kolonialismuskritik anzuwenden. 
Darüber hinaus haben sie Bedenken bezüglich jener Elemente in Foucaults Werk formuliert, die 
vermeintlich eine eurozentrische Weltsicht aufrechterhalten, und diese zur Diskussion gestellt. 
Wenn die vorliegende Arbeit sich also mit den postcolonial studies nach Foucault befasst, so 
umfasst die Präposition ‚nach‘ eine doppelte Bedeutung: ‚Nach‘ verweist nicht nur auf die 
Tendenz bestimmter postkolonialer Texte, sich auf das Werk Foucaults zu beziehen, sondern 
auch auf den Bruch zwischen Foucaults Europa-zentrierten Analysen und einer postkolonialen 
Kritik, die versucht, sich von der eurozentrischen Sichtweise weg zu entwickeln. Diese 
Dissertation nimmt beide Aspekte zugleich in den Blick und stellt dabei die Frage, inwiefern die 
postcolonial studies sich Foucaults Arbeiten für ihre Zwecke angeeignet haben. 
                                                 
49
 vgl. Ann Laura Stoler 1995: 1, Timothy Brennan 2006: 103 und Neil Lazarus 1999: 11. 
50
 Jahreszahlen bei Publikationen beziehen sich auf die originalsprachliche Ersterscheinung. 
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Statt sich also auf die theoretischen Rahmenbedingungen der Zusammenhänge zwischen 
Foucaults Werk und den postcolonial studies zu konzentrieren, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit, 
diese vermeintliche Einheit zugunsten der Ausarbeitung separater Konzepte aufzulösen. Weder 
das Oeuvre Foucaults noch die zahlreichen Texte, die unter der Rubrik der postcolonial studies 
subsumiert werden, können einem einzelnen theoretischen Rahmenkonzept zugeordnet werden. 
Daher ist es nicht zielführend, die postcolonial studies als reinen Anwendungsbereich 
Foucaultscher Theorien zu betrachten. Bei der Betrachtung ihrer einzelnen Bestandteile wird 
vielmehr deutlich, dass die Aneignung von Foucaults Werk durch die postcolonial studies in der 
Übernahme zahlreicher spezifischer Konzepte und der Debatte über deren Bedeutungs- und 
Funktionspotentiale besteht.  
 
Es sind vor allem vier Konzepte, die sowohl in Foucaults Werk als auch in den postcolonial studies 
grundlegende Rollen spielen: Diskurs, Disziplin, Biomacht und Gouvernementalität. Als mobile 
travelling concepts sind sie in verschiedensten akademischen Disziplinen, Denkschulen, 
Fachbereichen und Texten – oder, kurzum, in den unterschiedlichsten Kontexten – in Erscheinung 
getreten. Eine Grundannahme dieser Arbeit ist die Kontextabhängigkeit von Konzepten: diese 
erhalten ihre Bedeutung nur, indem sie zu anderen Konzepten, Texten und theoretischen 
Systemen in Beziehung gesetzt werden.51 Wird ein Konzept von einem Kontext in einen anderen 
transferiert, verändern sich im Zuge dieser Rekontextualisierung notwendigerweise auch seine 
Bedeutungen und Funktionen. 
 
Umgekehrt spielen Konzepte eine entscheidende Rolle in der Konstruktion ebendieser Diskurse, 
indem sie Modi des Denkens und Wahrnehmens prägen und bestimmte Weisen der 
Weltwahrnehmung erzeugen. Daher sind Konzepte nicht nur als kontextabhängig zu verstehen, 
sondern sie tragen zugleich zur Konstruktion der Kontexte bei, in denen sie auftreten. Daraus 
folgt, dass Rekontextualisierungen nicht nur eine Veränderung von Bedeutungen und Funktionen 
von Konzepten, sondern auch eine Veränderung des Kontexts mit sich bringen. Am Ende der 
‚Reise’ eines Konzepts steht demzufolge eine wechselseitige Transformation von Konzept und 
Kontext als Endprodukt seiner Mobilität. Um die Bedeutung dieses Prozesses zu verstehen und 
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hervorzuheben, untersucht das vorliegende Forschungsprojekt die Konzepte des Diskurses, der 
Disziplin, der Biomacht und der Gouvernementalität vor und nach ihrer ‚Reise’ von einem 
Kontext zum nächsten. 
 
Die Betrachtung dieser Konzepte erfolgt in vier separaten Kapiteln und bildet das Kernstück der 
vorliegenden Arbeit. Jedes Kapitel beginnt mit einer Analyse des zentralen Texts, in dem Foucault 
das jeweilige Konzept entwickelt hat. Im nächsten Schritt werden je zwei postkoloniale Texte 
untersucht, die maßgeblich von diesem Konzept beeinflusst sind. Durch diese Gegenüberstellung 
werden die Transformationen des Konzepts im Vergleich zwischen beiden Kontexten sichtbar 
und analysierbar gemacht. 
 
Die Untersuchung der Veränderungen dieser vier Konzepte ermöglicht es, sich sodann der Frage 
zu stellen, inwiefern diese ‚postkolonialen Aneignungen’ einen, wie der Titel eines einflussreichen 
Bandes vorschlägt, ‚Foucault-Effekt’ in den postcolonial studies hervorgebracht haben.52 In 
welchem Ausmaß ermöglichen seine Konzepte eine eigene Form der Kritik, und in welchem 
Maße ist diese in den postcolonial studies präsent? Unterscheiden sich die untersuchten 
postkolonialen Texte in ihren konzeptuellen Rahmenbedingungen von den Bereichen der 
postcolonial studies, die sich nicht auf Foucaultsche Theorien berufen? Und wenn ja, welche 
Konsequenzen ergeben sich daraus für die postkoloniale Kritik? 
 
Die grundlegende These dieser Arbeit besagt, dass keineswegs von einem unproblematischen 
‚Foucault-Effekt’ in den postcolonial studies ausgegangen werden kann. Die Verwerfungen 
innerhalb von Foucaults Werk, die Vielschichtigkeit des durchlässigen Feldes der postkolonialen 
Forschung sowie die unausweichlichen Transformationsprozesse, die mit der 
Rekontextualisierung von Konzepten einhergehen, verhindern eine theoretische, 
methodologische oder konzeptuelle Einheitlichkeit innerhalb des von Foucault beeinflussten 
Segments der postcolonial studies. Vielmehr präsentiert sich dieses Feld als Netzwerk eng 
gesponnener intertextueller Bezüge, in dem die Vorherrschaft des Foucaultschen Impetus in 
Konkurrenz mit anderen Konzepten und Methoden verhandelt wird. Insbesondere das 
konzeptuelle Rahmenwerk, das Edward Said in seiner Studie Orientalismus entwickelt hat, eignet 
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sich fortwährend Foucaultsche Konzepte an und leitet sie in neue Bahnen. Dies geschieht selbst 
in den Werken jener Autor_innen, die sich ausdrücklich gegen Saids Theoriegebäude wenden. 
Dies resultiert in einem grundlegenden Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Foucaults Konzept von 
Macht als Zusammenspiel von Techniken und Strategien und Saids Auffassung von Macht als 
Autorität. 
 
2. Theoretisches Rahmenwerk und Methoden 
 
Die kulturwissenschaftlichen Methoden, die in den vier Einzelkapiteln Anwendung finden, und 
der theoretische Kontext, aus dem sie sich ableiten, werden in einem separaten Kapitel erläutert. 
Den Ausgangspunkt bildet die Annahme, dass ‚Diskurs’, Disziplin’, ‚Biomacht’, und 
‚Gouvernementalität’ Zeichen sind, die anhand des semiotischen Dreiecks verstanden werden 
können. Diese Konzepte sind also durch die Begriffe des Bezeichnenden, des Bezeichneten und 
des Referenten zu beschreiben. Obgleich dieser Konzeptbegriff dem allgemeinen Verständnis des 
Konzepts als Bezeichnetem und auch Mieke Bals Definition von Konzepten als ‚shorthand 
theories’53 entgegensteht, bietet er den Vorteil, auch solche Transformationen eines Konzepts 
einzubeziehen, die sich auf den Ebenen des Bezeichnenden und der Referenz abspielen. 
 
Entsprechend wird die Wendung travelling concepts übernommen, um auf die Veränderungen zu 
verweisen, die auf den verschiedenen Ebenen von Bezeichnendem, Bezeichnetem und 
Referenten stattfinden, wenn ein  Konzept von einem Kontext in einen anderen wechselt. Dies 
führt schließlich zu drei möglichen Variablen am Ende des Reiseprozesses: 1) Das Bezeichnende 
ändert sich, wenn ein neuer Begriff im alten Kontext in Bezug auf denselben Referenten 
verwendet wird; 2) das Bezeichnete ändert sich, wenn der gleiche Begriff in einer neuen 
Bedeutung gebraucht wird; 3) der Referent ändert sich, wenn derselbe Begriff in derselben 
Bedeutung in Bezug auf ein neues Objekt angewendet wird. 
 
Es sollte allerdings nicht vergessen werden, dass solche Transformationen nicht willkürlich 
stattfinden: Die wissenschaftliche Praxis verlangt, dass Konzepte klar definiert werden. Im 
Prozess der Ausarbeitung konzeptueller Apparate und spezifischen Vokabulars bemühen sich 
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wissenschaftliche Texte um die Festlegung oder das ‚Einfrieren’ der Bezüge zwischen den drei 
semiotischen Variablen. Transformationen von Konzepten sind daher keineswegs regellos: Sie 
werden von anderen Konzepten, anderen Texten, Denktraditionen, disziplinären Strukturen und 
Forschungskulturen bestimmt. 
 
Nachdem das ‚Reisen von Konzepten’ als Prozess der Rekontextualisierung von Zeichen 
beschrieben worden ist, kann sich den verschiedenen Theorien und Methoden zugewandt 
werden, die unter dem Phänomen der Intertextualität zusammengefasst werden. Die 
untersuchten postkolonialen Theorien weisen nicht nur etliche Bezüge zum Werk Foucaults auf 
und transponieren so eine Vielzahl von Zeichen, sondern auch die Verwendung Foucaultscher 
Konzepte selbst steht bereits für die Präsenz von Zeichen aus einem anderen Text. Transponieren 
und verhandeln also wissenschaftliche Texte Konzepte aus anderen Texten, so kann das Konzept 
als intertextuelles Element par excellence angesehen werden. 
 
Wenn wissenschaftliche Konzepte solchermaßen als intertextuelle Elemente verstanden werden, 
folgt daraus notwendigerweise, dass die innerhalb der Intertextualitätsforschung laufenden 
Debatten zu Bedeutungskonstitution und ihren Krisen direkte Auswirkungen auf den Status von 
Konzepten haben. Ausgehend von Bachtins Konzept der Hybridität soll die Untersuchung 
postkolonialer Transformationen von Foucaultschen Konzepten beleuchten, auf welche Weise 
diese travelling concepts multiple Bedeutungsebenen herausbilden: Als intertextuelle Elemente 
bringen Konzepte sowohl die Bedeutung mit, die sie in der Verwendung in ehemaligen Kontexten 
erhalten hatten, als auch die, die sie innerhalb des Zielkontexts erwerben. In diesem Sinne sind 
sie als hybride Konzepte zu verstehen. Darüber hinaus kann nicht davon ausgegangen werden, 
dass sich diese Bedeutungsvielfalt auf zwei Ebenen beschränkt: jedes Mal, wenn ein Konzept in 
einen neuen Kontext übertragen wird, wird eine neue Bedeutungsebene zu den vorherigen in 
Bezug gesetzt und verhandelt. Auch der gegenteilige Vorgang ist denkbar: Konzepte können an 
Bedeutungspotential verlieren, wenn ihre intertextuellen Charakteristika nicht mehr anerkannt 
oder aktualisiert werden. Dieses Bild soll jedoch keinesfalls suggerieren, es handle sich beim 
Hinzugewinn oder beim Verlust von Bedeutungsebenen um simple Additions- beziehungsweise 
Subtraktionsvorgänge: Bedeutungen von Konzepten summieren sich nicht lediglich auf, sondern 
stehen in Konkurrenz zueinander, widersprechen oder verändern sich wechselseitig. Da 
Bedeutungen nicht notwendigerweise kompatibel sein müssen, können sie zu Brüchen, 
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Verwerfungen und Unbestimmtheiten innerhalb von Konzepten führen, die unmittelbar von ihrer 
Rekontextualisierung herrühren.  
 
Die Analyse dieser Ebenen und ihrer Transformationen, die in den vier Hauptkapiteln 
vorgenommen wird, besteht grundsätzlich aus drei Schritten. Jeder Text wird im Hinblick auf den 
Kontext betrachtet, auf den er sich bezieht, sodann auf den Kontext, in dem er das jeweilige 
Konzept situiert, und schließlich auf das Konzept an sich. Diese Struktur korrespondiert mit der 
Wechselwirkung von Konzepten und Kontexten, wie sie in Sektion 2.1 besprochen wird. Zwecks 
größerer Eindeutigkeit wird der Bezug des Kontexts eines Konzepts hier zweigeteilt: Es wird 
unterschieden zwischen dem ‚Ko-Text’ (‚cotext’) eines Konzepts, also dem Text, in dem ein 
Konzept beschrieben wird, und dem ‚context’ als Kontext im eigentlichen Sinn. 
 
Die erste, kontextuelle Analyse hat zum Ziel, den Text in seiner Relation zu anderen Texten zu 
verorten, indem seine intertextuellen Spuren nachvollzogen werden. Dies meint zunächst die 
grundlegende Aufgabe, Zitate, Paraphrasierungen und Bezugnahmen aus anderen und auf 
andere Texte nachzuvollziehen und ihre Funktionen zu bestimmen. Dies kann jedoch nur ein 
erster Schritt sein, der nicht zwangsläufig weit führt. Vor allem bei Texten von Foucault sind 
Bezugnahmen auf spezifische Fremdtexte sehr selten. Dies erschwert die Kontextualisierung 
seines Werks bis zum Anschein der Unmöglichkeit. Durch die Betrachtung von intertextuellen 
Spuren im weiteren Sinne ist es jedoch zumindest möglich, einen Text in Bezug auf andere 
Textgruppen zu verorten. Selbst wenn der Text gar keine direkten Referenzen zu anderen Texten 
enthält, kann er dennoch auf etwas reagieren, und in diesem Fall impliziert die Reaktion ihren 
textuellen Gegenpart. Diese Annahme kann auch in Bezug auf den Beitrag gemacht werden, den 
der Text zu leisten behauptet: Ein Beitrag beinhaltet per Definition eine Einbringung in etwas 
anderes, sei es eine Disziplin, ein Themenfeld, eine Forschungsgemeinschaft, -tradition oder -
kultur. Was in einem Text also implizit aufgerufen wird, lässt valide Rückschlüsse darauf zu, auf 
was er aufbaut, was er verhandelt und worauf  er reagiert. 
  
Die kotextuelle Analyse zielt darauf ab, das Konzept innerhalb des Textes zu verorten, und zwar 
auf einer formalen und auf einer funktionalen Ebene. Die formale Ebene bezieht sich auf die 
Quantität (die absolute Anzahl von Nennungen des Konzepts innerhalb des Textes), Häufigkeit 
(die Anzahl in Relation zur Textlänge) und die Verteilung (die Häufigkeit innerhalb verschiedener 
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Textpassagen). Dies stellt die syntagmatische Dimension eines Konzepts dar: seine Position 
innerhalb eines konzeptuellen Systems. Der Begriff ‚konzeptuelle Architektur’ wird dabei für den 
mehr oder weniger stabilen Bezugsrahmen von und zwischen Konzepten verwendet, der sich im 
Zuge der Interpretation herauskristallisiert. Dies stellt keine simple Abstraktionsleistung dar, 
sondern einen hermeneutischen Prozess – dies zeigt sich darin, dass aus demselben Text 
mitunter unterschiedliche konzeptuelle Architekturen rekonstruiert werden können. Statt als 
Problem wird dieses Phänomen als Chance verstanden, da innerhalb dieses Prozesses 
unterschiedliche Bedeutung-, Funktions- und Wirkungspotentiale von Konzepten ersichtlich 
werden. 
 
Schließlich untersucht die konzeptuelle Analyse, auf welche Weisen Kontexte und Ko-Texte ein 
Konzept mit einem bestimmten Wirkungspotential hervorbringen. In diesem Prozess wird als 
erster Schritt die definitorische Bedeutung des Konzepts umgrenzt und daraufhin mit den 
impliziten Bedeutungen verglichen, die sich offenbaren, wenn das Konzept angewendet statt nur 
definiert wird. Neben der ursprünglichen Denotation umfassen diese dann auch Konnotationen 
und Assoziationen. Das Hauptaugenmerk liegt hierbei auf der paradigmatischen Dimension eines 
Konzepts, seinen Bezügen zu anderen Konzepten in absentia (Synonymen, Hyponymen, 
Hyperonymen und Antonymen) sowie den Kollokationen, in denen das Konzept angetroffen wird. 
Die zuvor beschriebene Vorstellung von mehreren Bedeutungsebenen erweist sich hier als 
sinnvoll: Häufig kann die Bedeutung eines Konzepts nicht auf einen einzelnen, stabilen 
semantischen Kern reduziert werden; und unterschiedliche konzeptuelle Architekturen innerhalb 
desselben Textes führen zu verschiedenen Funktionen der jeweiligen Bedeutungsebenen. Die 
Aufgabe der konzeptuellen Analyse besteht also darin, die jeweiligen Ebenen voneinander 
abzugrenzen und ihre Wechselbeziehungen untereinander zu verdeutlichen. Sind diese 
unterschiedlichen Bedeutungen und Funktionen klar benannt, kann die Frage nach ihrem 
Wirkungspotential gestellt werden: Welche normativen Implikationen birgt das besagte Konzept 
für Betrachtungen des Kolonialen? Welche Bedeutungsebenen sind dominant, und welche 
Elemente kolonialer Macht beherrschen das Bild? Dies stellt den kritischen Teil der Analyse dar, 
und der Kontext, von dem ausgegangen wird, bildet gewissermaßen die Basis für die kritische 
Betrachtung. Tatsächlich ist es nur in Relation zu anderen Konzeptualisierungen möglich, eine 
Bewertung des Verlustes, des Zugewinns oder der Modifikationen von Bedeutung vorzunehmen. 
Verlust und Gewinn sind dabei nicht als absolute Werte zu betrachten, sondern werden in Bezug 
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auf einen vorangegangenen Text, eine vorangegangene Analyse von Machtverhältnissen oder ein 
früheres Bild des Kolonialismus beurteilt. 
 
In ihrer Gesamtheit geben diese drei Schritte Antwort auf drei Kategorien von Fragen, nämlich 
nach den Bedeutungen eines Konzepts, nach seinen Funktionen sowie nach seinen 
Auswirkungen. Die erste Frage befasst sich mit der Bedeutung: Wie wird ein Konzept definiert? 
Ist seine Bedeutung verändert worden? Hat es mehrfache Bedeutungen? Sind diese 
untereinander konsistent oder widersprüchlich? Worauf bezieht sich das Konzept, und was 
schließt es aus? In welcher Beziehung steht seine Bedeutung zu der von anderen Konzepten? 
Zweitens stellt sich die Frage nach der Funktion: Welche Aufgabe, welchen Zweck erfüllt das 
Konzept? Welche Rolle spielt es innerhalb des Texts? Welche Funktionen hat es in Relation zu 
anderen Konzepten? Die dritte Frage adressiert die Auswirkungen eines Konzepts: Inwiefern 
beeinflussen Bedeutung und Funktion eines Konzepts seinen Ko-Text und Kontext? Verändert die 
Verwendung eines Konzepts den Fokus des Texts, und wenn ja, auf welche Weise? Welche 
Konsequenzen und Schlussfolgerungen ergeben sich daraus für die postcolonial studies, und 
welche Implikationen haben die Ergebnisse in Bezug auf Foucaults Werk? Verändern sie die 
Beziehung zwischen Foucault und den postcolonial studies? Die Analysekapitel haben zum Ziel, 
Antworten auf diese Fragen zu finden und diese untereinander in strukturelle Zusammenhänge 
zu bringen. 
 
3. Diskurs 
 
Der Fokus dieses Kapitels liegt auf dem Konzept des Diskurses in der Form, wie es von Foucault 
entwickelt und von Edward Said und Homi K. Bhabha übernommen und weiterentwickelt worden 
ist. Das Kapitel beginnt mit der Analyse von Foucaults Archäologie des Wissens, erstmals 1969 
erschienen, und betrachtet in der Folge Saids Orientalismus (1978) und Bhabhas Artikel „The 
Other Question“ und „Of Mimicry and Man“ (1994). Insbesondere betrachtet dieser Abschnitt, 
welche Bezüge Said und Bhabha zwischen dem Foucaultschen Diskurskonzept und 
unterschiedlichen Konzeptionen von Macht herstellen und die Schwierigkeiten, mit denen sie 
sich in Folge dieser Transformationen konfrontiert sehen. 
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Foucault stellte sein Konzept des Diskurses erstmals in der Archäologie des Wissens vor. Wie der 
Titel verdeutlicht, war sein zentrales Anliegen die Betrachtung von Wissensstrukturen, weniger 
die des Diskurses als solchem. Er hatte nicht zum Ziel, eine grundlegende Theorie des Diskurses 
zu etablieren, sondern nutzte vielmehr das Diskurskonzept, um die Produktion von Wissen als 
diskursivem Konstrukt anhand bestimmter Strukturen zu verstehen. Die Schlüsselidee liegt für 
Foucault darin, dass Wissen nicht in der Beziehung zu einem materiellen Objekt besteht, sondern 
ein autonomes System bildet, das seine eigenen Diskursobjekte selbst hervorbringt. Das Wissen 
wird also nicht von materiellen Dingen beherrscht, sondern von etwas, das Foucault historical a 
priori nennt: zufällige Regeln, die die Produktion von Wissen strukturieren. Die Aufgabe des 
Archäologen besteht somit darin, diese Regeln zu identifizieren und abzugrenzen sowie zu 
analysieren, wie bestimmte Gruppen von Regeln verschiedene Diskurse und Wissenssysteme 
prägen. Mit diesem Verständnis von Wissen als diskontinuierliches Phänomenen bricht Foucault 
mit der Vorstellung des souveränen Subjekts als Quelle und Grundlage absoluten Wissens und 
sieht das Subjekt vielmehr selbst als Projektion des Diskurses. 
 
Dabei ist wichtig, dass dieses Verständnis von Diskurs als autonomem System traditionelle 
Vorstellungen von Wahrheit und ‚wahrem’ Wissen modifiziert. Foucault behauptet weder, es 
gebe keinen Unterschied zwischen Lüge und Wahrheit, noch, dass alles Wissen unwahr sei. 
Vielmehr befasst er sich damit, wie die Regeln des Diskurses Wahrheitseffekte innerhalb ihrer 
diskursiven Formation hervorbringen. Wahrheit ist nicht die Beziehung zwischen einer Aussage 
und einem materiellen Objekt, sondern selbst Teil der Diskursbedingungen. Dies impliziert auch, 
dass Foucaults Theorie des Wissens weder eine Theorie der Repräsentation noch der 
Fehlrepräsentation beinhaltet: Der Archäologe betrachtet den Diskurs als autonomes System 
ohne festes Korrelat in der materiellen Welt, anhand dessen sein Wahrheitsgehalt verifizierbar 
wäre. 
 
Als dritter Punkt sollte im Hinterkopf behalten werden, dass Foucault sein Konzept des Diskurses 
in der Archäologie des Wissens nicht mit seinem Konzept der Macht in Verbindung bringt. 
Tatsächlich wird das Konzept der Macht hier gar nicht thematisiert, und die Verbindungen 
zwischen Macht, Diskurs und Wissen werden erst in seinem späteren Werk hervorgehoben, 
insbesondere in Überwachen und Strafen. Das Konzept von Macht, das in Überwachen und 
Strafen entwickelt wird, lässt sich allerdings leicht mit Foucaults Konzeptualisierungen von 
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Diskurs und Macht aus der Archäologie des Wissens in Verbindung bringen. Foucaults 
Behauptung ist, dass Wissen und Macht keine getrennten Begriffe sind, sondern dass die 
Hervorbringung und Benennung von diskursiven Objekten selbst das Wissen in eine 
Machtposition gegenüber den Objekten versetzt: Der objektivierende Effekt des Wissens selbst 
begründet ein Machtverhältnis. Dies soll ausdrücklich nicht behaupten, dass Wissen stets durch 
Machtverhältnisse korrumpiert wird – eine solche Haltung würde suggerieren, dass 
Machtverhältnisse nur außerhalb und getrennt von Wissen existierten und zudem die 
Unterscheidung zwischen vermeintlich richtiger und falscher Repräsentation beförderten. Um zu 
unterstreichen, dass Macht und Wissen die gleiche objektivierende Grundstruktur teilen und in 
diesem Sinne flächengleich sind, verwendet Foucault für diese Struktur den Begriff 
‚Macht/Wissen‘. 
 
In seinem Werk Orientalismus analysiert Edward Said Repräsentationen des Orients und 
bezeichnet das System entsprechender textueller Repräsentationen im Foucaultschen Sinne als 
‚Diskurs’. Obgleich Said die objektivierende Macht des orientalistischen Diskurses bisweilen auf 
eine Weise beschreibt, die Analogien zu Foucaults Konzept von Macht/Wissen aufweist, bemüht 
sich Said um eine Beibehaltung der Unterscheidung zwischen ‚richtiger’ und ‚falscher’ 
Repräsentation und versteht also Macht und Wissen als potentiell voneinander getrennt. Dieser 
Widerspruch verweist auf die Tatsache, dass Orientalismus zwei konzeptuelle Architekturen 
beherbergt: aus dem gleichen Repertoire an Bezeichnenden konstruiert die Studie zwei völlig 
verschiedene und nicht kompatible Konstellationen von Konzepten. 
 
Die erste aus dem Text abzuleitende Architektur versteht Macht und Wissen im Diskurs als 
flächengleich: Der orientalistische Diskurs ist eine objektivierende Form des Wissens, die das 
‚orientalische Subjekt’ als Objekt westlichen Wissens konstruiert. In diesem Sinne wird die 
Wissensbeziehung zu einer Machtbeziehung. 
 
Die zweite Architektur arbeitet ebenfalls mit den Konzepten des Diskurses, der Macht und des 
Wissens, jedoch in einer anderen Konstellation: Macht und Wissen werden als voneinander 
abgetrennt verstanden und Macht ist in der Lage, Wissen und dessen diskursive Artikulationen zu 
korrumpieren. Der orientalistische Diskurs ist somit als falsche Repräsentation des Orients zu 
verstehen: seine Darstellung speist sich aus dem westlichen Willen zur Macht über den Orient. 
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Der orientalistische Diskurs repräsentiert den Orient daher in einer Weise, die den Westen als 
überlegen erscheinen lässt und ihm so die Legitimation verschafft, den Orient zu kolonisieren. 
Der Diskurs ist in dieser Konzeptualisierung kein autonomes System mehr, sondern ein 
Machtinstrument. 
 
Im Zuge der von Said angestoßenen Transformation kommen zwei weitere Konzepte ins Spiel: 
Identität und Autorität. Während Foucaults Interesse rein dem Wissen als spezifischer Subjekt-
Objekt-Beziehung und der Autonomie des Diskurses galt, konzentriert sich Said auf den Diskurs 
als Fehlrepräsentation. Diese Herangehensweise impliziert die Frage nach Identität eher als die 
nach dem Wissen per se: Said versteht den orientalistischen Diskurs als Strategie, die Identität 
des orientalischen Subjekts festzulegen, und den Westen als im Vergleich dazu überlegen 
darzustellen. Das Machtverhältnis innerhalb dieser Konstellation ist also nicht das Ergebnis einer 
Objektivierung, sondern der Erzeugung von Identitäten, die dem Westen Autorität verleiht. 
Macht bezeichnet hier demnach nicht mehr das Verhältnis zu einem diskursiven Objekt, sondern 
ein Autoritätsverhältnis. 
 
Offensichtlich gibt es also grundlegende Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Rekonstruktionen 
von Saids Argumenten, und doch kommen beide in Orientalismus zum Einsatz. In Abhängigkeit 
davon, ob er versucht, die Strategien der Machtausübung über orientalische Subjekte 
darzustellen oder aber das Narrativ, das diese Unterdrückung rechtfertigt, spricht Said vom 
Diskurs entweder als einem autonomen System oder aber als Fehlrepräsentation, die die 
Autorität des Westens mittels der Erzeugung von Identitäten befördert. 
 
Eine zweite Aneignung findet sich im Werk Homi Bhabhas und weist deutliche Bezüge zu Saids 
Arbeit auf. In „The Other Question“ und „Of Mimicry and Man“ kehrt Bhabha zu Foucaults 
Verständnis vom Diskurs als autonomem System zurück und vermeidet so die Widersprüche, die 
Saids Arbeiten innewohnen. Jedoch sind seine Studien denen Saids insofern durchaus ähnlich, als 
dass beide Wissenschaftler sich keineswegs wie Foucault auf die Analyse von Wissen 
beschränken, sondern das Diskurskonzept auf Strukturen von Identität und Subjektivität 
anwenden. Da Subjektivität durch den frühen Foucault lediglich als diskursiver Effekt 
wahrgenommen wurde und nicht als Faktor der Beziehungen zwischen Subjekten, ergänzt 
Bhabha die Theorien Foucaults mit denen Lacans, um diese vermeintliche Lücke zu schließen, 
xii 
 
wobei das Konzept des Subjekts als Bindeglied zwischen beiden Theorien fungiert. Dies wiederum 
führt dazu, dass Bhabha Lacans universales Subjekt als Subjekt des Diskurses reproduziert und 
dabei Differenzen in Bezug auf Geschlecht, Rasse54 und soziale Herkunft aus dem Blick verliert. 
 
Somit dekontextualisieren sowohl Said als auch Bhabha das Foucaultsche Diskurskonzept: 
Während Foucault es definierte, um Wissensstrukturen zu untersuchen, wenden die beiden 
späteren Wissenschaftler es auf Fragen der Identitätsbildung und der intersubjektiven 
Beziehungen an. Außerdem verzahnen sie das Konzept des Diskurses mit dem der Macht: Bei 
Said wird Macht bisweilen als Synonym für Autorität verwendet; bei Bhabha hingegen erscheint 
Macht als psychosoziales Phänomen. Wie im Folgenden gezeigt wird, unterscheiden sich beide 
Konzeptualisierungen deutlich vom Begriff der Macht, wie Foucault ihn entwickelt hatte. 
Dennoch prägen diese psychosozialen Interpretationen Foucaults weiterhin grundlegend den 
Fokus auch jener postkolonialen Forschung, die sich ausdrücklich auf das Foucaultsche Konzept 
von Macht beruft. 
 
4. Disziplin 
 
Nachdem in Kapitel 3 festgestellt wurde, dass Said und Bhabha den Arbeiten Foucaults ihre 
eigenen Konzepte von Macht aufgepropft haben, wendet sich Kapitel 4 zu Beginn Foucaults 
eigenem Machtkonzept zu und legt dabei besonderes Augenmerk auf den Begriff der Disziplin. 
Eine weitere Sektion beschreibt, inwiefern Timothy Mitchells Colonising Egypt (1991) Foucaults 
Arbeiten zur Disziplin aufgreift, anwendet und transformiert. Darüber hinaus wird herausgestellt, 
wie Mitchell schließlich zu einem Autoritätsbegriff gelangt, der dem von Said in Orientalismus 
stark ähnelt. Schließlich betrachtet das Kapitel in einer Analyse von Martha Kaplans „Panopticon 
in Poona“ (1995) jene Aspekte des Foucaultschen Disziplinbegriffs, die ihn aus einer 
postkolonialen Perspektive problematisch erscheinen lassen: seine Tendenz zum Eurozentrismus 
und sein Ausschluss von Phänomenen des Widerstands. 
 
                                                 
54
 Hier ist anzumerken, dass ‚Rasse’ ein in den deutschen Geisteswissenschaften wenig verwendeter, da 
historisch stigmatisierter Begriff ist. Er bezeichnet hier in Anlehnung an das Konzept race eine konstruierte 
Differenzkategorie und nicht die Annahme einer biologischen Gegebenheit. Um möglichst nah am 
Sprachgebrauch in Foucaults Texten zu bleiben, wurde der Begriff nicht durch das zeitgenössische Konzept 
der Ethnizität ersetzt. 
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Foucault beschrieb sein Konzept der Disziplin erstmals in Überwachen und Strafen (1975), jener 
Arbeit, die innerhalb seines Werks den Übergang vom archäologischen zum genealogischen 
Erkenntnisinteresse markiert. In seinen genealogischen Arbeiten hat das Konzept der Macht das 
des Diskurses als zentrales Thema abgelöst: So, wie er das Subjekt als Resultat des Diskurses 
anstatt als seinen Urheber beschrieben hat, werden Subjekte und Objekte nun zum Ergebnis von 
Disziplinen55 erklärt. Statt von einem souveränen Subjekt, das Macht besitzt, geht Foucault von 
einem Machtbegriff aus, der vom Subjekt abgekoppelt ist und Macht als relational, dezentral, 
multidirektional und strategisch versteht. Disziplinen bilden dann eine Form der Machtausübung, 
die den Menschen zum Objekt macht: Subjekte werden zu Objekten der Überwachung, des 
Wissens, der Manipulation, der Ertüchtigung, der Strafe etc. Es existiert kein Subjekt, das die 
Ausbreitung und Anwendung objektivierender Strategien kontrollieren könnte, und dennoch 
beschreibt Foucault eine klare diachrone Entwicklung hin zu einem Punkt, an dem solche 
Objektivierungsstrategien gesellschaftlich allgegenwärtig geworden sind. 
 
Timothy Mitchells Colonising Egypt bezieht sich auf dieses Konzept der Disziplin, um die 
Kolonisation Ägyptens als Folge der Ausbreitung der Moderne und der disziplinierenden 
Technologien zu deuten, die seiner Ansicht nach den Kern des Konzepts der Moderne bilden. In 
diesem Sinne ähnelt Mitchells Verständnis von Macht zumindest der Struktur nach jenem von 
Foucault: beide verorten Macht eher in einem Geflecht von Machtstrukturen als in der konkreten 
Machtausübung eines Souveräns, eines souveränen Staates oder seiner Streitmacht. Letztendlich 
ordnet Mitchell dieses Konzept der Disziplin allerdings dem Konzept der Autorität unter, indem 
er argumentiert, dass disziplinierende Macht letztlich den modernen Dualismus von Subjekten 
und Objekten hervorbringt, wobei Autorität in der Sphäre des Subjektiven angesiedelt ist. Diese 
Auffassung von Autorität unterscheidet sich zwar deutlich von der Saids, aber auch hier fällt die 
Tendenz auf, vor allem die Umstände in den Blick zu nehmen, die koloniale Handlungen 
legitimieren, und weniger die eigentlichen Techniken der Unterdrückung. 
 
In Martha Kaplans Essay “Panopticon in Poona” findet eine zweite Aneignung des Konzepts der 
Disziplin statt. Obgleich Kaplan sich auf das Konzept bezieht, um Strategien der Machtausübung 
im kolonialen Indien zu untersuchen, zieht sie letztendlich in Zweifel, ob das Konzept der Disziplin 
                                                 
55
 Unter ‚Disziplinen’ wird hier nicht der Plural des abstrakten Konzepts der Disziplin verstanden, sondern 
werden Instrumente und Techniken der disziplinierenden Machtausübung zusammengefasst. 
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überhaupt geeignet ist, Machtstrukturen in kolonialen Kontexten adäquat zu beschreiben, da 
Foucaults Konzeptualisierung durch und durch eurozentrisch geprägt sei. Dabei übersieht sie 
allerdings ein ebenso bedenkliches Problem: Weder Überwachen und Strafen noch Colonising 
Egypt oder ihrem eigenen Beitrag “Panopticon in Poona” gelingt es, dem Widerstand gegenüber 
den kolonialen Disziplinen gerecht zu werden. Stattdessen kritisiert Kaplan das Konzept 
disziplinierender Macht als europäisches Phänomen und führt aus, eine oberflächliche binäre 
Unterscheidung zwischen disziplinierenden und nicht-disziplinierenden Gesellschaften sei ein 
Versuch, eine Idee von Europa zu profilieren. Nach der Zusammenführung der Überlegungen zu 
Kaplans Behauptung und Mitchells Arbeiten endet dieser Abschnitt mit der Schlussfolgerung, 
dass Überwachen und Strafen insofern als eurozentrisch anzusehen ist, als dass es eine in sich 
geschlossene Geschichte Europas entwirft – ein Problem, dem bereits in Colonising Egypt 
abgeholfen wurde. Die mangelhafte Beschäftigung mit anderen Grundprinzipien der Macht – 
auch mit potenziell widerständigen – erscheint hier als dringlicheres Anliegen, da das Konzept 
der Disziplin als monolithische Darstellungsform moderner kolonialer Macht in Erscheinung tritt. 
 
5. Biomacht 
 
Während die vorhergehenden Kapitel festgestellt haben, dass Saids Auffassung von Autorität 
postkoloniale Transformationen eher von Foucaults Konzept der Macht entfernt, befasst sich 
dieses Kapitel mit der Unterscheidung zwischen Macht als Autorität und Macht als Handlung. 
Zunächst wird dargelegt, in welchem Umfang Biomacht als Konzept von Foucault verwendet 
wurde, um bestimmte Handlungsformen und Techniken zu beschreiben, um dann in einem 
zweiten Abschnitt der Annahme nachzugehen, dass Ann Laura Stolers Text Race and the 
Education of Desire (1995) über eine Saidsche Interpretation von Foucaults Werk nicht 
hinausgeht. Im dritten Teil legt eine Analyse von Achille Mbembes „Necropolitics“ (2003) dar, 
inwiefern eine Transformation des Konzepts der Biopolitik koloniale Wirkprinzipien der Macht 
und insbesondere Strategien des Bevölkerungsmanagements, die in Stolers Darstellung von 
Autorität im Dunkeln bleiben, beschreibbar machen kann. 
 
Foucault entwickelte sein Konzept der Biomacht in seiner Geschichte der Sexualität (1976) und 
einer 1975-76 gehaltenen Vorlesungsreihe, die später unter dem Titel In Verteidigung der 
Gesellschaft (1996) veröffentlicht wurde. In beiden Kontexten verwendete er den Begriff mit 
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Bezug auf das Management und die Optimierung der Bevölkerung durch eine Reihe von 
Techniken, die beispielsweise Hygienekampagnen, Krankenversicherung, Stadtentwicklung, 
Geburtenkontrolle und andere Maßnahmen zur Bevölkerungsentwicklung umfassen. Diese 
Techniken können in zwei Kategorien unterteilt werden: solche, die ‚normale’ Werte und 
Normen definieren und jene, die tatsächliche Gegebenheiten an die zuvor bestimmten 
Normwerte annähern sollen bzw. Teile der Gesellschaft als abweichend pathologisieren. An 
dieser Stelle kommt das Konzept der Rasse ins Spiel: für Foucault ist der Begriff der Rasse ein 
Mittel, ein biopolitisches Kontinuum künstlich zu unterteilen und Lebensformen danach zu 
markieren, inwiefern sie sich der Norm annähern können. Dieser Abschnitt argumentiert, dass 
diese Macht der Normalisierung eher eine Verteilung rund um eine Normvorstellung zur Folge 
hat, als eine binäre Unterscheidung zwischen Normalität und dem Abnormen zu begünstigen. 
Das vorrangige Anliegen der Biomacht ist daher nicht, die Identität von Subjekten 
festzuschreiben, sondern sie durch Bevölkerungsmanagement der Norm anzunähern. Kurz 
gesagt: Macht ist Handlung. 
 
Stoler verwendet dieses Konzept allerdings, um zu zeigen, inwiefern koloniale Autorität auf 
Voraussetzungen sexueller und rassischer Identität beruht. Dabei ist ihr konzeptuelles 
Rahmenwerk praktisch identisch mit dem von Said: Beide konzentrieren sich auf die Rolle, die 
Prozesse der Identitätsbildung für die Herausbildung kolonialer Autorität spielen. Sowohl die von 
Foucault analysierten Handlungen und Techniken, als auch das tatsächliche Management der 
kolonialen Bevölkerung bleiben außen vor. Erneut hat dies zur Folge, dass der Fokus auf der 
Legitimation des Kolonialismus liegt, statt seine Funktionsweisen in den Blick zu nehmen. 
 
Mbembes Text stellt eine Unterbrechung dieser Tendenz dar: Sein Konzept der ‚Nekropolitik’ 
stellt die Gewaltsamkeit des kolonialen Bevölkerungsmanagements in den Vordergrund. Für 
Mbembe besteht die Strategie des modernen Kolonialismus eher in der Zerstörung der 
Bevölkerung als im Schutz ihrer Gesundheit. Dieses zerstörerische Wirkprinzip leitet er aus einer 
Analyse der verschiedenen Waffen- und Tötungstechnologien der kolonialen Besatzung ab und 
betrachtet so die Technologien der Macht und nicht lediglich ihre Legitimation. Jedoch 
konstruiert Mbembe aus der Verschmelzung von Foucault und Agambens Konzept der Biopolitik 
eine binäre Opposition von kreatürlichem und politischem Leben, die zu einer entsprechenden 
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Trennung von Biopolitik und ‚Nekropolitik’ führt. In diesem Sinne wird er dem Potential der 
Interaktion und des Wettbewerbs verschiedener Machtprinzipien nicht gerecht.  
 
6. Gouvernementalität 
 
Ebendieser potenzielle Wettbewerb zwischen verschiedenen Wirkprinzipien der Macht ist das 
zentrale Thema dieses letzten Kapitels. Nach der Diskussion der Vorlesungen, in denen Foucault 
das Konzept der Gouvernementalität entwickelt, arbeitet dieses Kapitel den Kontrast zwischen 
David Scotts „Colonial Governmentality“ (1995) und James Duncans In the Shadows of the Tropics 
(2007) heraus. Während ersterer sich ausschließlich auf die gouvernementale Macht 
konzentriert, hebt Duncan hervor, dass koloniale Macht sich nicht allein auf Gouvernementalität 
reduzieren lässt, sondern im Zusammenspiel unterschiedlicher und oft widersprüchlicher 
Strategien besteht. 
 
Hauptmerkmal von Foucaults Konzept der Gouvernementalität ist die Aufhebung des 
traditionellen Gegensatzes von Macht und Freiheit. Foucault versteht Gouvernementalität als 
Strategie des Managements der Bevölkerung, die darauf abzielt, ihren Subjekten die 
Verwirklichung ihres Potentials zu ermöglichen. Damit begreift er Macht als die Erzeugung eines 
potentiellen Handlungsraums statt als Bestrebung, Menschen zu etwas zu zwingen, das sie nicht 
wollen. Diese gouvernementale Strategie erfordert das Schaffen von gesetzlichen, politischen, 
medizinischen und ökonomischen Bedingungen, die es den Subjekten ermöglichen, sich für die 
Interessen der Gesellschaft einzusetzen, indem sie zugleich ihre eigenen verfolgen. In der Praxis 
involviert dies die Etablierung einer freien Marktwirtschaft, eines biopolitischen Systems, das die 
Menschen ermuntert, für das eigene Wohlergehen Sorge zu tragen, und eine demokratische 
Gesellschaft freier und gleicher Subjekte. Foucault diskutiert den Aufstieg dieses Grundprinzips 
innerhalb Europas, lässt aber dabei unbeantwortet, ob diese gouvernementale Strategie ein 
Alleinstellungsmerkmal europäischer Gesellschaften sei. 
 
In „Colonial Governmentality“ bejaht Scott diese Frage: Das Bemühen der kolonialen sei 
gewesen, den Handlungsspielraum der kolonialen Subjekte zu strukturieren. Durch eine Analyse 
der juristischen, ökonomischen und medizinischen Systeme, die während der Kolonialherrschaft 
in Ceylon des 19. Jahrhunderts implementiert wurden, zeigt Scott, dass koloniale Macht als 
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Projekt, als Grundprinzip und als Handlung verstanden werden kann. Bemerkenswert ist, dass 
Scott diese Herangehensweise als Intervention in ein Feld formuliert, das geradezu besessen 
davon war, das ‚Gesetz der Differenz’ herauszustellen: jene Idee, dass Kolonialherrschaft als 
binäre Opposition von Eigenem und Fremdem zu begreifen sei; eine Auffassung, die, wie die 
vorangegangenen Kapitel gezeigt haben, bis auf Saids Orientalismus zurückgeht. In diesem Sinne 
bestätigt Scotts Auffassung von Macht als Projekt die bereits zuvor beschriebene Diskrepanz 
zwischen einem Verständnis von Macht als Handlung und Macht als Autorität. 
 
Scotts deutliche Unterscheidung zwischen Souveränität und Gouvernementalität – wobei letztere 
die historische Nachfolgerin der erstgenannten ist – bringt allerdings einige Probleme mit sich. 
Zum einen führt sein Fokus auf die Gouvernementalität dazu, dass er außer Acht lässt, inwiefern 
eine gouvernementale Strategie, die auf die Förderung gesamtgesellschaftlicher Interessen aus 
war, mit der Strategie von Plantagenbesitzern in Ceylon im Widerstreit stand, die lediglich ihre 
eigenen Interessen verteidigten und als lokale Souveräne agierten. Zum anderen übersieht Scott, 
in welchem Ausmaß die lokale Bevölkerung und die Gegebenheiten in Ceylon sich der 
Implementierung gouvernementaler Projekte widersetzten. Darüber hinaus mag die Tatsache, 
dass er das ‚Gesetz der Differenz’ nicht zentral in den Blick nimmt, den Fokus auf die Aktivitäten 
und Projekte kolonialer Herrschaft lenken; doch werden dadurch auch die zerstörerischen 
Tendenzen der Kolonialherrschaft außer Acht gelassen. 
 
All diese Themen werden in der konzeptuellen Architektur von Duncans In the Shadows of the 
Tropics verhandelt. Indem er das Konzept der Gouvernementalität mit denen der Souveränität, 
der Disziplin und der Biomacht verbindet, zeigt Duncans Analyse Ceylons im 19. Jahrhundert, wie 
ein Gesetz der Differenz auch innerhalb eines gouvernementalen Regimes, nämlich im Dienste 
lokaler Souveräne, in Kraft blieb. Sie eröffnet zugleich die Möglichkeit, Widerstand im Sinne 
konkurrierender Grundprinzipien der Macht und konkurrierender Projekte und Handlungen zu 
begreifen statt lediglich als gegen die koloniale Autorität gerichtete Stimmen. Schließlich 
verbindet Duncan die Konzepte von Gouvernementalität und Autorität – jedoch ohne Strategien 
von Macht und Autorität zu vermischen – in seiner Schlussfolgerung, dass Kolonialherrschaft 
innerhalb eines gouvernementalen Regimes auf der Fähigkeit des Subjekts fußte, sich selbst in 
einer Weise zu führen und zu kontrollieren, die zugleich den eigenen wie 
gesamtgesellschaftlichen Interessen diente. In diesem Sinne gelingt es Duncan, die von Said in 
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Orientalismus begründete konzeptuelle Architektur und Foucaults Konzept der Macht als 
Handlung mit ihr eigenem Wirkprinzip gewinnbringend zusammenzudenken. 
 
7. Schlussfolgerungen 
 
Dieses abschließende Kapitel folgert auf der Basis der zuvor analysierten Transformationen, dass 
Saids Werk eine äußerst einflussreiche Interpretation von Foucaults Oeuvre begründet hat, 
indem es die Gewichtung von Wissen und Macht hin zu Identität und Autorität verschob. Der 
Einfluss von Orientalismus ist in den Arbeiten von Bhabha, Mitchell, Kaplan und Stoler klar 
herausgestellt worden. In jedem dieser Texte werden Foucaultsche Konzepte behelfsweise zur 
Beschreibung und Diskussion von Begriffen von Identität und Autorität herangezogen, obgleich 
Foucault selbst diese Konzepte nie benutzt hat. Diese Fokussierung auf koloniale Autorität – und 
Identität insofern, als dass sie Autorität hervorbringt – hat dazu geführt, dass die postcolonial 
studies die Diskurse und Praktiken untersucht haben, die den Kolonialismus legitimieren, und die 
Handlungen, Strategien und Projekte kolonialer Macht außer Acht gelassen haben. Die Arbeiten 
von Wissenschaftlern wie Mbembe und Scott können jedoch als Reaktion auf diesen 
ausschließlichen Fokus auf Identität und Autorität verstanden werden. Sowohl Mbembe als auch 
Scott untersuchen die Techniken und Wirkprinzipien, die die koloniale Macht konstituieren. Wie 
die Analysen von Foucaults Texten ausführlich verdeutlicht haben, kommt diese zweite 
Herangehensweise Foucaults eigener Kritik der Macht als nicht-subjektives, relationales und 
strategisches Geflecht von Techniken und Projekten wesentlich näher. 
 
Wenn also von zwei Gruppen innerhalb der postkolonialen Rezeption Foucaults ausgegangen 
wird, ist die Trennung zwischen den beiden in diesem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Macht als 
Autorität und Macht als Handlung zu verorten. Es ist erstaunlich, dass dieser Bruch für so lange 
Zeit nicht anerkannt oder fehlinterpretiert worden ist. Seine Signifikanz kann jedenfalls kaum zu 
hoch bewertet werden: Diese beiden Konzeptualisierungen kolonialer Macht führen zu 
unterschiedlichen Grundverständnissen von Macht, verschiedenen Instrumenten der 
Machtausübung, und verschiedenen Formen des Widerstands ihr gegenüber. 
 
Im Anschluss an eine ausführliche Kontrastierung beider Positionen befasst sich dieses Kapitel 
mit der Geschichte der Verbreitung und Übersetzung von Foucaults Werk, um eine Erklärung 
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dafür zu finden, warum diese Unterscheidung so lange nicht vorgenommen worden ist. Die 
kürzlich erschienene Gesamtausgabe von Foucaults jährlichen Vorlesungen am Collège de France 
hat eine (Re-)Kontextualisierung seiner Monografien ermöglicht. So überrascht es nicht, dass die 
jüngsten postkolonialen Texte im Korpus der vorliegenden Arbeit endlich über die Saidsche 
Interpretation von Foucaults Werk hinausweisen.  
 
Diese Schlussfolgerung schmälert keineswegs den Wert des Erkenntnisgewinns jener 
postkolonialen Arbeiten, die auf Saids konzeptueller Architektur basieren: Die grundlegende 
Annahme ist, dass die beiden erarbeiteten Konzeptualisierungen von Macht tatsächlich zwei 
unterschiedliche Phänomene untersuchen, nämlich die Projekte – im Sinne von 
zweckgebundenen Unternehmungen – der kolonialen Macht einerseits und andererseits der 
Autorität, die diese legitimiert. Dieses wird vor allem in Duncans In the Shadows of the Tropics 
ersichtlich, in dem der Autor sowohl die Narrative und Praktiken untersucht, die koloniale 
Autorität produzieren, als auch die Techniken und Strategien in den Blick nimmt, die eine 
koloniale Gesellschaft hervorbringen. 
 
Das eigentliche Problem liegt daher nicht darin, dass postkoloniale Forscher_innen Foucaultsche 
Konzepte zu einem anderen als zu jenem von Foucault beabsichtigten Zweck angewendet haben, 
sondern vielmehr darin, dass sie lange Zeit die Anliegen außer Acht gelassen haben, auf die 
Foucault ursprünglich hinweisen wollte: die verschiedenen Wirkprinzipien, Strategien und 
Instrumente der Macht. Indem sie ihre kritischen Arbeiten zum Konzept der Autorität mit Hilfe 
der Foucaultschen Terminologie formulierten, ersetzten postkoloniale Denker_innen in der 
Tradition der Saidschen Interpretation schlussendlich die Erforschung kolonialer Macht als 
Handlung mit der Kritik kolonialer Autorität – mit dem Ergebnis, dass die postcolonial studies erst 
kürzlich damit begonnen haben, die bruchstückhafte Geschichte kolonialer Unternehmungen und 
die widerstreitenden Interessen und Strategien, die koloniale Gesellschaften hervorgebracht 
haben, in den Blick zu nehmen. 
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